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The thesis is an investigation into the proper way a liberal education system should 
respond to the diversity of opinions that are held in modern societies. The work 
primarily engages with the philosophy of John Rawls as laid out in his book Political 
Liberalism. The first section of the thesis defends Rawls' account from its most 
prominent critics. In particular, I defend Rawls’ response to pluralism. Following 
this, I analyse the application of political liberalism to education. This reveals a 
serious problem with Rawls' account: while Rawls responds fairly to pluralism in 
the case of adults, his model fails to consider the implications of education for 
children themselves. I develop this objection into an internal problem for Rawls’ 
theory by showing that children must be counted as full members of the 
community, which means they cannot be ignored when considering issues of 
legitimacy. I show that political liberalism, as defended by Rawls, is blind to the 
effects of different schemes of education on the welfare of children.  In light of this, 
I show that children could reasonably reject Rawls' account; a conclusion which 
renders Rawls’ model illegitimate. 
The thesis thus shows that political liberalism fails to deal adequately with the case 
of education. Further, this case study reveals internal problems with the theory 
that go beyond the particular example of education.  After highlighting this 
problem, I propose a modification to Rawls' account which can both better respond 
to the case of education and remain faithful to the core goals of political liberalism. 
My account is less deferential to parents' wishes than is Rawls’ model, but it does 
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The mission statement of the English national curriculum begins with the assertion 
that ‘Education influences and reflects the values of society, and the kind of 
society we want to be. It is important, therefore, to recognise a broad set of 
common purposes, values and aims that underpin the school curriculum and the 
work of schools.’(Qualifications and curriculum authority: 2009).  To meet this 
requirement the English education system aims to ‘promote the, spiritual, moral, 
cultural, mental and physical development of learners within society’ and to 
‘prepare learners for the opportunities responsibilities and experiences of adult 
life’ (ibid). 
Stated in these broad terms, this understanding of the role and purpose of 
education seems to be beyond reproach.  Yet contained within these seemingly 
innocuous statements is a problem of the utmost importance for any theorist 
concerned with education. The writers of the English curriculum are absolutely 
right when they note that education is both a product of what society is and an 
influence on what it is to become.   However, taking seriously the kind of society 
we live in today might undermine the ability to pursue those goals laid out in the 
Act. Namely, creating a national curriculum, based on shared values, designed to 
promote the welfare of children.  
The most relevant feature of modern liberal societies for political theorising is that 
they are characterised by permanent, deep and often hostile disagreement. 
Citizens differ substantially on a whole range of matters ranging from political 
outlook, to lifestyle, to religious conviction.  Hard-line ‘new wave’ atheists co-exist 
with fundamentalist followers of many hundreds of different faiths; libertine free 
spirits live in the same neighbourhoods as prudish puritans.   
Education in liberal democracies reflects this pluralism through the provision of a 
diverse range of different types of schools and other educational institutions.  In 
both the US and the UK, faith based groups run significant numbers of schools.  
They are joined by a wide variety of independent organisations, often with unique 
missions targeting specific sections of society. Both countries offer publicly funded 
6 
 
schools which are free at the point of use but also have numerous different private 
schools funded directly by parents.  Home schooling is a significant phenomenon 
in many countries, which implies that for these countries there is a significant 
minority of children who never attend school at all.  The result of this is that in 
liberal democracies the content of what is taught at school, as well as the 
environment in which children learn differs enormously for children of different 
backgrounds. 
As well as being shaped by the diversity in society, educational institutions are a 
significant influence on the nature of pluralistic societies.  Education is one of the 
principal ways in which citizens first come to experience our diverse society. It 
therefore plays an important role in the development of their views on the many 
questions which divide the community.  Given this central importance it should be 
of no surprise that many different groups within society seek to influence the 
nature of educational institutions. A good example is offered by Charles Taylor 
who draws attention to the Quebecois demand for ‘la surivavance’ (Taylor, 58-59: 
1992). This group advocates compulsory teaching of the French language to 
children born in the province.  In this way, one aspect of pluralism in Canada, the 
distinction between Anglophonic and Francophone communities, is not only 
reflected in education but is actively maintained by it. A consideration of 
education thus shows that ‘the fact of pluralism’ is not simply one to be dealt with 
or responded to, but rather one whose precise character or nature is the result of 
how we choose to design our common institutions and the principles by which 
they are governed.  
While the appreciation of education’s relevance to wider society is important, it is 
also the source of the difficulty in determining the aims of education, as stated at 
the outset. Recognising the importance of pluralism complicates the aims of 
schools as laid out in the Education Act.  In a society in which there is no 
consensus on matters of the good it is difficult to determine what is in the spiritual 
or moral best interests of children.  For some citizens, children’s spiritual interests 
are furthered by engendering in them a respect for all faiths and an appreciation 
of the common ground between them.  For others, such an education would be 
7 
 
offensive, particularly to those who demand the right to educate their children in 
the tenets of only one faith.  Contrasted to both of these cases are some atheists 
who might believe that educating children in any religious matters at all is 
abhorrent.  For instance, in his recent popular work The God Delusion, Richard 
Dawkins describes some, rather extreme, cases of teaching religion to children as 
tantamount to child abuse (Dawkins, 2007: 318).  
Likewise, while the national curriculum aims at teaching children their civic 
responsibilities, there is little agreement in society as to what the content of such 
civic education should be.  The national curriculum lists a responsibility to respect 
the environment and the interests of future generations.  Even these broad goals 
will be subject to objections from some sections of society, who might feel that 
the natural world can be used in whatever manner humankind sees fit. This 
difficulty is exacerbated when one attempts to consider the practical questions of 
how best children should pursue these goals.  So called ‘deep greens’ believe that 
we can only respect the environment by living a radically more ascetic and locally 
focussed life than we do at present, for others we respect the environment best 
by taking account of carbon emissions in our market purchases, whilst some 
citizens deny the existence of global warming entirely.  Advancing even this 
relatively modest set of civic aims will thus require taking a position in ongoing 
discussions about climate change and the role of manmade pollution.  
The interaction of the goals of education with the fact of pluralism offers up two 
distinct challenges for both policy makers, concerned with these issues, and 
political philosophers. The first is that the values and beliefs inculcated through 
education might reflect just one of the many different views held in society.  
Moreover, this would most likely be the views of those who are politically and 
culturally dominant.  A common education policy thus risks becoming a vehicle for 
the illegitimate imposition of the views of one group within a society onto the 
society as a whole.  The other danger is essentially the reverse: it is that in trying 
to avoid taking a stand on any of the contested issues in a pluralistic society, 
education policy will become vacuous and ineffective. The challenge for 
philosophers is thus to show how a meaningful set of education policies can be 
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justified while taking seriously the reality of pluralism and the claims of all groups 
in society. 
Avoiding both these possible problems has proven extremely difficult for liberal 
theorists. Indeed, I will argue that each of the leading contemporary accounts is 
undermined by one of these two issues.  So called ‘perfectionist’ responses, which 
aim to use education to promote one conception of the ‘good life’ fall foul of the 
first difficulty.  Their strategy privileges one set of answers to the questions that 
divide society, and thus illegitimately foists these views upon other citizens, who 
may quite reasonably dissent.  Given the force of this objection, and the fact that 
it results from basic features of the perfectionist view, I will reject this strategy as 
a means of confronting the issues of education in the context of pluralism. 
Instead, I will focus on the strategy of so called political liberals, who respond to 
pluralism within the framework developed by John Rawls. I will argue that this 
framework represents the most appropriate response to the wider circumstances 
of pluralism.  However, I will also attempt to show that political liberalism1, as 
defended by Rawls, faces a serious problem when we consider the case study of 
education.  This problem is the second one that I alluded to above, namely, that by 
taking seriously the fact of reasonable pluralism political liberalism is committed to 
an education the content of which will be empty and ineffectual.  
In response to these worries, my thesis is an attempt to show how a defensible 
theory of the role and goals of education can be incorporated into the political 
liberal framework. In doing this, the thesis also demonstrates a failing in the 
existing understanding of political liberalism and provides an account of how to 
rectify the position, and thus a better understanding of this popular and important 
theory of contemporary liberal politics. 
To adumbrate the problem for political liberalism, I show that no sensible schema 
of education can ignore the welfare of children. The consequence of this is that 
political liberalism must take a position on contested questions of both human 
                                                          
1
 The term political liberalism refers to both the 1993 text by John Rawls as well as the theoretical position which was 
developed following its publication. In this thesis, the italicised Political Liberalism will refer to the text itself, whereas 
‘political liberalism’ refers to the wider position. 
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good and our place in the world.  I argue that this need not undermine the 
commitment to neutrality which defines this approach.  Suitably understood, the 
commitment to liberal neutrality is compatible with two broad aims of education.  
The first is to aim to ensure children hold a plausible comprehensive view of the 
world and their place in it. The second is to give children skills that will enable 
them to succeed in pursuing their plan of life, a plan which will be informed by 
their comprehensive doctrine. 
The thesis is thus relevant both to the specifics of the education debate and to 
debates concerning pluralism more generally. For educational theorists, the thesis 
covers how pluralism might present a problem to their theories, shows why 
several common strategies out of this problem will fail, and then offers a different 
solution.  My own account of education will justify many of the policies advocated 
by other leading education theorists, such as Harry Brighouse, Adam Swift and 
Eamonn Callan. This includes policies such as increasing the amount of time 
children spend learning about political and moral problems, and exclusively 
teaching scientific theories such as evolution rather than religiously motivated 
alternatives. More broadly, the thesis is a defence of the notion that all children 
should have to go to school and that at school they must learn about views of the 
world which are not shared by their parents or community. While I do not delve 
specifically into the educational arrangements which might meet the criteria I lay 
out, the thesis is clearly relevant to the ongoing debates over cases such as Mozert 
vs Hawkins and Wisconsin vs Yoder. 
To theorists interested in wider debates about pluralism, I believe that the 
education case sheds light on important aspects of these questions which would 
otherwise go unnoticed. The case of education is unique in liberal society, since 
while we can assume adults already have a comprehensive view of some sort, 
children’s views are in the process of being formed.  Consideration of the case of 
education thus forces consideration of how the liberal state can legitimately affect 
the development of comprehensive views, and what obligations it may have to 
show views are developed in a certain way.  
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The conclusions that follow from a more detailed consideration of the case of 
education force significant changes in the way political liberalism is conceived and 
in the architecture of this theory. Two such changes will be especially significant. 
The first is that we must consider children to be citizens of society when 
considering issues of the justification of the use of state power. Children are 
directly affected, albeit in different ways, by our policy decisions and by the design 
of political institutions. Thus, counting children as citizens will have important 
ramifications for the practical implications of political liberal principles. 
 The second significant change advocated by the thesis is that political liberal 
institutions cannot hope to be justified in a way that is entirely freestanding from 
debates about the good.  This might seem to be a familiar critique in that a similar 
claim is made by theorists who argue that strict neutrality is impossible. However, 
unlike these critics, my argument is not that neutrality over questions of the good 
is impossible, but rather that it is undesirable. I argue that the goal of remaining 
freestanding leads inescapably to an education policy which fails to address 
children’s interests, and which is thereby open to a serious objection. In its place, I 
propose that the justification of institutions must be made compatible with the 
tenets of each comprehensive doctrine. In this way, citizens can accept liberal 
principles without abandoning the core commitments of their comprehensive 
doctrine.  This broader convergence between liberalism and the other views held 
in society is what made this approach an attractive theory to deal with the broader 
questions posed by pluralistic society. 
Chapter summary 
The argument of the thesis is structured into four sections. In section one, the first 
chapter reviews the existing literature that deals with what the content of a 
legitimate education system in a pluralistic liberal society.  I divide this body of 
work into two broad camps, those who favour using education to promote 
autonomy, and those who focus on the civic aims of education. ‘Education for 
autonomy’ covers theorists such as Harry Brighouse and Joel Feinberg.  While 
these theorists have very different proposals for education, they are linked by the 
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view that education ought to promote the development of the children in its care. 
Just as in the National Curriculum, this goal implies that the state must take a 
position on what is in children’s best interests, which has important connotations 
for the way a liberal society deals with pluralism. 
By contrast, the approach of ‘education for citizenship’ avoids the state taking a 
position on matters of the good.  This strategy derives from the account laid out 
by John Rawls in his Political Liberalism (Rawls, 1993). In education, the 
implications of political liberalism are fleshed out by theorists such as Stephen 
Macedo and Eamonn Callan. The review thus highlights the extent to which our 
response to practical questions of education is driven by deep theoretical issues 
relating to the proper justification and role of liberal principles.  
The second chapter considers the first of the two strategies I outlined in chapter 
one, which I term ‘education for autonomy’. It argues that this strategy is the 
educational implication of liberal perfectionism, a theory most notably developed 
by Joseph Raz. I show that Raz views pluralistic society in a very different way from 
Rawls. While Rawls conceptualises society in terms of the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, Raz relies on the theory of value pluralism. I assess the merits of this 
theory, and through a review of Raz’s arguments, I show that a reliance on value 
pluralism is not a useful way of characterising pluralism, especially in the religious 
case.  Following this, I show that the theory of value pluralism is also a 
fundamental premise in one of the leading accounts of education for autonomy, 
which is thus rejected on this basis. 
Following the rejection of education for autonomy, in the third chapter I consider 
the theory of ‘education for citizenship’. The chapter consists of a defence and 
clarification of political liberal principles. I first consider two different ways in 
which the fact of reasonable pluralism might lead to a defence of liberal neutrality. 
These are stability and epistemology. Both of these accounts are rejected. In their 
place, I argue that the best defence of political liberalism is explicitly moral. The 
need to make liberalism free standing in circumstances of pluralism derives from a 
view about the legitimate basis of political authority and the most appropriate 
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terms for debate between citizens of a democratic society. This line of defence has 
important implications for the rest of the project, since it defines the scope and 
structure of political liberal principles. 
The second section is entitled ‘Understanding Political liberalism in Education’. In 
this section I spell out the implications of political liberal principles for the case of 
education. This ongoing argument has two parts. In chapter four I show why under 
political liberal principles, parents2 will have a free hand in deciding the non-
political aspects of their child’s education.   They will thus be the primary influence 
on the development of their child’s comprehensive view. Significantly, this 
consequence does not depend on a view about parental rights, and is thus 
independent of recent discussions concerning the grounding of parent’s authority 
and the importance of the family.  At most, rejecting a strong conception of 
parental rights would simply imply some other adults would have to take the lead 
in shaping the development of the children.  Given the political liberal eschewal of 
any theory of the good, schools cannot promote any conception of non-political 
education. This view is the direct implication of key features of political liberalism, 
specifically the notion of legitimacy and the quest for stability for the right 
reasons. 
Given the arguments outlined in chapter four, it follows that the limits on parental 
choices are only that parents raise reasonable and fully co-operating citizens.  In 
chapter five, I explore the implications of these limits in light of claims made by 
Any Gutmann and Eamonn Callan who suggest that the requirements of 
reasonableness have strong non-political implications. Indeed, they go as far as to 
suggest this aspect of political liberalism implies the whole project will collapse 
into a species of comprehensive liberalism.  I reject this claim, and argue that by 
carefully considering the aims of political liberalism the project will in fact promote 
autonomy far less than these theorists believe.  The implications of the ongoing 
argument developed in chapters four and five is thus that parents have significant 
                                                          
2 I use the term parents throughout the thesis to mean the adults entrusted with their care. For various practical and 
philosophical reasons, discussed in chapter four, I believe this will usually be children’s biological progenitors. However, I do 
not assert that this is necessarily the case, or that biological parents have a deep moral right to raise their children. 
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authority in shaping their children’s non-political values, since the requirement of 
raising reasonable citizens is a relatively weak one. 
The third section of the thesis is entitled ‘Justice to Children’, and explores the 
ways in which children fit into liberal theories of justice. Chapter six explores the 
membership requirements of political liberalism.  I argue that we cannot plausibly 
exclude children from the category of citizens without undermining political 
liberalism’s commitment to the equal respect owed to all adult citizens.  There are 
no plausible grounds rooted in human development that would allow us to divide 
children from adults in the way required. This implies that just as the principle of 
legitimacy demands that the liberal state be able to justify its actions in reasonable 
terms to all adult citizens, it must be able to offer reasonable reasons defending its 
conduct towards child citizens as well.  
In chapter seven I explore the implications of the claim that children must be 
counted as full citizens by developing an account of the reasons we owe to 
children, and how they differ from those we owe to adults.  I begin by considering 
Matthew Clayton’s argument that owing children justification implies that we 
cannot teach them any non-political values.  I attempt to show that this position is 
untenable, since children will acquire a comprehensive view anyway. What 
matters is the content of this view, not only the intentions of parents or other 
adults. On my account the principle of legitimacy allows parents to teach children 
in the way they desire, with the proviso that these beliefs are both plausible and 
conducive to certain aspects of the child’s development. Even on this weaker 
interpretation, the political liberal model of education, as elucidated in section 
two, is shown to be illegitimate.  
The final section of the thesis is entitled ‘A Neutral Defence of a Liberal Education’. 
Here I aim to show that the most attractive elements of political liberalism, as laid 
out in the first section, can be made compatible with a scheme of education that is 
justifiable to those children on whom it will be coercively enforced.  The twin goals 
of education on my model are to ensure that children hold a plausible, coherent 
and comprehensive view of the world and human flourishing, and that they 
14 
 
possess a range of skills to pursue the requirements of this view in a successful 
way. The argument of this section has two parts. 
In chapter eight I show how liberal education can be legitimately designed to aid 
children in coming to hold a plausible and coherent comprehensive view. The best 
means of attaining this is by encouraging children to learn about a variety of 
different doctrines. While, in practice, this is a similar policy to those advanced by 
theorists such as Callan and Brighouse it is justified in a very different way, and, as 
such, can avoid the objections which I have levelled at these views.  
In chapter nine, I show how education can prepare children to flourish given the 
comprehensive view that eventually informs their lives.  I aim to map out a series 
of general skills, which I argue will be useful to children regardless of their 
comprehensive views. These skills are justified because they enable individuals to 
prosper in societies such as ours. 
In the concluding chapter, I review the account which results from the 
combination of the previous chapters.  I show that this account, despite its 
practical similarities to ‘education for autonomy’, is still faithful to the most 
attractive features of political liberalism. I also reflect on the lessons for political 





                                                    


























Chapter 1- The purposes of education 
Before developing my own account, it is useful to survey existing attempts to 
grapple with the problems of education in the circumstances of pluralism.  The 
purpose of the review is to introduce some influential arguments against which I 
will situate my own theory.  As well as outlining these existing arguments, the 
review divides accounts of education into two broad groups, ‘education for 
citizenship’ and ‘education for autonomy’.  Analysing the distinctions between 
these groups is the subject of the first substantive section of this thesis.  
Theorists who defend the strategy of ‘education for autonomy’ argue that the 
purpose of education ought to be to promote the ability of children to live 
autonomous and independent lives.  By contrast, those theorists who defend 
‘education for citizenship’ focus on the civic goals of education. Chiefly, this is to 
maintain a just and stable liberal order. On this account, education’s most 
important role is in ensuring everyone plays by the rules rather than fostering any 
one vision of how it is best for one to live. 
This divergence within the debate over education is linked to one of the most 
significant theoretical divides in contemporary liberal theory.  This is the 
distinction, made by John Rawls, between political and comprehensive varieties of 
liberalism.  Political Liberalism is defined by the thesis that the justification of 
liberal institutions, and perhaps of all policies of the liberal state,3 cannot rest 
upon the truth or falsity of any one contested doctrine. Instead, the justification 
for liberalism must be independent of such matters. Ronald Dwokin terms this the 
‘discontinuous’ strategy for justifying liberalism, which reflects the fact that the 
justification of liberal institutions is logically discrete from any substantive theory 
of ethics or morality (Dworkin, 1990: 16-22). 
As conceived by Rawls, the framework of political liberalism rules as illegitimate 
claims that the state should use civic education to further one, distinctly liberal, 
conception of the good life (Rawls, 1993: 199). Since the state cannot legitimately 
promote any one comprehensive view, it cannot attempt to shape children’s non-
                                                          
3
 See Quong (2004)  on the limits of public reason. 
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political values.  Instead, the focus of education is upon achieving a shared set of 
civic aims, and as such, the aim is to imbue a purely political set of values such as a 
commitment to toleration and diversity. This more limited aim is regarded as a 
permissible goal for public policy.  
Political liberals are contrasted with comprehensive liberals, for whom the 
justification for political institutions is interwoven with an account of interpersonal 
morality and a notion of the good life. This label captures a set of theories that is 
far broader than that demarcated by ‘political liberalism’. The category of 
‘comprehensive liberals’ includes theorists such as Immanuel Kant and John Stuart 
Mill as well as a wide range of contemporary theorists. In this thesis, the chief 
example of comprehensive liberalism is liberal perfectionism. This theory which 
conceives of the good life in terms of the value of autonomy and believes the role 
of the state should be to promote this value.  In the case of education, this 
position is thus encapsulated by two core claims. Firstly that promoting autonomy 
is directly beneficial to the children concerned, and secondly that this value is 
sufficient to justify a preferred curriculum and set of supporting institutions.   
Education for citizenship.  
Rawls-Political Liberalism 
Despite not being a work primarily concerned with education, the natural starting 
point for this review of the literature is Rawls’ Political Liberalism. This text 
provides the underpinning of most contemporary accounts of ‘education for 
citizenship’, and the work outlines core arguments for refraining from inculcating 
non-political values. For this thesis, the most significant such non-political value 
will be a robust notion of autonomy, Rawls argues that using education to advance 
a conception of autonomy or individuality goes beyond the legitimate use of state 
power (Rawls, 1993: 199). 
The impetus for Political Liberalism is a problem Rawls perceived with his earlier 
account of stability laid out in A Theory of Justice.  Precisely what this problem was 
is a live issue amongst Rawls’ interpreters, and will be dealt with in more detail in 
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chapter three. What is relevant here is that Rawls believed that there was a deep 
incompatibility between his earlier account of stability and the emergence of 
pluralistic society.  Since such pluralism is the natural result of free institutions, 
which are integral to his account of a just society, he thought this represented a 
serious tension between two central aspects of his theory. 
Political liberalism alters Rawls’ theory, known as ‘justice as fairness’, to take 
account of the fact of reasonable pluralism.  Reasonable pluralism is differentiated 
from simple pluralism by virtue of the fact that many of the various 
comprehensive conceptions found in society are held reasonably.  Our societies 
are therefore characterised by a plurality of co-existing reasonable views, although 
of course all societies will include some citizens whose views are unreasonable. 
For Raw,s reasonable pluralism results from a collection of factors known as the 
‘burdens of judgment’.  The burdens include the fact that there will likely be 
differences in citizen’s perspectives, as well as problems in weighing evidence, as 
well as the existence of hard cases. Taken together, these factors explain why 
reasonable citizens do not necessarily reach consensus on matters of ethics or 
politics (Rawls, 1993: 54-58). 
This presents a problem in so far as it calls into question the legitimacy of liberal 
institutions. According to Rawls, the liberal idea of legitimacy demands that the 
use of coercive force is, in principle, acceptable to all reasonable persons (Rawls, 
1993: 136). Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, this principle of legitimacy 
implies that the justification of liberalism cannot depend upon the truth or falsity 
of any one (or set of) reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Instead, Rawls argued 
that liberal principles must be defended as purely political; that is, freestanding 
from the deep disagreements which threaten to divide pluralistic societies.  In this 
way, the deepest questions of morality and philosophy are put aside from the 
political realm and citizens can each understand the reasons given for the use of 
public power, though of course questions of ethics and theology will continue to 
be hotly debated by individuals in their capacity as private citizens.   
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Instead of appeals to comprehensive ideals to justify liberalism, Rawls instead 
relies on what he calls the ‘ideals implicit in a democratic culture‘(Rawls, 1993: 
100).  These shared ideals are comprised of the central ideas motivating 
democratic societies.  They include, most importantly, the notion that all citizens 
are to be regarded as politically free and equal and that there is virtue in 
sustaining a regime that respects them as such.  These ideals are, Rawls believes, 
widely held across many reasonable doctrines found in a democratic society. The 
fact that many different doctrines are able to accept these fundamental ideas 
creates what Rawls refers to as an overlapping consensus of shared norms (Rawls, 
1993: 144-145)  He believes this overlapping consensus is sufficiently powerful to 
maintain social unity despite the presence of reasonable pluralism.  
This core idea of ensuring that the justification of liberalism can be made 
explicable to all reasonable citizens gives rise to the notion of public reason. Rawls 
presents this idea as public in three senses.  First, it is reasoning carried out by the 
public in a democratic fashion.  Second, the ends of debate are public in that they 
are for the common, not sectarian, good. Third, the reasons given must be public, 
meaning that they are acceptable to all reasonable persons. This idea of public 
reason guides the notion of legitimacy underlying political liberalism; only 
institutions and policies the justification of which can be framed in terms of public 
reason can justly provide the basis for the use of coercive power (Rawls, 1993: 
162). 
Taken together, these ideas make up the core framework of political liberalism. In 
a brief discussion of their implications for education, Rawls argues that they imply 
a very different set of policies to that implied by comprehensive liberalism.  His 
political version of liberalism requires that children be taught a curriculum 
sufficient for them to become participants in a liberal society.  This implies that 
they have knowledge of their civil rights and of the constitutional arrangements of 
the regime in which they live.  Further, he argues that an education should 
encourage the political virtues, meaning that the individual will wish to honour the 
terms of fair social co-operation.  In Rawlsian terms, this means teaching children 
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in such a way as to enable the devolvement of a sense of justice and a settled 
desire to act in accordance with the principles of justice.  
 However, it is impermissible, on Rawls’ account, to use education to promote 
distinctively liberal values as a model for a worthwhile life (Rawls, 1993: 199).  The 
examples he gives of such values are Millian individuality or Kantian autonomy.  
These doctrines represent only one of the many possible reasonable conceptions 
of what constitutes a good life.  This formula of teaching liberal political virtues, 
while abstaining from teaching liberalism as an answer to wider questions, 
provides the basic structure for the other political liberals covered in this review.  
Macedo-Diversity and Distrust  
Two of the most prominent thinkers to apply the ideas of Political Liberalism more 
fully to the specific problems raised by education are Stephen Macedo and 
Eamonn Callan (the former of whom is the most closely Rawlsian). Macedo shares 
the core tenets of the political liberal project, and as such argues that state policy 
cannot be based upon claims to the whole truth about metaphysics or ethics, and 
instead must embody a set of shared civic aims. The purpose of Diversity and 
Distrust is to show how these core principles can be used to justify a common 
education system with a nationally set curriculum.  Macedo’s defence of liberal 
institutions, and common schools in particular, is premised on the notion that a 
shared set of liberal institutions are of great worth across society, but particularly 
to minority religious communities or creeds.  He then argues that a public school 
system, with a common curriculum, is of fundamental importance in preserving 
these institutions. The book thus explores the core political liberal aim of securing 
stability for the right reasons.  
Macedo is able to draw upon two sources to justify a common education.  Firstly, 
as a political liberal, he draws upon the value of the shared political commitments 
latent in the political culture.  Secondly, he believes that liberal regimes have 
proven the most effective at safeguarding such civil rights as freedom of 
association and worship. These are freedoms that are important to precisely those 
individuals who most often question the legitimacy of a common education in a 
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liberal state. For instance, small religious communities have much to gain from a 
culture which values freedom of worship. As such, an argument in favour of the 
value of liberal institutions can be made even to those who are sceptical about 
some of the specific elements of the school curriculum.  
However, despite these broad similarities there are important distinctions 
between the approaches of Macedo and Rawls.  Macedo terms his own approach 
‘civic liberalism‘, to distinguish it from purely political liberalism. This reflects his 
insistence that the purview of liberal principles goes beyond the basic structure of 
society.  Instead, he believes, adequately attaining our shared aims requires a 
vibrant civic culture. Much of Macedo’s argument is premised on a belief that 
without such a culture, liberal institutions are in jeopardy, or, at least, require 
constant and active support from the citizens of the state.  
Given this, liberal institutions, in particular educational ones, are judged by the 
extent to which they encourage this civic-minded participation.  This role gives 
licence to a curriculum that is more interventionist than the one envisioned by 
Rawls.  Macedo advocates schools becoming small communities in themselves, in 
which racial integration and mixing of people from different socio-economic 
backgrounds are actively encouraged by school policy.  He locates such policies 
within what he calls the ’transformative’ project of liberalism.  To this end, he 
claims that the ‘aim of liberal civic order should be to promote patterns of belief 
and action that are supportive of liberalism, to transform people’s deepest 
commitments in ways that are supportive of liberal politics’ (Macedo, 2000: 205). 
As this quote shows, this project requires that some individuals who hold 
comprehensive views must alter their views towards attitudes and opinions which 
are compatible with liberalism. Macedo thus envisions that the long term effect of 
liberal institutions, and in particular a common liberal education system, will be to 
shift the tenets of comprehensive doctrines towards arrangements which are 
hospitable to core liberal principles. This is a common feature in both Rawls’ and 
Macedo’s theories and given plausible empirical assumptions seems a necessary 
requirement of a successful political liberal strategy. There are, after all, many 
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citizens living in currently existing liberal societies whose beliefs are far from being 
compatible with political liberal principles. However, there is an important 
difference in attitude between the two theorists when faced with the need for 
such changes.  
Rawls agrees with Macedo that there are legitimate grounds for seeking to 
educate children in a sense of justice even if it would alter their comprehensive 
views. However, faced with such cases he states that ‘The unavoidable 
consequences of reasonable requirements for children’s education may have to be 
accepted, often with regret’ (Rawls, 1993: 200).  By contrast, Macedo, when 
considering the transformative power of liberalism on the Catholic Church in 
America, comments that ‘this story represents a dramatic triumph of the 
transformative potential of civic liberalism’ (Macedo, 2000: 134).  This difference 
in reaction is suggestive of a significant divergence between the theorists. We 
might expect Rawls to want to minimise the changes that occur to comprehensive 
doctrines through their contact with liberal society, whereas Macedo is likely to 
promote such changes when they accord with his understanding of liberal 
purposes.  
Eamonn Callan-Creating Citizens 
In Creating Citizens, Eamonn Callan argues that a liberal system of education ought 
to promote the capacities and drive necessary to live an autonomous life. Indeed, 
he devotes a significant part of his work to showing how being autonomous 
contributes to living a flourishing life. (Callan, 1997: 43-67) Since, for political 
liberals, a belief in autonomy’s value is only one of many possible reasonable 
views, promoting this value seems a clear violation of the principle of legitimacy. 
There is then a major disagreement between the two theorists on the proper 
scope of liberal education system. However, while the goal of promoting 
autonomy is one which Rawls would not share, Callan reaches this conclusion from 
premises drawn from Rawls’ own work. Thus, rather than dismissing Rawls’ 
fundamental principles, Callan’s argument is that their full implications, when 
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applied to education, are such as to require institutions which will promote 
autonomy. 
The heart of Callan’s case is premised on the Rawlsian notion that all children must 
come to accept the burdens of judgement (Callan, 1997: 30).  This is a requirement 
of becoming a reasonable citizen in the Rawlsian model. Appreciating the 
existence of the burdens of judgement implies accepting that different citizens 
who hold beliefs entirely different from one’s own might still be reasonable. Given 
the nature of a pluralistic society, it is critical for liberal citizens to be able to 
respond in this way to adherents of other faiths or creeds. If they cannot then the 
political liberal project of putting aside such differences, in the pursuit of a fair 
scheme of social co-operation, is seriously at risk of being imperilled. For Callan, 
understanding the burdens of judgement requires taking a deeply reflective view 
of one’s own beliefs as well as of the relation of one’s beliefs to those of others. 
This, in turn, will require a curriculum similar to those proposed by theorists such 
as Brighouse who advocate the direct promotion of autonomy. Thus for Callan the 
requirements of a just liberal state go beyond the civic mission Macedo defends, 
and in fact collapse political liberalism into a species of comprehensive liberalism. 
Whether Callan’s arguments are convincing is a key question that must be 
examined when determining the educational implications of political liberalism. 
This will be addressed at length later in this thesis.  What is significant here is that 
despite advocating institutions that are very similar to those theorists who wish to 
promote autonomy, Callan’s arguments are, at their core, concerned with the civic 
aims of education.  Citizens must accept the burdens of judgment for a political 
liberal society to function properly and, as such, education has a profoundly 
important role in preparing future citizens to accept these constraints. This differs 
significantly from both an argument that simply suggests that being autonomous is 
the best way for humans to live, and from one that suggests that understanding 
and accepting the burdens of judgement is intrinsically valuable. 
Conclusions on ‘Education for Citizenship’ 
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The brief review of Rawls, Macedo and Callan highlights several important 
considerations about ‘education for citizenship’.  Most importantly, we see how 
the political liberal principle of legitimacy leads to a policy of neutrality between 
competing comprehensive doctrines. This principle implied that the state cannot 
take a side in the contentious debates which divide society but must instead offer 
justifications which are, at least in principle, acceptable to all reasonable citizens.  
For this framework, the existence of pluralistic society represents a barrier to state 
actions and a test for justification. 
It is this eschewal of divisive ethical and metaphysical questions, and hence the 
commitment to neutrality, which entails an education system focussed on civic 
matters. Were the state to promote any conception of children’s best interests, it 
would seem committed to picking sides in divisive questions of the good. The 
account pursued by Rawls and other political liberals is intended to avoid these 
contentious issues. Thus the focus on liberal stability is, for Rawls, a goal that can 
be shared by all members of the overlapping consensus, an agreement about the 
value of liberal institutions which is held across the many different reasonable 
views held in society. Likewise, Macedo points to the great value of liberal 
institutions across many different sections of society. 
Despite these similarities, the second point to note is that the theoretical decision 
to eschew reliance on any comprehensive doctrine does not - or, at least not 
obviously - determine the content of any educational account. Thus while Rawls 
and Macedo both endorse a similar conception of liberal legitimacy, their accounts 
differ in important respects. I noted that the two theorists take very different 
positions on the alteration of doctrines via a liberal education; Macedo celebrates 
such changes, while Rawls views them with regret.  Eamonn Callan diverges even 
more sharply from Rawls’ position, to the point of arguing that the correct 
interpretation of political liberalism requires rejecting many of the features Rawls 
believes are part of this model.  Thus even accepting important features of 




Education for Autonomy 
Feinberg-The Child’s right to an open future. 
Despite being a text primarily concerned with whether children ought to have 
legal rights, Joel Feinberg’s important piece is one of the most influential 
arguments in favour of using education to promote autonomy.  Feinberg begins 
with an analysis of familiar liberal rights such as freedom of speech and protection 
against physical harm.  His purpose is to assess which rights are appropriate for all 
individuals, and which should only be held by adults. To do this, he divides rights 
into two broad categories; those protecting welfare and those defending 
autonomous choices.  For rights safeguarding welfare, protection from physical 
harm, etc., he finds no grounds to differentiate the claims of children and adults.  
These are termed A-C rights, indicating that they are shared by both adults and 
children (Feinberg, 2007: 121). 
Since children cannot be taken to be autonomous agents in the same way as 
adults, they cannot hold rights designed to protect certain kinds of autonomous 
choices.  He terms these A rights, indicating that they are restricted only to adults.  
However, while children are not yet able to hold these rights, Feinberg argues that 
we must offer children rights to protect their ability to become the kind of 
individuals who will be able to act autonomously in the future when they have 
matured sufficiently.  On his model, children thus hold ‘anticipatory rights’ which 
derive their importance from the adult the child will become.   
Since the purpose of these rights is to protect the development of autonomy, 
Feinberg gives them the collective name of ‘the right to an open future’ (Feinberg, 
2007: 120-122).  In spelling out the implications of this right, he argues that there 
are two classes of things that could prevent one from making autonomous choices 
about life plans. These are the internal and external conditions of choice.  
Examples, of external effects that would limit our ability to choose are such things 
as coercion or fraud.  The internal requirements of making our own choices 
include the cognitive capabilities required to make rational decisions and an 
exposure over our lives to a variety of differing options such that we can compare 
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and contrast the advantages of each.  Feinberg also considers that failing to 
develop abilities or talents may be a barrier to the choices protected by A-rights, if 
the adult would otherwise wish to pursue them later in life. Feinberg’s approach, 
then, is to draw upon the similarity between external barriers to autonomous 
choice, on which there is broad liberal agreement on the need for rights, and 
internal ones, arguing that these too deserve a similar degree of protection.  From 
the necessity to protect future adults from internal barriers to their ability to make 
autonomous choices, he derives the child’s right to an open future.  
Arneson and Shapiro-Democratic Authority  
While Feinberg’s account is central to the development of theories which posit ‘a 
right to an open future’, several other articles accept the importance of furthering 
children’s abilities to choose between competing ways of life. One of the most 
significant is Arneson and Shapiro’s article, ‘Democratic authority and religious 
freedom’. This paper deals with the issues raised by the United States Supreme 
Court case of Wisconsin v Yoder. The 1972 trial of Yoder concerns the claims of an 
Amish parent, Jonas Yoder, who claimed that his children should be allowed to 
leave school at the age of 14. This claim was made on the basis that Jonas felt this 
limited education was sufficient to furnish his children for the life envisioned by 
the Amish community. Any further education beyond this age would risk 
undermining his children’s commitment to Amish principles. The court eventually 
found in favour of these claims, and allowed Mr. Yoder to remove his children 
from education once they had completed the eighth grade.4  This case set a 
precedent that applied to all Amish children, and therefore became a central piece 
of law regarding the relationship between the Amish community and wider 
society. 
Arneson and Shapiro present a series of arguments opposing the court’s decision 
to make the case that the court should have forced the Amish children to stay in 
public education.  The arguments they present are premised on both the 
democratic interest in having children prepared for participatory citizenship, and 
                                                          
4
See court records, Wisconsin v. Yoder ( 19721,406 U.S. 205, at 245-46). 
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on the interests of children themselves in receiving an education to further 
autonomy.  This is instructive, since it reminds us that while political liberals may 
for principled reasons avoid claims about autonomy’s place in the good life, and 
hence rely only on civic interests, other commentators can coherently employ 
arguments drawing from both the interests of the child and those of society.  
However, while these civic arguments are important they could also be adopted 
by political liberals and, as such, they need not concern us here. The most 
important argument the authors present is what they term the ‘instrumental 
argument for autonomy’.  I focus on this because it is explicitly grounded on the 
child’s interests, and because this account is an extremely influential one in 
educational debates. It purports to show why autonomy is in the best interests of 
children without assuming that autonomy is a constitutive element of the good 
life.  Indeed, Arneson and Shapiro claim to make ‘no controversial assumptions 
about the good life or about the role of autonomy within a vision of the good life 
that are biased against religious traditions’ (Arneson and Shapiro, 1996: 401).   
In brief, the argument begins, first, from the premise that there are a great many 
ways of life open to any child.  Second, it claims that some of these ways of life are 
more suited, because of talent and inclination, to some people rather than others.  
Children are lucky if their parents, schooling or other early experiences push them 
towards a way of life to which they are well suited, but there is an obvious danger 
that children will be pushed into choices that will cause them to struggle.  The 
third premise is that with careful study of various ways of life, children are able to 
make choices that are generally suited to their natures.  Of course, many people 
may make mistakes, or their character may change over time, but this 
consideration need not undermine the instrumental argument. The argument put 
forward by Arneson and Shapiro merely relies on it being generally true that, on 
balance, children are capable of making wise choices when well informed about 
the opportunities open to them.  Offering children a variety of different 
opportunities is thus consonant with furthering their welfare because they are 
likely to choose options to which they are suited. From these it follows that fewer 
people will follow ways of life which are detrimental to them. Autonomy is thus 
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seen as instrumentally valuable because it allows individuals to review and revise 
beliefs, and thus come to beliefs ‘that could withstand critical reflection and that 
would be a reliable guide to a valuable and worthy life’ (Arneson and Shapiro, 
1996: 399). 
To illustrate how these instrumental benefits of autonomy are sufficient to entail 
that a liberal education would be in the best of interests of the Amish children, the 
authors offer a simplified model of the issues involved in the case. In this model, 
‘the assumptions presented are more favourable to the Amish cause than any 
alternative set that could be adopted without violating the establishment clause of 
the first amendment’ (Arneson and Shapiro, 1996: 402).   While the first 
amendment is obviously specific to the American case, the establishment clause – 
which holds that congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion - is representative of the core liberal belief that the state should not 
embody one religious faith to the detriment of others.   
The model assumes each Amish child is faced with only two possible life choices, 
‘the secular worldly life’, and the ‘religious traditionalist’.  No assumption is made 
as to the relative worth of each life.  However, it is assumed that persons differ in 
their traits so that for some the traditional life is better, while for others the 
secular life is more fitting.   Autonomy’s only value is in increasing the chance that 
a person will make the correct choice of life for his or her own abilities. Without 
assuming, as some liberals would, that a choice made autonomously is inherently 
better than a non-autonomous one, it nevertheless follows that for instrumental 
reasons persons are better off receiving an education that promotes their 
autonomy.  The authors argue that this conclusion entails that the court ought to 
have rejected the Amish case, and more generally that the purpose of education in 
liberal societies ought to be the promotion of autonomy. 
Brighouse- School Choice and Social Justice 
The arguments presented by Harry Brighouse share a number of features with the 
instrumental argument outlined above. This instrumental argument will be the 
main example of education for autonomy considered in the thesis. A number of 
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arguments deployed by Brighouse refine this argument and show more clearly its 
political implications. Outlining his position, Brighouse explicitly differentiates his 
account from purely civic theories. He writes,  
             ‘Civic education aims to teach children the beliefs and habits which will 
help to stabilize the, presumably just, state. Those arguments often start with the 
need to maintain the state in some prescribed form, and then prescribe education 
of a certain kind to cultivate in children the characters likely to maintain stability 
within the state. The instrumentalist argument for teaching autonomy, by 
contrast, starts with the obligation which adults have towards prospective adults, 
to provide them with certain kinds of opportunity to live well. The state is charged 
neither with maintaining its own stability, nor with promoting the attitudes and 
abilities which will make the institutions of the state healthy and just, but with 
providing prospective citizens with the substantive means to select pursuit of a 
better, rather than worse, conception of the good. The fundamental interest each 
person has in living well yields an obligation on all to provide prospective adults 
with an instrument for selecting well among possible ways of life. Confidence that 
others have a real opportunity to live lives that are good for them is only possible 
if we provide the means to select one’ (Brighouse, 2003: 70). 
For Brighouse, the notion of autonomy most pertinent to educational policy is a 
less theoretically loaded one than is propounded by other theorists.  He 
distinguishes his account both from the Kantian understanding that to be 
autonomous is to act in accordance with the categorical imperative and from 
views which hold that to be autonomous is to act in accordance with one’s own 
values.  Instead, Brighouse defines autonomous preferences as those that are 
endorsed consciously by the agent. This contrasts with beliefs and attitudes that 
are held in the absence of reflection and introspection.  Autonomous actions are 
those that follow these preferences in the absence of coercion or manipulation.   
The educational agenda that flows from this understanding of autonomy focuses 
on developing children’s critical faculties, and on exposing children to a range of 
differing views. Thus, the requirements of liberal education are that children come 
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to know ‘How to identify various sorts of fallacious arguments, and how to 
distinguish among them, as well as between them and non-fallacious arguments. 
The autonomous person needs to be able to distinguish between appeals to 
authority and appeals to evidence, between inductive and deductive arguments, 
as well as to identify ad hominem arguments and other misleading rhetorical 
devices’. Moreover, the autonomous child must be exposed to ‘a range of 
religious, non-religious, and anti-religious ethical views in some detail; about the 
kinds of reasoning deployed within those views; and the attitudes of proponents 
toward non-believers, heretics, and the secular world’(Brighouse, 2006: 24). 
Brighouse does not claim that acting autonomously is what creates the value of 
any way of life. Indeed, he freely admits the possibility that non-autonomous lives 
might well instantiate other values to an extent that autonomous lives cannot, and 
that they can therefore be valuable ways of life.  The value of different ways of life 
is thus derived from aspects of the way of life itself, rather than the reasons for, or 
way in, which it is adopted. On such a model, having the capacities necessary to be 
autonomous will not directly imply that one is leading a flourishing life. Instead, 
just as with Arneson and Shapiro, the claim is that becoming an autonomous 
individual will greatly increase one’s chances of flourishing in life. 
To support this connection between autonomy and flourishing, Brighouse points 
to two specific aspects of living well.  The first is that while there are many 
different ways of living well, some of which may indeed be non-autonomous, 
there are some ways of life that are not valuable.  Being able to evaluate the 
different options one possesses is thus valuable in so far as it enables one to select 
a way of life which is in fact valuable.  Brighouse fully admits that rational 
reflection is not an infallible tool in assessing the merits of different ways of life. 
However, his argument does not require this strong claim, only the claim that 
possessing the skills of rational reflection and critique makes children more likely 
to end up living valuable ways of life than they would be without them. 
The second connection between living well and autonomy is the need to live one’s 
life well ‘from the inside’.  This implies that to live well one must be able to 
31 
 
endorse the way of life as valuable for oneself, and accept that its tenets are both 
valuable and right for you. If one cannot live one’s life well from the inside, then 
even if one’s way of life is valuable one cannot flourish within it.  Brighouse gives 
the example of a way of life in which only heterosexual marriage is permissible.  
Such a way of life cannot be lived successfully by a homosexual.  ‘Trapped in such 
a way of life, he will be alienated from it.  It may be a good way of life, but not one 
that he can endorse from the inside and therefore not one he can live well’ 
(Brighouse, 2006: 17). 
The importance of being able to endorse one’s way of life properly from the inside 
has links to autonomy in two ways. First, it reinforces the value of children being 
able to select their way of life from a number of different options. This is because 
some individuals will be simply incapable of living well within certain ways of life.  
As Brighouse makes clear, the conservative heterosexual way of life may well be a 
valuable one, but it is not one that can be authentically pursued by a homosexual.  
Assuming, plausibly, that one’s sexuality is not something one can choose to alter, 
it follows that homosexual children must be given the opportunity to select a 
different way of life if they are to have any chance of flourishing at all.   Second, 
children need to be able to evaluate the tenets of a view if they are to be able to 
assess, early, whether it is a way of life which they are likely to be able and willing 
to endorse for themselves. 
Conclusions on education for autonomy. 
The three arguments surveyed are more diverse in character than the arguments 
surveyed in the section on ‘education for citizenship’. There are though important 
features in common to all these accounts, an analysis of which will form the basis 
of the next chapter.  Significantly, each of the arguments surveyed in ‘education 
for autonomy’ shares the initial assumption that the best education system is the 
one that promotes the flourishing of the children who are subject to it.  Since each 
of the three theorists surveyed also believes that education ought to promote 
autonomy, this entails a view of children’s interests in which rational deliberation 
and reflection are held to lead to a more flourishing life. 
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This view underpins Feinberg’s defence of children’s right to an open future.  For 
him liberal rights are premised on the view that they protect individuals’ 
important interests in being able to make up their own minds about important 
choices facing them in their lives.  Being an autonomous agent is thus a vital 
element in living well. From this, he argues that children must be able to make up 
their own minds about those same fundamental questions of ethics and theology 
which underpin the anticipatory right to an open future. 
The second important conclusion of these arguments is to show that while 
theorists who favour education for autonomy must be committed to the thought 
that autonomy is in the best interests of children, they need not be committed to 
a thick Kantian conception of the person. The instrumental argument developed 
by both Arneson and Shapiro and by Brighouse is instructive here, since this 
argument explicitly avoids the state taking such a controversial metaphysical view.  
Instead, autonomy is justified because it has instrumental benefits; being 
autonomous means a child is more likely to select a way of life that will enable 
them to flourish. 
Surveying the instrumental argument is thus a useful step, since it shows that 
advocates of ‘education for autonomy’ may not be as sectarian as political liberals 
sometimes assert. Given the appeal of the instrumental argument, we cannot 
simply respond that Kantian or Millian notions of flourishing are illegitimate guides 
to public policy, since even if this is true there may still be good reasons to 
promote autonomy through education. Instead, we must look at the fundamental 
differences between those theories which aim to promote autonomy directly and 
those which see a civic role for education.  Chief amongst these differences is that 
while ‘education for citizenship’ responded to pluralism by creating an education 
system which could be justified to citizens across the divides in society, ‘education 
for autonomy’ responds to pluralism by enabling children to be able to choose for 
themselves amongst the many different options which exist within pluralistic 
societies.   
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These differing responses suggest that the two strategies are premised on a very 
different view of the nature and importance of pluralism.  Political liberals view 
the differing opinions held in pluralistic society as boundaries to political 
theorising.  A state which explicitly endorsed any single conception of the good 
would be unjustifiable to all those citizens who held a different view.  By contrast, 
liberals who aim to use education to promote autonomy see pluralism as 
presenting a range of options which are open to citizens. The task is then to 
determine how to make children best prepared to face this plurality, which 
explains the reliance on personal autonomy. Exploring these differing perspectives 
on pluralism will form the basis for my own comparison of the two approaches 
















Chapter 2-Liberal Perfectionism and Value Pluralism 
 
From the analysis of the existing literature, we thus see two very different 
strategies employed to meet the challenges faced by education systems in 
pluralistic societies.  This chapter will analyse the first of these: ‘education for 
autonomy’.  As noted above, this view is distinguished by being child-centric; it 
aims to use education to further the welfare of children. On the face of it, this 
strategy is perhaps the more intuitively appealing of the two routes I have 
surveyed.  It seems natural to believe that the core aim of any scheme of 
education ought to be promoting the interests of the children who receive it. This 
intuition is a powerful and attractive one, and is something which I will attempt to 
keep hold of when developing my own account. However, this chapter will argue 
that those liberal theorists who currently employ this strategy commit a set of 
inter-related errors that are the product of the framework within which their 
accounts are developed.  
 Within contemporary political philosophy, the view that the state ought to 
arrange institutions to aid its citizens in living flourishing lives is termed 
‘perfectionism’.  For liberal perfectionists, as for those theorists I covered who 
apply this view to education, promoting the welfare of citizens usually implies 
promoting a notion of autonomy or individuality.  Liberal perfectionism of this kind 
provides the most significant alternative to political liberalism, which we saw was 
the theoretical underpinning of ‘education for citizenship’. 
Joseph Chan defines perfectionism as ‘the view that the state ought to promote 
valuable conceptions of the good life’ (Chan, 2000: 5).  As he makes clear, taken in 
this broad sense the label perfectionism covers a wide array of theorists.  Indeed, 
he argues that ‘If one takes the long view of the development of western political 
thought, perfectionism seems to be the standard view of the role of the state’ 
(Chan, 2000 :5).  In light of the wide variety of thinkers this label can be applied to, 
we should not expect all ‘perfectionist’ philosophers to have similar theories.  
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Instead, Chan makes it clear that, at heart, perfectionism is a view about the 
legitimate role of the state and about the proper use of coercive force.  Thus, 
being a perfectionist does not by itself commit one to any view about what human 
flourishing consists of, but only to the idea that we can come to knowledge about 
human flourishing and that the state ought to promote it. 
Theorists have often compared political liberalism to perfectionism purely based 
on their normative content, and thus assessed the plausibility and attractiveness 
of the liberal theory of legitimacy or the perfectionist aim of promoting 
worthwhile lives (for instance, see Lecce, 2008: 97-134).  What is less often 
appreciated is that political liberalism and liberal perfectionism rest on very 
different understandings of pluralism. Even amongst those theorists who have 
tackled these questions, the focus has tended to be on the character or 
implications of pluralism, rather than on the more fundamental question of what 
pluralism consists in (McKinnon, 2003). 
 In this chapter I aim to show how intimately liberal perfectionism is bound up 
with the theory of value pluralism, which understands pluralistic society as 
consisting of a multitude of independently, and incomparably, valuable ways of 
life.  This is a fundamentally different understanding from the Rawlsian notion of 
‘reasonable pluralism’, which focuses on disagreements between philosophical 
and theological doctrines.  Following this classification, I argue that this reliance on 
the theory of value pluralism represents a serious weakness for liberal 
perfectionism.  My arguments against the theory of value pluralism have direct 
implications for the educational debate. This is because value pluralism forms the 
foundations for leading accounts of ‘education for autonomy’, most obviously the 
instrumental argument reviewed above.  I will show that value pluralism fails to 
adequately describe the circumstances of pluralism liberal democratic societies. In 
light of the failure of value pluralism to describe pluralistic society appropriately, 
we are pushed towards understanding pluralistic society in terms of the notion of 
reasonable pluralism. This in turn provides a strong reason to adopt the political 
liberal framework as elucidated by Rawls and Macedo. 
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I show why value pluralism is unable to properly deal with the diversity present in 
modern society through a survey of the writings of the most influential liberal 
perfectionist, Joseph Raz.  While Raz himself is not explicitly concerned with 
education, his work provides the most detailed and nuanced account of the 
relationship between the perfectionist understanding of the role of political power 
and the theory of value pluralism. An analysis of Raz’s work thus provides a natural 
starting point for this discussion.  Moreover, while Raz himself does not often deal 
with questions of education, each of these two aspects of Raz’s account, value 
pluralism and perfectionism, are central to the ‘instrumental argument’ for the 
promotion of autonomy through education.  As mentioned above, this argument is 
developed by Brighouse, Arneson and Shapiro and is one of the most influential 
child centred accounts of the role of education. The problems that are revealed 
through a discussion of Raz are also present within this educational argument. This 
is then demonstrated through a consideration of the case of Wisconsin v Yoder. 
 
Raz: Perfectionism and value pluralism. 
 
Raz gives a slightly different account from Chan of the perfectionist thesis 
concerning the role of the state. According to Raz, ‘It is the goal of all political 
action to enable individuals to pursue valid conceptions of the good and to 
discourage evil or empty ones’ (Raz, 1986: 133).  Considered alone, this 
perfectionist view does not seem to have a close connection to liberalism; indeed, 
it might seem to be illiberal.  Liberal freedoms seem reliant on the assumption that 
individuals ought to be left to make up their own minds about how to lead their 
lives, rather than being guided in this by the state. Likewise, a belief in the 
importance of toleration implies that the state ought to permit some activities 
even if they are regarded as in some sense evil or empty.  For Raz, the connection 
between perfectionism and liberalism comes via the concept of autonomy.  




For Raz, the existence of pluralism implies that there are many different valuable 
ways of life pursued within society.  The notion ‘way of life’ is defined very broadly 
as ‘‘Views and opinions, activities, emotions expressed or portrayed (in forms of 
public expression) are an aspect of a wider net of opinions, habits of action or of 
dressing, attitudes etc, which taken together, form a distinctive style or form of 
life’ (Raz, 1994: 60). The continued existence of pluralism is explained by Raz as a 
consequence of the impossibility of combining all the various goods open to 
people together into one life.  This is the thesis of practical incompatibility. 
Valuable pursuits are ‘incompatible in that no person can combine all of them in a 
single life, as they call on different qualities and relative neglect or even 
suppression of other qualities which are good in themselves’ (Raz, 1986: 395).   
The practice of any way of life thus entails the attainment of certain virtues, and 
many of these virtues are incompatible within any one human life. Thus, it is an 
integral feature of the human condition that our choices will necessarily preclude 
valuable alternatives.  
This observation is combined with Raz’s belief in the incommensurability of these 
fundamental values.  Incommensurability implies that it makes no sense to 
attempt to compare the worth of the various choices open to individuals against 
some universally valid scale of measurement, since no such scale exists.  The test 
of incommensurability is the failure of transitivity.  Thus, the condition of 
incommensurability holds between two options when ‘(1) Neither is better than 
the other, and (2) there is (or could be) an option that is better than one but not 
the other’ (Raz, 1986: 325).  So, for instance, consider a situation in which an 
individual is faced by a choice between pursuing a life of soldiering or that of an 
academic at their local university. It may be that neither choice is intrinsically 
more valuable than the other, meaning that their life could go just as well with 
either choice. It might also be that the option of becoming an academic at Harvard 
is more valuable than at their local institution. Even though Harvard is preferable 
to a job at one’s local university, it might not be immediately superior to a life in 
the army. This would thus show incommensurability between the life of an 
academic and that of a soldier. 
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When we are faced with a dilemma between incommensurable options, it 
represents the point at which reason cannot guide our choices between one and 
the other.  Given incommensurability, neither of the options is rationally 
compelling, and thus choosing either does not leave one open to rational criticism. 
In this way, choices between incommensurable options differ significantly from 
choices in which one option is in fact more valuable than the other, but this value 
is hidden or misread. This would be true if we were faced with a career choice in 
which one option did not in fact represent a valuable way of life.  
The practical incompatibility of valuable ways of life, combined with the thesis of 
incommensurability, explains both the emergence and permanence of pluralism in 
society.  Given incompatibility, it is an inevitable part of life that we are faced with 
choices between pursuing different, albeit genuinely valuable, goods.  Given 
incommensurability, there is no way of ranking these various choices into a 
coherent and rationally compelling order. Our expectation then is that even 
rational agents, fully aware of the value of the choices that they are presented 
with, will pursue different ways of life.   
While this provides an explanation for the continuing presence of diversity in 
society, these considerations alone tell us nothing about the normative 
significance of pluralism.  Indeed, the analysis, as it stands, might seem to speak in 
favour of intervention designed to limit diversity, perhaps by attempting to 
engender a preference for one valuable way of life over others. This would be 
attractive if this would achieve valuable social goals, such as stability or unity.  The 
normative importance of diversity (which is regarded as an additional element 
over and above the separate value of each way of life) within Raz’s conception of 
pluralism is provided by the special value of autonomy.    
Given his framework of value pluralism placing special importance on a life being 
autonomous may seem a difficult move for Raz. Raz cannot assert that 
autonomous lives are always superior to non-autonomous ones, or posit that 
being autonomous is a necessary condition of the good life. To do this would 
undermine the coherence of also being a value pluralist. It would, at least, 
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undercut his notion of incommensurability in so far as the notion of autonomy 
would provide a way of evaluating the worth of different ways of life.  
Despite this worry, Raz holds on to this conception of value pluralism, and 
explicitly denies that autonomy ought to be considered intrinsically superior to 
competing values, such as might be achieved by a close knit community or by 
living in accordance with traditional ways of life. Autonomy is only one of many 
valuable characteristics a life may possess, and, as Raz admits, it is incompatible 
with other valuable pursuits (Raz, 1986: 390).  Nevertheless, he argues that the 
autonomous life ought to be promoted by the state, out of concern for the welfare 
of its citizens.5   
Thus, Raz’s claim is more complex than simply the argument that autonomy is 
intrinsically more valuable than alternative options. His claim is rather that, in the 
context of our society, individuals will be better off acting autonomously. To 
defend this account of autonomy’s special importance, Raz relies on a claim about 
the pervasive impact of autonomy within our society.  There is then a strong 
connection between flourishing within a way of life and living within a society that 
recognizes and respects these pursuits.  
This connection between ‘social forms’ and human flourishing implies that the 
autonomous life is uniquely well suited to our environment.  Raz claims that ‘The 
mistake in this argument [that non-autonomous people can flourish in an 
autonomy promoting culture] is the hidden assumption that while an environment 
supports autonomy .., that fact does not affect the nature of the opportunities it 
provides.  The opposite is the case.  An autonomy supporting culture offers its 
members opportunities which cannot be had in a non-autonomous environment 
and lacks most of those available in the latter’ (Raz 1986: 392).  
To support this thesis, Raz draws attention to the change from arranged marriage 
to being able to choose matrimonial partners, and to the change in working 
                                                          
5   See Raz, ‘The Morality of Freedom’, that autonomy is not intrinsically superior to other goods see pp 384-391. For the 
promotion of autonomy see pp 407-409. 
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practices from a society in which we are encouraged to follow our parents to one 
in which we have a freer choice.  The point is that the change to an autonomy 
supporting culture does not merely offer more options, but rather changes the 
options such that one must be autonomous in order to succeed in them (Raz, 
1986: 392-394). Thus the context of our lives, reflected in our institutions and 
practices, is what creates the special importance of autonomy.    
Taken together with his perfectionist thesis about the role of state power, this 
notion of autonomy makes up the broad outline of Raz’s response to pluralism.  
The diverse society we face is explained by the plurality of incompatible and 
incommensurably valuable ways of life.  The value of diversity is dependent upon 
its contribution to autonomy. A diverse society provides a range of options around 
which individuals may choose how to structure their lives.  The special value of 
autonomy is important for the state, since the state’s primary responsibility is to 
ensure that citizens live flourishing lives. From this, it follows that the role of the 
state when faced by our pluralistic society is to ensure that individuals have the  
options and faculties which are required to live autonomous lives.  Further, since 
individuals only flourish when they pursue valuable options, the criteria for 
determining whether we should offer an opportunity is whether the option is, in 
fact, valuable.  
Raz thus provides an account of how the state might best promote human 
flourishing which is rooted in the notion of value pluralism. It is the existence of 
many, incompatible and incommensurable options which gives rise to the need for 
autonomous choice.   Indeed, for Raz, this connection between value pluralism 
and autonomy is a necessary one. As he says, ‘The upshot is that autonomy 
presupposes a variety of conflicting considerations, which require relinquishing 
one good for the sake of another….To put it more precisely, if autonomy is an ideal 
then we are committed to such a view of morality; valuing autonomy leads to the 
endorsement of moral pluralism’ (Raz, 1986: 398). 
These claims are the core of liberal perfectionism.  The initial contention of 
perfectionists is one about the role of government, namely that the proper use of 
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coercive institutions is to promote flourishing lives.  This premise, however, is not 
specifically a liberal one.  Perfectionism becomes a liberal doctrine for Raz only 
once we consider the normative obligation to promote flourishing lives in the 
context of value pluralism.  Indeed, notice that it is only by embracing value 
pluralism, and the related notion of autonomy, that Raz is able to adopt the 
perfectionist view of the state while remaining genuinely liberal.  If he were a 
monist about the structure of value, meaning the view that the various values 
open to individuals could be ranked on one single scale, then it would follow that 
the perfectionist thesis about the role of state power would have decidedly 
illiberal connotations. Monism would imply that the state should promote 
whatever happened to be the most valuable way of life to the detriment of others. 
Only with the added assumption that there are many, incommensurably, valuable 
ways of life does the perfectionist view of state power lead to liberal conclusions. 
 Problems with value pluralism 
The assumption of value pluralism is thus a critical one for liberal perfectionism. 
However, reliance on value pluralism also causes serious problems for Raz’s 
account. In the remainder of the chapter I will outline two serious difficulties for 
Raz. The first is that he relies on implausible assessments of the relative merits of 
different ways of life. In particular, Raz’s account is troubled by cases in which a 
way of life is closely connected to a religious or philosophical doctrine. Secondly, 
value pluralism makes assessments about the relative worth of different ways of 
life at times when liberals should wish to avoid making such judgements. In light of 
this, a liberalism based on value pluralism will inevitably rest on judgements that 
are deeply controversial, and as such becomes an inappropriate solution to the 
problems of pluralism.  
The connection between truth and value 
The first problem I will outline with respect to value pluralism, at least on Raz’s 
account, is that it implies making an implausible assessment of the value of 
differing ways of life. In particular, I will argue that Raz’s conception of value 
pluralism faces serious difficulties when we consider ways of life which are closely 
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connected to a religious or philosophical doctrine. Since these doctrines are some 
of the most widely held in society, and are at the heart of many of the most 
intractable disagreements, this problem represents a severe weakness of Raz’s 
account. 
As we have seen, the theory of value pluralism posits that there are a variety of 
different ways of life which are each actually valuable.  This differs significantly 
from merely recognising that currently people view different, and incompatible, 
lifestyles as valuable. The claim of value pluralists is a metaphysical one, not 
merely a cultural or sociological observation. As William Galston (himself a 
committed value pluralist) states, ‘value pluralism is offered as an account of the 
actual structure of the normative universe. It advances a truth-claim about that 
structure, not a description of the perplexity we feel in the face of divergent 
accounts of what is valuable’ (Galston, 1999: p 770). Value pluralism is thus a 
theory that relies on robust metaphysical assumptions. Only if each of the differing 
options we face is actually valuable does value pluralism hold. Further, as I 
adumbrated above, Raz’s account requires the different options we face to be of 
incommensurable value. I will now argue that both of these core assumptions are 
difficult to sustain in cases where different ways of life are reflections of religious 
or ethical disagreement.  
To illustrate the problem for value pluralism, consider Galston’s remarks regarding 
value pluralism’s relationship to religious diversity. He states that ‘There are some 
genuine goods whose instantiation in ways of life allows or even requires illusion.  
(For example, it is impossible for contradictory religious creeds to be equally true, 
but many help under gird important individual and social virtues.  While self aware 
value pluralists cannot lead such lives, they must recognize their value.  To 
demand every acceptable way of life reflect a conscious awareness of value 
pluralism is to affirm what value pluralism denies’ (Galston, 1999: 774). 
Galston is correct when he suggests that value pluralists must deny that only true 
doctrines or sets of belief can underwrite valuable ways of life. If only true 
doctrines could instantiate valuable ways of life the range of valuable options 
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would be much narrower than value pluralists suggest. They must therefore make 
room for the fact that false belief sets can still underpin valuable ways of living. 
However, the problem for value pluralists cannot be resolved as easily as Galston’s 
remarks suggest. As I noted above, value pluralism is more than the simple 
assertion of a diversity of valuable options. Instead, a value pluralist must make 
the stronger claim that there is no way of decisively showing that any one of the 
many valuable ways of life is superior to the others. Therefore, value pluralists 
must claim that ways of life based on true beliefs cannot be shown to be decisively 
superior to ways of life based on illusion.  
This claim is deeply problematic when faced by religious disagreement, especially 
when these religious doctrines are Salvationist in character.  After all, if one 
religious doctrine were, in fact, the only route to salvation it would surely be a 
vastly more valuable way of life than the others. However, if this conclusion is 
granted then value pluralism breaks down, since the most valuable option would 
be whichever religion was in fact true. Further, note that it does not matter that it 
is very difficult to know which religion is true. As Galston’s remarks earlier suggest, 
value pluralism is a claim about the actual structure of the normative universe. If 
one Salvationist religion is true and thereby superior to other ways of living, then 
value pluralism is false. 
Therefore, when faced with a plurality of different doctrines which each claim to 
be the only path to salvation, value pluralists are thus faced with a serious 
dilemma. If any of these doctrines is in fact true then value pluralism is false. The 
only alternative would be to assume that all of these Salvationist religions are 
equally false. This would sustain value pluralism in so far as it is now plausible to 
believe that each of the many different religious, and secular, ways of life are each 
incommensurably valuable. This would be because none would be the route to 
salvation, and it is plausible to assume that false religious doctrines can still 
instantiate genuine values. However, assuming religion to be false is a non starter 
for liberal theory. While liberals can, of course, be atheists in their private lives, a 
public declaration of atheism would make the justification for liberalism 
profoundly antithetical to religious believers of all stripes.  A liberalism justified in 
44 
 
this way would hardly present a solution to the problems of pluralistic society at 
all. 
Further, the problems for the value pluralist analysis extend beyond religious 
examples. I focused on religious cases initially because that is the example 
selected by Galston, and because religious beliefs provide an easy case to show 
that the truth of a doctrine may be a strong determinant of the value of an 
associated way of life.  Beyond these examples, it is important to note that these 
are by no means the only example of the connection between a way of life’s value 
and the truth of a related doctrine.  Even if we exclude belief systems that have 
otherworldly implications, it still seems problematic to believe that ways of life 
based on true beliefs do not have a significant, perhaps decisive, advantage over 
those based on false ones.  
Consider this hypothetical example.  Harry and Jeremy are both individuals who 
feel a duty to help others, and for both individuals this desire leads them to pursue 
a life in medicine.  Harry decides to do this by going to medical school and later 
becoming a brain surgeon. Jeremy takes a very different path, and decides to 
practice homeopathy and a variety of different alternative medicines. This 
different career choice leads to the two individuals having very different lifestyles 
and worldviews. Harry’s job as a surgeon leads him to develop friendships with 
very scientifically minded, hardnosed, empiricists. He also commands a high salary 
in the marketplace, which leads him to develop expensive tastes and an interest in 
costly activities such as international travel. In contrast, Jeremy’s career in 
homeopathy brings him into contact with a very different community of 
individuals, who share a much greater emphasis on environmentalism and 
spirituality. Jeremy also has a much lower salary than Harry, which encourages a 
less resource dependent lifestyle; perhaps he learns to enjoy hiking or gardening. 
We might grant that both these lifestyles, which are encouraged by the different 
career choices, embody different and independently valuable aspects of life.  
Harry will garner the benefits of travel and presumably have many interesting 
experiences unavailable to Jeremy. Jeremy may develop a greater appreciation for 
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nature and live his life at a more leisurely pace. As well as both being valuable, we 
might also assert that these valuable ways of life are incompatible within one life. 
The kinds of attitudes and beliefs required by Harry’s lifestyle might lead one to 
reject major elements of Jeremy’s. For instance, Jeremy might object to 
international travelling in so far he would thereby abandon his commitment to 
reducing his environmental impact. In so far as both ways of life are independently 
valuable but incompatible, this situation seems to fit the model of value pluralism.  
As such, a Razian account of liberalism would seem applicable in this case. Liberal 
perfectionists might say that both of these alternatives are incommensurably 
valuable, but that individuals would do best by choosing for themselves which 
option they find most appropriate.  
However, merely characterising the situation as one of competing values ignores 
the root of the disagreement, which is their different beliefs about medical care. 
Jeremy’s lifestyle choices are the direct result of a belief in the efficacy of 
alternative medicines and homeopathy.  As we have seen, these beliefs are 
justified differently from Harry’s; since Jeremy does not believe that double-blind 
tests, and peer reviewed science are the only useful ways to conduct medical 
study. On this issue, the two individuals thus have directly incompatible belief sets. 
Harry is committed to normal science and the methods that follow from this, and 
this belief leads him to reject the approach taken by Jeremy. In this, one of them 
must surely be closer to the truth than the other. Jeremy’s homeopathic and 
alternative treatments might be highly effective despite their non-scientific 
justification or they may be virtually useless. 
The important point to note here is that for both individuals, it is their belief in the 
truth of their position that leads them to pursue their chosen ways of life. In light 
of this, whether or not this starting belief is true has immense importance for 
assessments of the value of the differing lifestyles. Assume, for the sake of 
argument, that homeopathy and the alternative medicines practised by Jeremy 
are ineffective, and any benefit that his patients have shown is the result of a 
placebo effect. If Jeremy discovered this fact, we might expect him to be bitterly 
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disappointed, and seriously to question the worth of his life choices. For him, just 
as for Harry, the guiding motivation of his life was to help people in medical need.  
Indeed, even if Jeremy never accepted that the treatments he offered were 
ineffective, we might still think that his life choices are undermined in so far as 
Harry’s work has helped individuals in a way that Jeremy’s never really did. Of 
course, asserting that the true nature of his beliefs makes Harry’s lifestyle more 
valuable than Jeremy’s does not imply that Jeremy’s life had no value. We can fully 
accept that Jeremy pursued many valuable activities that Harry did not, and 
indeed that some of these activities were unavailable to Harry because of his 
attitudes. What the example does show is that, just as in the religious case, for 
many individuals the value of certain practices is directly dependent on the truth 
of certain beliefs.  
Asserting equivalent value or incommensurability between these two ways of life 
is thus inappropriate. Therefore, in some cases the claim that a way of life is 
incommensurably valuable compared to other ways of living even though it might 
be based on an illusion is false. In many cases it is the truth of a set of beliefs 
which gives their associated way of life its value. As the case of Harry and Jeremy 
illustrates, these cases cannot be adequately dealt with through a value pluralist 
analysis, since in these cases the value of a life cannot be sustained if it is based on 
an illusion. Where ways of life are deeply intertwined with a set of beliefs, the 
value pluralistic analysis faces a serious problem.  It is often true that we can 
legitimately point to values that are instantiated by ways of life based on 
falsehood. Indeed, it might well be the case that only a way of life based on such a 
falsehood would allow someone to pursue these values. However, these claims 
are insufficient for the value pluralist case.  Instead, value pluralists must assert 
that there is no decisive way of ranking these ways of life, even though some are 
based on a correct understanding of the world whereas others are premised on 
illusion.  In many cases, both religious and secular, this assertion looks 
unsustainable.  
Value pluralism’s conflicts with other doctrines. 
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The second problem with a value pluralistic analysis concerns not the metaphysics 
of this claim, but rather its political implications.  Liberals who endorse a value 
pluralistic account of the nature of society often do not appreciate the extent to 
which this analysis conflicts with the tenets of many widely held doctrines.  Put 
simply, since value pluralists must claim that many different ways of life are 
actually valuable they will thereby be at odds with any citizen who cannot or will 
not accept this.  A liberal state premised on value pluralism thus rests on beliefs 
that are deeply antithetical to many of its citizens, and a liberal state justified in 
this way will reveal these controversial underpinnings through its policies. 
To illustrate, consider members of Salvationist religions who believe that their 
faith is the only one that will grant access to Heaven or the afterlife.  Such 
believers are defined by the thought that holding their set of beliefs is of 
enormous value, whereas holding other rival sets of beliefs is either empty or 
positively harmful.  The assumption that all of the ways of life associated with rival 
doctrines are each valuable thus cuts against the core beliefs of these citizens. 
While Salvationist religions may be the most difficult case, many citizens’ doctrinal 
views imply that some of the ways of life in society are wrong or misguided.    For 
instance, many religions teach that a homosexual life is one without value.  Some 
vegetarian or vegans are committed to the view that lifestyles that include eating 
meat involve serious wrongdoing. Many widely held comprehensive doctrines thus 
prohibit or censure certain ways of life. 
The negative attitude many citizens have towards the beliefs of rival doctrines 
constitutes a problem for the liberal perfectionist state because it will reveal its 
opinions on each of these topics through the design and actions of its institutions.  
Remember that the perfectionist goal is to promote valuable ways of life while 
discouraging empty ones.  This aim leads to perfectionist policies such as 
promoting arts or high culture, while discouraging empty activities like gambling or 
drug taking. It follows from this that the reason a perfectionist state will treat 
different ways of life differently is a purported assessment of their actual value.  
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For instance, consider again Brighouse’s example of a homosexual child growing 
up in a conservative community in America that I introduced in the literature 
review. Brighouse begins with the thought that the heterosexual conservative 
Christian way of life can be a valuable one. However, he argues that since a 
homosexual child cannot plausibly endorse this way of life ‘from the inside’ he 
cannot possibly flourish within it.  Since the child cannot flourish in the 
conservative way of life, the good liberal state must give him alternatives.   These 
other alternatives will include a whole host of different religious or secular ways of 
living which are structured such that the child can endorse them from the inside. 
Critically, if this is to be an actual improvement for the child then these other ways 
of life must be actually valuable.  Thus, while Brighouse suggests that the 
conservative Christian life is fully valuable, he also assumes that a whole host of 
other lifestyles which are more conducive to homosexuality are also valuable.  
However, seeing the situation in these terms is deeply antagonistic to the beliefs 
of the parents.  For them, their lifestyle is not merely one alternative way of living 
which exists on a par with a homosexual lifestyle. Instead, for some conservatives 
at least, a homosexual way of life is not a valuable one at all.  While the language 
of value pluralism may therefore seem accommodating to diversity, since we 
accept that the conservative way of life is valuable, in fact it rests on assumptions 
deeply antithetical to this way of life. This is because value pluralism treats each 
way of life as simply one option amongst many.    
Further, when a state is both value pluralist and perfectionist it will reveal its 
problematic theoretical underpinnings through its policies. For instance, if a 
liberal-perfectionist state does not treat homosexuality or meat consumption in 
the same way as it does other empty ways of life, say one of addiction to mind 
altering drugs, this can only be because it does in fact consider the homosexual or 
carnivorous way of life to be one with value. While both of these assertions may 
well be justifiable, they directly contradict those doctrines that posit that these 
ways of life are empty or wrong. 
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Therefore, a liberalism based on value pluralism will be forced to take a position 
on the most divisive issues within a pluralistic society. Whatever values 
perfectionist liberals assign to various controversial ways of life, it will be an 
assessment which directly contradicts the views of many of citizens. The 
justification of liberalism to these citizens can only proceed on the basis of denying 
claims that are central to their beliefs, which is a perilous strategy for a liberal 
theory attempting to respond to a pluralistic society like ours.  Given the fact that 
any stance on these matters – on the nature, as Galston puts it, of the normative 
universe – will be deeply contested, basing liberalism on any particular account of 
value is deeply problematic. 
 
Implications for the instrumental argument: Wisconsin vs Yoder 
 
While I have considered the case of Raz in detail, it is useful at this point to 
reiterate that both of these difficulties stem from features that are inseparable 
from the liberal perfectionist account. Only the assumption of value pluralism 
stopped perfectionism from being a deeply illiberal creed, one that commits the 
state to promoting whatever is in fact the most valuable way of life.  It is precisely 
this assumption, though, that leads to serious problems. A value pluralistic analysis 
of doctrinal conflict implies asserting an implausibly weak connection between a 
doctrine’s truth and its value. Further, as I showed above, value pluralism is a 
theory that is antagonistic to the beliefs of many of the citizens of a liberal state, 
which undercuts its effectiveness as a solution to pluralism.  
This critique of Raz’s argument is important to my consideration of liberal 
education in so far as the core features of Raz’s account are shared by some of the 
leading proponents of education for autonomy. Specifically, I will argue that the 
two problems which I highlighted in Raz also afflict the instrumental argument 
developed by Arneson, Shapiro and Brighouse. As discussed in the literature 
review, this argument was developed to show why autonomy ought to be 
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promoted even if it is not considered intrinsically valuable.  Instead of being 
considered intrinsically valuable, autonomy is instrumentally valuable in so far as it 
leads citizens to select ways of life which are valuable and in which they will 
flourish. This instrumental argument is explicitly presented as a solution to the 
case of Wisconsin vs Yoder.  In this section I will show how the two abstract 
problems I highlighted in relation to Raz also undermine the instrumental 
argument as a way of dealing with this real world example. 
The argument put forward by Arneson and Shapiro rests on a simplified model of 
the situation in the Yoder case. This model is supposed to demonstrate the value 
to all children of being given a choice between the competing ways of life.  The 
model simply assumes that each child is faced by a choice of only two options, 
which they term ‘secular-worldly’ and ‘devout-withdrawn’. Following this, their 
model assumes that both of these ways of life are of equal value, but that some 
individuals are better suited to some rather than others. Given these assumptions, 
it follows that children who are able to choose between the two alternatives have 
a better chance of choosing a life in which they will flourish than those who are 
forced by their parents into either of the options. As such, all children benefit from 
a choice between being secular worldly individuals and living a life which is devout 
but withdrawn. Moreover, note that for Arneson and Shapiro the fact that an 
autonomy promoting education is beneficial to children is sufficient to support 
such a policy. Arneson and Shapiro thus hold a perfectionist view about the role of 
the state. 
As my discussion of Raz suggests, my problem with this model is the assumption 
that each of the two ways of life are actually valuable.  This assumption is not the 
same as the assumption that the religious and secular lives are equally reasonable 
or plausible. By claiming each way of life is actually valuable the authors make a 
metaphysical claim about the relative merits of the competing ways of life. As per 
Galston’s phrase, they make a truth claim about the structure of the normative 
universe. Further, this assumption about the actual value of the competing ways 
of life is essential to the instrumental argument.  Only if both alternatives are 
actually valuable does the instrumental argument hold. If one way of life was in 
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fact more valuable than the other, then children would be better off being taught 
whatever the most valuable option was. 
Therefore, the instrumental argument shares two key features with Raz’s account. 
It is perfectionist in its account of the role of state power, and it rests on a value 
pluralistic analysis of society. These assumptions leave the instrumental argument 
vulnerable to the two problems I identified in Raz’s account. Firstly, the 
instrumental argument rests on an unconvincing metaphysical account of the 
situation, meaning it rests on a misguided attempt to assess the relative merits of 
the Amish way of life compared to others. Further, proponents of the instrumental 
argument are forced to make assumptions that are deeply antithetical to the 
Amish belief system. Relying on these controversial claims undermines the extent 
to which the instrumental argument can be seen as a useful response to this 
dispute. 
To highlight these problems, note that the Amish do not advance their way of life 
as simply an alternative way of life to those pursued by the mainstream ‘English’ 
culture.  Rather, they advance their way of life as uniquely lived in accordance with 
God’s commandments.  Thus, the nature of Amish practices is not derived from a 
belief that a simple way of life is better, or that community ought to be preferred 
over a more metropolitan existence.  Instead, the Amish way of is based on a strict 
interpretation of certain aspects of the Old Testament, collectively called the 
Ordnung. 
The Amish thus exemplify the reasons why philosophical or theological doctrines 
are difficult to cope with on a value pluralist analysis.  Their faith is advanced as a 
truth claim about the nature of God and the best way to respond to His existence.  
Their beliefs thus contradict many other doctrines, including those held by secular 
individuals and by members of different faiths.  The Amish beliefs also commit 
them to the thought that many other ways of life pursued in pluralistic society are 
less valuable than theirs; indeed, that many are immoral.   
Given that the Amish believe their way of life to be divinely inspired, it would be 
deeply antagonistic to suggest to them that their way of life was merely one of the 
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many possible ways of life open to individuals to pursue. Proponents of the 
instrumental arguments assert that individuals can live a fully flourishing life as an 
atheist individual in a large urban environment. Making this assumption is, in an 
important sense, to reject the heart of the Amish belief system.  The assumption 
that individuals can live flourishing lives as atheists, or as members of different 
faiths, seems to deny the premise that God favours only individuals who dedicate 
themselves to one particular faith and its related way of life. Therefore, offering 
arguments to the Amish that begin with the premise that their way of life is just 
one amongst a series of options does not take their claims seriously. The 
instrumental argument seems guilty of a flaw Brian Barry pointed out in 
utilitarianism, in that it asks certain believers to ‘Accept a way of regarding their 
own conception of the good that they could reasonably find repugnant’ (Barry, 
1995a, 161).  
Therefore, the instrumental argument is far more antagonistic to the Amish than 
was originally suggested. This undercuts one of the chief advantages of the 
account, which was that it could avoid making unduly controversial assumptions. 
Indeed, for Arneson and Shapiro the instrumental argument was adopted because 
the assumption that autonomy is intrinsically valuable is inappropriate for 
consensual public policy. The authors argue that by defending autonomy in a 
minimal instrumental fashion they can avoid making claims which go against the 
beliefs of the Amish. They claim that, ‘No assumption is made about the relative 
value of the options, but it is assumed that individuals differ in their traits such 
that for some individuals the secular life is better, and for some, the traditionalist 
way of life is better’ (Arneson and Shapiro, 1996: 401). However, as we have seen, 
the problem for the instrumental argument lies precisely in the assumption that 
individuals can flourish in both ways of life. Indeed, in the quoted statement the 
authors make the further assumption that for some Amish individuals the secular 
way of life is better. As such, they do in fact rely on claims which place their 
argument at odds with the core claims of the Amish.  
The second problem I highlighted in my discussion of Raz was that a value pluralist 
analysis would be forced to make dubious assumptions about the relative merits 
53 
 
of different doctrines. In my review of his arguments, I showed that this problem 
arises for Raz in cases where a way of life is intimately bound up with a 
philosophical or religious doctrine. This problem is particularly acute if the 
doctrine in question makes truth claims about the world that are at odds with 
those of other belief systems, as do the Amish. 
Some aspects of Amish life could be viewed as fully valuable even from a secular 
perspective. For instance we might draw attention to the strong community spirit 
that the Amish way of life allows to flourish. Other individuals might be attracted 
to the slow pace of Amish life, or the agricultural nature of their activities. We 
could plausibly believe that their eschewal of modern technology is valuable, in 
that it reveals older methods of production that might test individuals in different 
ways. 
However, any objective look at the Amish case must accept that some of the 
aspects of their way of life are deeply unpalatable when viewed from the 
perspective of someone who rejects their belief system. Examples here might be 
the patriarchal nature of Amish family life, with husbands having extensive 
authority over their wives. Perhaps even more troubling, there is the vivid nature 
of Hell that is portrayed to (often very young) children, as a real existing place to 
which sinners are sent in the after-life.6 The value of each of these pursuits seems 
closely related to the truth of the beliefs underlying it. If the Amish are correct 
about the implications of certain immoral behaviour, it will seem justifiable to 
ward children away from such actions at almost any cost. However, if the Amish 
are incorrect about the implications of a modern lifestyle, bringing children up 
with such a vivid and troubling account of hell looks deeply objectionable.  
Thus, the Amish way of life cannot be regarded as simply one amongst a range of 
options. Rather, its value depends greatly upon our assessment of their belief 
system.  Many practices may be justifiable if their theological beliefs are accurate, 
                                                          
6
 Consider the following account given by an anonymous woman who left a Mennonite church in Wisconsin, she believed 
she would ‘spend eternity in a napalm environment.’  Further she noted that she lost connection with almost all of her 
family, and described her family’s feelings of revulsion towards her as borne of the fact that ‘…what they see when they 
look at you is someone they love being tortured for eternity in a hell dimension’.  Further, Emily is in fact a relatively mild 
case, since she left before being baptized. Amish who leave the church after being baptized are ‘shunned’ and face an 
absolute ban from communication with their family or community. (Shachtman, 2006;) 
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but are deeply misguided if they are not. Our judgements of how to regard the 
Amish way of life will thus reflect our opinion of the plausibility of Amish beliefs. 
The important point to notice for my account is that whatever our opinion of the 
Amish beliefs may be, we will find a value pluralistic analysis to be inappropriate. 
Asserting that the Amish way of life is equally, or incommensurably, valuable 
compared to a secular one either radically understates its value or radically 
overstates it. Therefore, attempting to resolve this issue, and surely many others, 
through a value pluralistic analysis is misguided and forces liberal theorists to 
make claims that are both deeply controversial and philosophically suspect. 
Value pluralism’s relationship to pluralism 
This core argument of this chapter has been that liberal perfectionism is an 
inappropriate response to pluralism. This argument has moved in two broad steps. 
Firstly, I demonstrated that liberal perfectionism was intimately bound up with the 
theory of value pluralism. I showed this through a detailed study of the argument 
of the most influential liberal perfectionist, Joseph Raz. I showed that value 
pluralism was an essential part of his argument and of his understanding of 
autonomy. Without this assumption, perfectionism does not give rise to a liberal 
response to pluralism. Following this, I argued that the assumption of value 
pluralism is problematic. This is because it does not provide a convincing analysis 
of our societies when we consider cases of doctrinal conflicts.  I highlighted two 
problems which were present for this account. These were that it required making 
implausible assessments about the relative worth of different doctrines, and that 
it commits the liberal state to positions that are at odds with those of many of its 
citizens.  
The common cause of both of these difficulties is that value pluralism is itself one 
of the competing doctrines, which citizens might hold, and is thus inappropriate as 
a means of resolving tensions between these, often contradictory, doctrines. At 
root, those philosophical and theological doctrines which might be referred to as 
‘comprehensive views’ consist of metaphysical views about the nature of the 
world and value judgements about the best way to live in that world. Some posit 
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the existence of God, and support a way of life that responds to this, others take a 
materialistic line and believe that the worth of a life ought to be measured in 
hedonistic terms; many others provide radically different answers to both of these 
accounts.  Being a value pluralist commits one to a specific position in respect of 
both of these fundamental matters. To restate the quote from Galston above, 
value pluralism is a truth claim about the metaphysical status of the world. It holds 
that there are real appreciable values but that these values cannot be rationally 
ordered.  
Taking a position on these fundamental issues is a fatal flaw in any prospective 
response to pluralism.  Where societies are characterised by different faiths, 
creeds and philosophical outlooks, the liberal state cannot simply pursue one view 
at the expense of all the others. In particular, where a society is faced by religious 
and doctrinal pluralism, the state must be able to avoid assessments of the value 
and truth of opposing doctrines. 
Attempts to respond to pluralism that begin with assessments of the value of each 
group are therefore ill considered.  Judgements about the relative value of 
different ways of life are deeply contentious within pluralistic societies.  By taking 
this route, liberals are forced to take a position on precisely those matters that 
divide society, and, as such, liberalism itself becomes a deeply sectarian doctrine. 
Granting that many different ways of life are valuable cannot assuage this worry; 
instead, a liberalism based on value pluralism rests on just as contentious a set of 
claims as any other comprehensive view.  
Even the most committed opponents of liberal neutrality accept that we must 
avoid basing liberal politics on any one theological doctrine or deeply contested 
philosophical theory.7 Simply suggesting, however, that each of the different ways 
of life in pluralistic society is valuable does not achieve this goal. Instead, avoiding 
sectarianism implies taking a very different view of both the nature and the 
normative importance of pluralism.  The next chapter will show how the very 
                                                          
7
 See, for instance, Arneson (2003) and Chan (2000). 
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different understanding of pluralism and its importance developed in Political 
















Chapter 3 –The normative basis of a political liberalism 
In the previous chapter, I highlighted the problems with describing pluralism as a 
conflict between independently valuable options.  By ascribing allocations of value 
to different ways of life, liberals who adopt this strategy are forced to take a 
57 
 
position on precisely those matters which divide pluralistic society. Taking a 
position on these matters leaves the liberal state open to serious objections, and 
renders it unable to act as a fair arbiter in the disagreements which arise in 
pluralistic society. The problems with this framework offer strong reasons to 
understand some of the aspects of pluralism in terms of reasonable disagreement, 
with the units being contrasting doctrines, rather than differences between ways 
of life.   
Crucially, the acceptance of permanent disagreement can be sustained, at least 
conceptually, without taking any position at all on the relative value of various 
ways of living, or on the truth of different doctrines.  It is not inconsistent to 
believe that many different comprehensive doctrines are reasonable from a 
political point of view (with whatever consequences that might follow from that) 
and also to believe that only one of them is true, or indeed to have no view at all 
on which of them is true. The model of reasonable disagreement is thus a better 
device for responding to pluralism in two distinct ways. First, it correctly describes 
some of the most pertinent divisions in society - those between religions or 
worldviews - as divisions between doctrines rather than ways of life.  Second, it 
allows us to take seriously the circumstances of pluralism by avoiding taking a 
position on the very questions which divide society.  
The arguments raised thus far suggest that we should understand pluralism as 
persistent and often reasonable disagreement. This conclusion seriously 
undermines the strategy of ‘education for autonomy,’ at least in the form it is 
currently defended.  As I showed in the previous chapter, this approach is 
intimately bound up with a value pluralistic analysis of pluralism. However, an 
acceptance that pluralism consists in permanent disagreement does not, in itself, 
lead us to endorse the political liberal model and the related view of ‘education 
for citizenship’. We might equally conclude that it is the role of the state to ensure 
that citizens come to hold the one correct view, or at least to use education to 
minimise the number of disagreements between citizens. 
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Political liberals thus require an additional premise to show why the existence, and 
persistence, of disagreement ought to lead us to be neutral between the different 
doctrines citizens come to hold.  In this chapter I will consider three different 
accounts of this premise.  The first, epistemic strategy, asserts that reason is 
fundamentally indeterminate between many different options faced by citizens in 
society. This implies that there is no rationally compelling reason to choose one 
over the others.  The state ought, therefore, to be neutral because many of the 
doctrines in society will be reasonably held, and selecting any one of them to 
promote above all others would therefore be unjustified.  The second asserts that 
since citizens in a pluralistic society will come to hold different doctrines, we 
should not promote any one of them for fear of creating instability.  While both of 
these views have attractions, and are sometimes applicable, neither is sufficient to 
defend liberal politics in the face of pluralism. To anticipate the argument, the first 
strategy seems to lead unavoidably into scepticism, a justification which would be 
deeply damaging to liberalism.  The second strategy is empirically dubious and 
entails a worrying degree of pragmatism in the defence of liberalism. 
While both of these accounts are sometimes suggested by Rawls’ writings, neither 
is in fact the best understanding of his view.  Instead, the requirement for the 
state to be neutral is justified neither on epistemic nor pragmatic grounds but is an 
explicitly moral obligation deriving from a view about the best way to view civil 
society.  On my account, the argument put forward in Political Liberalism is that 
the state ought to be neutral because only in doing so is it able to sustain a 
normatively desirable relationship with all its citizens. This relationship does not 
depend upon citizens’ actual consent, as the account from stability would suggest, 
nor does it depend on the citizen in question holding a philosophically plausible 
view as would be required by the epistemic route.  Instead, the relationship 
between citizens and the political state is desirable because all can, in principle, 
grasp the reasoning given in favour of this set of institutions. 
The purpose of this chapter within the broader thesis is threefold. It attempts to 
elucidate and explain some of the key concepts in Political Liberalism.   I then 
defend the broad framework of political liberalism against some of its most 
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important critics. Since many of the concepts developed in Political Liberalism are 
important in my own account, any serious objections to this framework would also 
undermine my own theory. Finally, the chapter offers an argument to show why 
my interpretation of these concepts is preferable to others.  This is of central 
importance to the wider project, since each of these differing understandings of 
political liberalism would have different implications for education.  
Reasonable pluralism 
The first possible strategy to defend political liberalism is an epistemic one. This 
argument begins with the notion that disagreement about ethics and theology is a 
permanent and inevitable feature of liberal democratic societies. It then explains 
this permanent disagreement by virtue of the fact that reason is simply 
indeterminate with respect to these questions.  If this can be established, it seems 
natural to prefer a broadly neutral solution. If we cannot rationally show one set 
of views about the good to be superior to its rivals then the state would lack a 
compelling reason to promote this doctrine over others.   
This strategy seems plausibly linked to Political Liberalism in so far as Rawls 
believes ethical and theological pluralism is an inevitable feature of modern 
societies (Rawls, 1993: 4). This imparts something special to ethics, theology and 
metaphysics, a fact that explains the persistence of disagreement. Thus there is, at 
least according to Rawls, a fundamental difference between issues of ethics and 
theology when compared to the natural sciences or mathematics. In the latter 
cases, the long term result of free debate and discussion is consensus. Progress is 
often slow, and there are different schools of thought, but, in the fullness of time, 
conclusions come to be accepted by the majority of participants. By contrast, 
debates about fundamental questions of ethics, or about the existence and nature 
of God, show no such signs of consensus. This constant disagreement forms the 
backdrop of life in liberal democracies, and creates a situation in which ‘Many of 
our most important judgements are made under conditions where it is not to be 
expected that conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free 
discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion’ (Rawls, 1993 : 58). 
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 The causes of this disagreement for Rawls are those series of considerations 
which he collectively terms ‘the burdens of judgement’.  The burdens include such 
considerations as ‘the evidence- empirical and scientific- bearing on the case is 
conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate,’ and that ‘To some 
extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weigh moral 
and political values is shaped by our total experience’ (Rawls, 1993: 56).8 Taken 
together, these factors explain why the long run result of human reasoning is not 
to reach consensus in matters of ethics or philosophy.   
The impact of the burdens of judgement is that disagreement over the deepest 
questions of ethics and philosophy is, in the long term, the inevitable result of 
human reasoning in the context of free institutions.  Conversely, the only way to 
preserve a consensus on any one comprehensive view is to resort to the use of 
coercive force on those who hold alternative views.  Rawls refers to this as ‘the 
fact of oppression’ (Rawls, 1993: 37). 
 Rawls’ use of the term ‘reasonable’ is famously complex, but two senses in which 
he intends the word are relevant here. Citizens are reasonable if they both accept 
the burdens of judgement and are willing to propose and abide by fair terms of co-
operation. The first criterion implies that, not only can we explain pluralism via the 
burdens of judgment, but that reasonable citizens must themselves accept the 
existence of these factors and their implications for liberal politics.  The second 
criterion is that citizens are willing to propose and abide by terms of co-operation 
that other citizen’s could, in principle, accept as fair. This entails that reasonable 
citizens recognise that reciprocity demands that they propose fair terms of co-
operation. Proper liberal citizens recognise that no members of society can be 
denied their fair share of social production, although they reasonably disagree 
about the most reasonable set of economic agreements. Reasonable citizens will 
honour any agreements made in good faith.  
                                                          
8
 The other burdens of judgement are that even when agents fully agree about the relevant considerations, they may 
disagree about their weight.  Concepts are vague and subject to hard cases. Our differing experiences and finally that any 
system of social values is a choice from amidst the total set of value which might be realised. (Rawls, 1993: 54-84). 
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Understanding the burdens of judgement as implying that reason cannot reach 
definitive answers about metaphysics or ethics thus seems to yield a plausible 
strategy for justifying liberal neutrality. Given the limitations imposed by the 
burdens, many citizens will each hold views which are supported by valid 
arguments, and it is simply unreasonable to expect any of these views to be more 
rationally compelling than the others.  In such a context, arguing that the state 
ought to employ perfectionist policies looks misguided, since the state would have 
to choose one of the many possible reasonable options and ignore or neglect the 
rest.  Instead then, we must design our institutions to take account of all of the 
many reasonable views. The commitment to neutrality thus arises out an 
understanding of the operation of reason, not out of a more practical desire to 
please each conflicting group. Joshua Cohen frames this thought well when he 
argues that: 
          ‘if we accept the idea of reasonable pluralism, then moral diversity is not 
simply a bare fact, even a bare general fact about human nature, but rather, 
indicates something about the operation and powers of practical reason. With this 
account of diversity, we have a response to the contention that accommodating 
different understandings of value in the formulation of basic moral principles is 
tantamount to supporting…that justice commands that we turn our money over to 
thieves. The response is that we are accommodating basic principles not to the 
reality of power, but, rather to the way that social reality reveals the powers of 
reason (Cohen, 1993: 280). 
While this approach has its attractions- it both offers an account of the 
permanence of pluralism and why its existence ought to lead us to embrace liberal 
politics, it suffers two central drawbacks. The first is that these epistemic 
constraints, if they are to be powerful enough to underwrite a commitment to 
liberalism, will also lead to a serious scepticism about the possibility of any 
knowledge about the good at all.  The second is that epistemic factors like these 
cannot possibly explain all of the different comprehensive views held in society 
and there is thus the problem of how to treat views which are not plausibly 
explained by the indeterminacy of reason. 
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The move from the epistemic strategy to scepticism seems difficult to avoid. If we 
argue that we cannot provide rationally decisive answers to questions of theology 
or ethics, we must concede that our own convictions on these matters are not 
fully supported by reason. In the case of Political Liberalism, a slide to scepticism 
seems suggested by Rawls’ arguments which focus on the difficulty in weighing 
evidence, the complexity of this evidence and the existence of hard cases.  By 
analogy, if informed scientists consistently disagreed about a certain principle, and 
cited the existence of hard cases, we ought to hold our own opinions on the 
subject with a degree of scepticism. 
In his Justice as Impartiality, Brian Barry argued both that scepticism was implied 
by Rawls’ views and that this did not pose a problem (Barry, 1995a: 188).  Indeed, 
scepticism about the possibility of secure knowledge about the good underwrites 
his account of the justification of liberal politics.  Barry’s argument is that since no 
conception of the good can be held without reasonable doubt, some citizens can 
always reasonably reject the imposition of other’s views on themselves. The result 
is that only impartialist liberalism can be legitimately pursued by the state (Barry, 
1995a: 168-173).  
However, while this type of scepticism might accentuate the appeal of liberal 
neutrality, it does so at an enormous cost. Most obviously, liberalism would again 
become a creed deeply antithetical to many citizens, in this case any who believed 
that they can legitimately endorse their conception of the good without doubt or 
uncertainty.   Further, the suggestion that no conception of the good can be held 
with the sufficient force to underwrite public policy undermines the extent to 
which these doctrines can serve as guiding ideals within an individual’s life.  
In the case of an individual’s life, some degree of scepticism does not appear to 
rule out acting in favour of a given ideal. The fact I have some doubts about a 
given set of beliefs does not in itself imply that I have not got sufficient reason to 
act upon them. Most beliefs are held with some degree of uncertainty, yet daily 
life requires acting on the basis of plausible opinions, not only those held with 
certainty. However, similar reasoning would seem to imply that the state could act 
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on the basis of claims which are reasonable but not held certainly. If Barry 
responds by showing why the level of scepticism that we should apply to these 
beliefs rules them out as a plausible basis for public policy then it is unclear how 
they can remain useful for the individual. 
Barry might respond to this line of criticism with the thought that his model does 
not rely only on scepticism, but rather on the idea of reasonable rejectability and 
on the obligations we have to fellow citizens. Thus, he suggests that the most 
historically accurate description of his position may not be scepticism but rather 
latitudinarianism (Barry, 1995a: 169n). Barry quotes Barbara Shapiro as suggesting 
that the latitudinarians rejected both the sceptics’ denial of the possibility of 
knowledge as well as believers who hold their faith as ‘a zealous dogmatism which 
was overly confident in opinions that lacked adequate certainty and which, given 
the opportunity, would impose its opinions on others’ (Shapiro, 1983: 110).  On 
this account, Barry’s arguments do not depend upon a brute scepticism about 
knowledge of the good but rather a special injunction against imposing beliefs on 
others. 
 In light of the special wrong of imposing our beliefs on others, Barry could 
coherently argue that we can hold beliefs with sufficient certainty to act on them 
as if they were true, but never hold beliefs with enough certainty to impose them 
on others. However, as insightful critics of Barry have noted, many pressing issues 
that demand public action arise out of beliefs with which many citizens disagree; 
the classic case being global warming or climate change.  Matt Matravers and 
Susan Mendus note that our empirical doubts about this issue do not, necessarily, 
lead to inaction. They write that, ‘We cannot know with certainty what the 
consequences of continuing to consume at current rates will be, and yet we do not 
deem that lack of certainty to be disabling.’ (Matravers and Mendus, 2003: 44).  
The case of global warming is one in which there is both (somewhat) credible 
doubt about the scale of the problem, a large number of reasonable citizens 
disagree about both the cause of the problem and the appropriate remedy, and in 
which any successful action would require nationwide, or perhaps even 
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worldwide, laws or institutional remedies.  Many mundane areas of public policy 
face similar issues (consider defence policy or the response to drug use). 
Defending neutrality thus cannot be sustained simply via a special injunction 
against imposing beliefs on others; instead we must point to a special wrong in 
imposing certain kinds of beliefs on our fellow citizens. As I will argue in this 
chapter, I believe that such an account can be produced, but it must surely be 
formed from normative concerns that come from living together. In so doing, this 
argument moves sharply away from one in which the central premise in favour of 
neutrality is one of scepticism. Only by moving away from sceptical arguments can 
we avoid conclusions which would seem to suggest inaction in people’s own lives 
or in matters of public policy. 
In addition to the problem of inaction, appeals to scepticism leave liberalism open 
to the objection that it becomes self defeating.  As has been pointed out by critics 
such as Simon Caney and Simon Clark just as there is disagreement about the 
good, there is also disagreement on matters of right (See Caney, 1995, Clarke, 
1999). Barry’s argument thus seems to imply that we should therefore also have 
scepticism about liberalism.  Indeed, this kind of scepticism combined with liberal 
impartiality results in a debilitating formula. If the state cannot act on the basis of 
beliefs to which doubt applies, it seems difficult to see how it could act in any 
number of mundane situations. There is, after all, a plurality of opinions on 
virtually all questions relevant to public policy, and most liberal-democrats would 
accept that many of these differing views could be reasonably held. Therefore, 
despite Barry’s sanguine attitude, political liberals ought to be extremely 
concerned about his suggestion that they are committed to an appeal to 
scepticism in order to justify their solution to pluralism. 
Added to the sceptical implications, a second fundamental problem with the 
epistemic strategy is that it cannot explain enough of pluralism. While it might be 
plausible to think that, in some cases, reason is indeterminate between a variety 
of options, it is surely implausible to think that this explains the totality or even 
the majority of the different views held in society.  Many doctrines held in our 
society contain contradictions, or do not seem supported by relevant evidence. 
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The presence of such views is not explained by an indeterminacy of reason itself, 
but rather by psychological or sociological factors.  Thus we must consider what to 
do with citizens whose views do not seem to be plausibly supported or explained 
by epistemic considerations.  
To illustrate the problems posed by citizens whose views seem unlikely to be 
supported by the best available reasoning, consider the argument put forward by 
Joshua Cohen. On Cohen’s account a view is reasonable ‘just in so far as its 
adherents are stably disposed to affirm it as they acquire new evidence and 
subject it to critical reflection’ (Cohen, 1993: 280-281). This definition of 
reasonable will exclude the views of many different citizens.  All manner of beliefs 
and values are often held in the absence of reflection. Particularly relevant to this 
thesis, these beliefs will often be those values and practices which are learned in 
the home or in childhood.  While some individuals might consider it important to 
subject all of their beliefs to constant criticism, many others will be content to only 
alter their beliefs occasionally in response to events which cannot be explained by 
their existing set of beliefs.  Some citizens might have entrenched loyalty to a 
certain doctrine and, thus, would affirm it in spite of the evidence.  
Indeed, on closer inspection, Cohen’s description of the notion of reasonableness 
is too weak for a plausible epistemic strategy. After all, it seems at least possible to 
hold a mad or irrational view while still subjecting it to critical reflection.  The 
existence of such a view would still not be explained by a fundamental 
indeterminacy of reason, but rather by a failure on the part of the agent to see the 
implications of certain pieces of evidence. Looking at current liberal societies, the 
epistemic strategy would thus surely be forced to count very large numbers of 
citizens as unreasonable, either because they hold their views unquestioningly, or 
because they miss key pieces of evidence.  While we might well have reason to 
hope that citizens do subject their views to reflection and that they do correctly 
assess evidence, to fail to do either or both of these things does not seem to be 
the kind of act that makes one unreasonable in the context of Political Liberalism.   
Steven Lecce makes this point well when commenting on the epistemic strategy. 
He argues that ‘‘philosophical enlightenment should not be a precondition of 
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moral status in a political society founded on the idea of a social contract.’ (Lecce, 
2008: 173). 
The kind of reasonableness which is relevant to inquiry or debate is not the same 
as political reasonableness. When deciding an individual’s political status, it does 
not seem to matter whether they hold their view for good reasons or not. Many 
citizens in liberal democracies believe that some (perhaps all) of the other views 
held in society are held without sufficient reason. This is their right, and in many 
cases their doubts about some of the views held by other citizens may well be 
warranted. Where liberal institutions step in is to say that, despite our doubts 
about the views of other citizens, we cannot legitimately treat them differently in 
political matters.   
This equal treatment is an essentially moral commitment, not one which derives 
from doubt about our own, or others’, beliefs. A plausible liberal strategy must 
allow for cases in which we are totally certain that our own beliefs are superior to 
another set. This case seems unavoidable. There is after all a big difference 
between believing one’s own beliefs with certainty and being certain they are 
superior to an alternative. For instance, I may not be totally certain that I am right 
to be an atheist, but could still hold with certainty the thought that atheism is a 
more plausible account of the world than is scientology. Even in these cases, 
liberals would still believe that it would be wrong to impose my beliefs on a 
scientologist. This case shows that the kinds of reasons liberals draw on then are 
not epistemic ones. Instead, liberals cite the right of others to hold whatever 
beliefs they wish, even beliefs which are odd or implausibly justified. Thus in a 
liberal state, we count citizens as fully reasonable individuals even where their 
beliefs are implausible or incoherent.  
The epistemic strategy thus appears to move unavoidably towards scepticism, and 
cannot deal appropriately with many of the disagreements in a pluralistic society. 
For both of these reasons, epistemic considerations alone cannot act as a sensible 
basis for liberal politics.  Fortunately, the concept of the burdens of judgement 
need not be understood in this way. Instead, the burdens of judgement explain 
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the causes, and relevance, of pluralism in liberal societies as we are likely to find 
them.  Recall that the subject of the burdens of judgment is the decisions that are 
made by free and equal citizens of a liberal society.  These are defined as ‘persons 
who have realized their moral powers to a degree sufficient to be free and equal 
citizens in a constitutional regime, and who have an enduring desire to honor fair 
terms of cooperation and to be fully cooperating members of society. Given their 
moral powers, they share a common human reason, similar powers of thought and 
judgment: they can draw inferences, weigh evidence and balance competing 
considerations’ (Rawls, 1993: 55).  As our experience of life in a liberal society tells 
us, Rawls is right to expect disagreement amongst such people over matters of 
theology and ethics. 
We should not then view persistent disagreement in society as the result of the 
fact that some citizens are biased or, more fundamentally, that they are wilfully 
misrepresenting the evidence. Indeed, Rawls argues that viewing these 
unreasonable factors as the only causes of pluralism is liable to lead to ‘mutual 
suspicion and hostility’ (Rawsl, 1993: 58). The burdens of judgment are introduced 
to explain why pluralism would arise even if we discount these factors.  That is, 
‘The account of these burdens must be such that it is fully compatible with, and so 
does not impugn, the reasonableness of those who disagree’ (Rawls, 1993: 55). 
The relevance of the difficulties and complexity of the evidence available to us is 
that it explains why disagreement takes place in a way which is fully consistent 
with all parties continuing to behave as reasonable citizens.  If the question of 
whether God exists were a trivial and simple matter then we would expect most 
citizens to come to similar conclusions. If citizens hold contrary beliefs on matters 
which are easy or obvious, we would have strong reason to suspect that they are 
behaving unreasonably. In reality, of course, the fundamental questions of ethics, 
theology and metaphysics are both deeply complex and profoundly personal.  
These factors imply that we would expect individuals to come to different 
opinions, even if none were biased, had based their opinions on faulty 
assumptions, or had made their claims in bad faith.  
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Showing that disagreement can still occur amongst individuals who are reasoning 
in good faith matters in so far as the claims made by such individuals differs 
fundamentally from the claims of individuals who are biased or engaging in wilful 
misrepresentation.  In Rawls’ terminology, the former are reasonable citizens 
whereas the latter are unreasonable.  For Rawls then, ‘being reasonable is not an 
epistemological idea (though it has epistemological elements). Rather it is part of a 
political ideal of democratic citizenship that includes the idea of public reason’ 
(Rawls, 1993: 62). Thus, Rawls’ strategy is emphatically not to assert that we 
simply cannot have justified knowledge about the good, or that reason is 
fundamentally indeterminate in such matters. 
Seen in this light, the reliance on the burdens of judgment can overcome both of 
the problems with the purely epistemic strategy. The fact that we would expect 
citizens of liberal states to disagree even when they are reasoning in good faith 
does not have to imply a sceptical view about our own convictions.  It is not 
contradictory both to recognise that some questions are so complex that we 
would expect disagreement and to remain fully convinced of our own answers to 
those questions.  More fundamentally, matters like the role of faith in justifying 
beliefs, and how best to live in different contexts, are highly personal. This is not 
to say that ethically reflective individuals should not take seriously the views of 
other citizens and reflect upon their possible worth and insight relative to their 
own.  The mere fact that many citizens hold a different view about God does not 
imply that we cannot hold our own view with confidence.   
By elaborating a fundamentally sociological claim, rather than an epistemic one, 
political liberals have a much more persuasive way of classifying citizens. The 
purely epistemic strategy faces a serious problem in so far as each citizen is 
classified as reasonable or unreasonable depending on whether their views are 
supported by fully valid arguments.   By contrast, if we view the burdens as having 
normative implications, citizens are classified as reasonable depending on whether 
they possess the two moral powers to the requisite degree. That is, whether they 
are able and willing to co-operate on fair terms with one another.  
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Classifying citizens as reasonable on the basis of the two moral powers has two 
distinct advantages over the epistemic approach. Firstly, the Rawlsian account will 
cover a much broader section of citizens. Many people are fully cooperating liberal 
citizens despite holding some views which are philosophically dubious. Secondly, 
this strategy offers much more persuasive reasons for counting someone as 
unreasonable, with all of the consequences that might follow. The epistemic 
strategy counted citizens as unreasonable simply if they have made mistakes in 
argument or weighing evidence or were not prepared to subject their view to 
constant revision. The normative strategy counts citizens as unreasonable if they 
are unwilling to participate fairly with others.  This seems a much more compelling 
reason to doubt the validity of their claims regarding the use of public power. 
Stability 
A concern for social stability is naturally a central one for philosophers concerned 
with the emergence and permanence of pluralism in society.  Most liberal 
responses to pluralism have their historical roots in the wars of religion that 
occurred in Europe during the 16th Century.  In our own time, religious 
disagreements are cited as causes in many of the most pressing problems in both 
global and domestic politics. These problems have become a major topic of 
interest, particularly in the wake of the terrorist attacks against America on 
September the 11th which seemed to intersect with religious differences.  
George Sher, in his wide ranging critique of liberal neutrality, effectively captures 
the essence of this stability based approach. He summarises this view as follows, 
‘When a society is composed of different religious, cultural or social groups, some 
are bound to want to impose their conceptions of the good on others, while many 
others are bound to resist.  In this way, any pluralistic society contains the seed of 
destabilizing conflict.  To avoid such conflict, we are urged to place all efforts to 
promote the good strictly off limits.’ (Sher, 1997: 107) 
Issues of social stability are thus undeniably important and seem amenable to 
neutral solutions. They therefore seem a natural basis for a defence of political 
liberalism. On this model, the state cannot risk associating itself with any one 
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section of society and instead plays the role of arbiter and peacekeeper between 
the various competing doctrines.  However, despite these attractions, a more 
detailed examination of the notion of social stability shows it to be a flawed basis 
on which to found liberal politics.   
The first problem with the stability strategy is that while social stability is certainly 
a real issue in liberal democracies it is sometimes exaggerated in importance.  
George Klosko remarks that ‘Brief reflection will reveal that, virtually without 
exception, the industrial democracies have been remarkably stable for more than 
fifty years (Klosko, 2000: 205).  Empirical evidence thus suggests that features of 
democratic constitutions render them inherently stable, and that in the past it was 
usually only serious external crises (or perhaps internal political excesses) which 
threatened their survival.  Given this, he argues that Rawls’ pursuit of the stability 
of liberal democracies under favourable conditions is somewhat superfluous.  The 
societies Rawls addresses are likely to remain stable even in the absence of his 
theoretical solutions. 
Furthermore, if social stability is our primary concern, liberal neutrality seems a 
somewhat misguided route to achieving what we want, particularly neutrality 
between the abstract philosophical theories that Rawls is concerned with.  
Questions of how to secure social stability ought to be concerned with what 
factors lead individuals to obey the law and act in a civilised manner towards one 
another.  A cursory consideration of issues relevant to the social stability of liberal 
democratic states would thus consider issues such as drug abuse, organised crime, 
entrenched poverty and racial disharmony.  Some aspects of the pluralism of 
society are relevant to these discussions, in particular religious and ethnic 
tensions. For the other aspects of pluralism Rawls discusses the connection to 
social stability seems far weaker, if such a connection can be plausibly asserted at 
all.  For instance, discussions of whether utilitarianism or value pluralism can be 
reconciled with liberal principles seem entirely misplaced in this context. The 
theoretical problems which are central to this text thus seem tenuously related, at 
best, to issues of social stability. 
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The initial problem with the notion of social stability is thus that it seems too weak 
to serve as the basis for liberal politics. It is weak in the sense that it is not 
obviously a pressing concern for liberal democracies and also in the sense that, 
even if it is a concern, it does not seem to push us decisively in the direction of 
liberal politics in general and political liberalism in particular. Furthermore, citizens 
may well support a state overall even if they disagree with its underlying 
reasoning. The fact that some citizens disagree with their state on one single issue, 
even one of high importance, does not mean that they will suddenly become a 
problem for social stability. Most citizens of liberal democracies resolve political 
disagreements through peaceful means even when they have profound 
disagreements with their governments over matters of the highest importance.  
Beyond this, grounding a defence of political neutrality on a concern for social 
stability is a move open to serious normative objections. Questions of social 
stability are essentially pragmatic ones.  When we theorise about how best to 
secure social stability, the relevant considerations are working out who the actors 
are who are most likely to undermine stability and what reasons are most likely to 
persuade such actors to refrain from so doing.  The pragmatic nature of this goal 
implies that neutrality may well not be the most appropriate response.  We might 
be faced with a situation in which a powerful group demands that the state favour 
its principles in some way.  The best way to secure stability in such cases might be 
to accede to these wishes. Conversely, where a group is weak, social stability may 
not be particularly undermined if the state ignores their claims even where those 
claims are normatively valid.   
 Therefore, the concept of social stability cannot possibly be sufficient to support 
the commitment to neutrality.  Most liberal states are stable enough to cope with 
most foreseeable circumstances, and many citizens will still be willing to accede to 
the actions of the state even if they disagree with some of the reasoning 
underlying its decisions.  Even if there were a problem with social stability, 
neutrality of the kind advocated by Rawls seems entirely misplaced.  Problems of 
civil strife are unlikely to be caused by Kantians or Utilitarians who believe the 
state is acting contrary to their comprehensive view. Moreover, premising liberal 
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politics simply on the search for stability seems to entail a worrying pragmatism, 
bending the state to whatever powers are most able to disrupt it.   
Given the importance of stability to Political Liberalism this would seem to be a 
serious, perhaps fatal, set of problems.   However, what is sometimes 
unappreciated by critics such as Klosko is the extent to which Rawls uses an 
atypical notion of stability. This is suggested by the context in which he introduces 
the search for stability, he states that ‘the problem of stability has played very 
little role in the history of moral philosophy, so it may seem surprising that an 
inconsistency of this kind [Rawls’ belief that the account of stability in A Theory of 
Justice was deficient] should turn out to force such extensive revision.  Yet the 
problem of stability is fundamental to political philosophy and an inconsistency 
there is bound to require basic adjustments (Rawls, 1993: xvii)’ 
This might seem a puzzling statement from Rawls.  Political discourse often 
considers questions of stability, and it seems a topic that has occupied the thought 
of many leading philosophers.  Brian Barry succinctly responded to this argument 
in the following terms, ’Perhaps it is true that the actual word ‘stability’ has not 
been used commonly in the history of political philosophy, though the Oxford 
English Dictionary traces uses of it in a social and political context back in the 
fifteenth century, citing Malory writing on the ‘stabylyte of the realm’. But all we 
have to do is rechristen the problem of stability as the problem of order and we 
can immediately recognize it as a central focus of political philosophy in all 
periods- but especially, of course, at times when order is particularly problematic’ 
(Barry, 1995b : 880).  
The problem with these critiques is that Rawls views stability in a different sense 
from its usual meaning.  For Rawls, stability is a property of conceptions of justice, 
which he defines thus ‘Systems are more or less stable depending upon the 
strength of the internal forces that are available to return them to equilibrium 
(Rawls, 1971: 400)’. The system Rawls is concerned with is, of course, the basic 
structure regulating the well ordered society, and the equilibrium for these 
institutions is them operating in a just fashion.  The problem of stability for Rawls 
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is thus whether the just institutions he envisions will remain just in the face of the 
changing circumstances which inevitably face societies over time. This was his 
understanding of the meaning and importance of stability in A Theory of Justice. 
There he stated that ‘The stability of a conception of justice does not imply that 
the institutions and practices do not alter.  In fact, such a society will presumably 
contain great diversity and adopt different arrangements over time.  In this 
context stability means that however institutions are changed, they still remain 
just or approximately so’ (Rawls, 1971: 458).  
This definition of stability explains remarks that would otherwise be somewhat 
puzzling in Political Liberalism. For instance, Rawls writes that the argument for 
stability comes in two stages. In the first part citizens select principles of justice 
without knowledge of human psychology. In the second, they ask whether these 
principles would be stable, a question he defines as whether a systems of justice 
‘generates in its members a sufficiently strong sense of justice to counteract the 
tendencies to injustice’ (Rawls, 1993: 141n). Clearly a tendency to injustice would 
define the problem of stability if we understand stability as applying to systems of 
justice. However, there are many incidences of injustice that have little or no 
consequences for the problem of social order (e.g., tax evasion which is done in, 
and remains, secret).  
Likewise, consider Rawls’ statement that ‘if a conception fails to be stable it is 
futile to try and realize it’ (Rawls, 1993: 142). This statement might plausibly be 
understood as referring to stability in the sense of social order, if a conception of 
justice was known to produce severe and persistent social strife then we might 
think we have good reason to avoid attempting to enact it, whatever its other 
merits. However, very few conceptions of justice would be open to such 
objections. World history suggests that a vast number of different systems of 
government can be pursued without collapsing into anarchy. Understanding 
stability as applying to notions of justice makes much better sense of these 
remarks. On this account, a threat to stability opens up the possibility of futility 
since any attempt to produce a just society will end in a less just one.  
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On my understanding of Rawls’ account of stability then, suggesting a regime is 
unstable does not mean that it is liable to collapse into anarchy. Instead, an 
unstable system is one in which forces exist which would tend to disrupt a 
society’s adherence to its own stated principles of justice. If these forces were 
sufficiently strong, it would follow that no society could exist in accordance with 
these principles of justice over time, since any attempt to follow these principles 
would gradually become less just. This conclusion, much more than the mere 
possibility of severe strife or anarchy, seems better described as a rendering the 
pursuit of a given conception of justice as futile. 
While stability in the Rawlsian sense may impact upon social order, and is thus a 
related notion, it is a distinct concept.  Incidences which might severely affect the 
continuation of the justice of a society may have little or no impact upon whether 
citizens obey the law, or the presence of civil strife.  For instance, consider a 
situation in which a liberal state passes laws which discriminate against a small 
minority group.  If this group had little power, and was generally peaceful, such a 
law might cause no instability at all in the sense of crime or protests.  It would not 
then be a threat to stability conceived in terms of order.  However, in so far as 
discriminatory laws represent a liberal state becoming less just, then instability is 
present by the definition that Rawls uses.  Thus liberal states which have a 
tendency to react in an unjust way to external events, say immigration or 
terrorism, are less stable than those which respond in a way that is more in 
keeping with underlying liberal principles.   
These arguments thus show that Rawls understands the term of stability in a very 
different way from that in which some critics have suggested. This conclusion is 
interesting beyond its importance in understanding the text of Political Liberalism, 
since on my account the question of stability is a much more pressing one, and 
one much more amenable to political liberal solutions, than Barry and Klosko 
suggest. On my account the paradigm problem for Political Liberalism is not social 
unrest caused by religious division, but rather certain sections of society passing 
laws informed by their own comprehensive conception of the good which 
undermine our shared liberal institutions. Seen in this light, it becomes clear why 
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Rawls thought that a problem with his account of stability necessitated an 
extensive reformulation of justice as fairness, since were there a problem of 
stability it would imply that liberal institutions would not be likely to remain just 
over time in the face of pluralistic society.  Since reasonable pluralism is the 
inevitable result of free institutions, this implies a fundamental flaw in the original 
Rawlsian project.  Therefore, regardless of whether it is best discussed under the 
rubric of ‘stability’, the question driving Political Liberalism is one of fundamental 
importance. 
The second key aspect of Rawls’ notion of stability is his insistence that stability 
must exist for the right reasons. Rawls introduces this notion while elucidating the 
imperative which drives the search for stability.  He argues that ‘Finding a stable 
conception is not simply a matter of avoiding futility.  Rather, what counts is the 
kind of stability, the nature of the forces that secure it…we try to show that, given 
certain assumptions specifying a reasonable human psychology and the normal 
conditions of human life, those who grow up under just basic institutions acquire a 
sense of justice and a reasoned allegiance to those institutions sufficient to render 
them stable’ (Rawls, 1993: 142). 
On this view then, the achievement of a stable set of liberal institutions is 
insufficient for a fully just liberal society.  Instead, only if those institutions are just 
over time, because citizens themselves act to keep them so, can we achieve the 
appropriate form of stability for a liberal regime.  Thus for Rawls the notion of 
stability is different to our usual use of the term. Most often an assessment of 
stability is essentially an empirical matter. For instance, we would tend to think 
that stronger foundations make a building more stable. By contrast, for Rawls, the 
notion of stability is an explicitly normative one and is only met when the right 
forces secure stability.  
Some critics have appreciated this strongly normative dimension of Rawls’ account 
of stability, yet still questioned whether strict neutrality is necessary to reach this 
objective.  For instance, Simon Caney recognises that, for Rawls, a stable state is 
one ‘that is willingly consented to by its citizens’ (Caney, 1995: 262). Nevertheless 
76 
 
he denies that even this sense of stability might require neutrality.  Instead, he 
recommends a state that secures stability on the basis of a ‘rainbow coalition,’ in 
which the state pursues a series of different perfectionist policies, each of which is 
designed to placate one section of society. In such a way, a state might have the 
consent of all its citizens in a pluralistic society without acting in a neutral fashion. 
Where this argument goes awry is that it mistakes what Rawls believes to be the 
correct relationship between both the state and its citizens, and between citizens 
themselves. For Rawls, not only must the state be able to explain its actions in 
terms that citizens could reasonably be expected to accept, but citizens must be 
able to justify their public actions toward each other in terms of public reason.   
In a society characterised by reasonable pluralism, only reasons which do not 
depend on the truth or falsity of any comprehensive view could possibly be shared 
by all citizens.  Thus only justification provided by public reasons could possibly 
form the basis for a debate or dialogue that is truly society wide. The ‘rainbow 
coalition’ idea ignores this, and would imply that the various sections of society 
were, crucially, closed off to one another.  This would undermine a core aim of 
political liberalism, creating a unified society able to debate and consider 
questions together, despite their different comprehensive views. On the model 
proposed by Caney citizens from group A cannot possibly debate the relative 
merits of the policies which are applied to group B, since they do not share a 
common standard of reasoning. For members of group A, many policies pursued 
by the state will be unintelligible and unjustifiable and are permitted only because 
they buy the loyalty of group B to the institutions of the liberal state. Thus, while 
each section of society may well consent willingly to the actions of the liberal 
state, this stability exists for purely pragmatic reasons not because all citizens 
believe its institutions are appropriately justified. 
Therefore, while there is undoubtedly a need to secure social stability, a task made 
more difficult by religious or ethnic pluralism, this aim is not the primary goal of 
liberal politics. Merely attempting to placate each of the many different groups in 
pluralistic society would make liberalism ‘political in the wrong way’ (Rawls, 1993: 
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40), giving unjustified weight to the claims of the powerful or the unreasonable. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful that such a goal underwrites neutrality, since many 
non-neutral actions have only a negligible impact on social stability. 
By contrast, there is a much closer link between the goal of a state which is stable 
for the right reasons and a neutral state. We begin with the plausible assumption 
that very few policies or institutions which rest upon a comprehensive view will be 
able to command unanimous agreement amongst all of the reasonable citizens in 
a pluralistic society.  While it is wrong to assume that comprehensive doctrines are 
never in agreement with one another, it seems reasonable to assume that a state 
which is justified by any single comprehensive doctrine would meet serious 
objections from adherents of other views. From this it follows that the only 
legitimate way to justify liberal principles is for them to be based exclusively on 
public reasons, which as we have seen are defined as those that will be 
acceptable, in principle at least, to all reasonable citizens. 
Therefore, once we understand properly the notion of stability and its relationship 
to the notion of liberal legitimacy, we see that only a state justified in terms of 
public reasons will meet the test of legitimacy. Moreover, understanding the 
notion of stability in this way shows that a properly legitimate liberal state 
possesses a series of attractive features.  In its ideal form, all citizens in a political 
liberal state can appreciate the reasons that are given for public policies and the 
makeup of constitutional essentials. By contrast, if we base public policy on any 
one of the comprehensive doctrines found in society its reasoning would be alien 
to other citizens found in society. The Rawlsian ideal of stability thus captures the 
ideal that a truly just society remains just only if each citizen understands and 
endorses the system of laws to which they are subject and does not do so merely 
because they represent a useful compromise as in a Modus Vivendi, or because 
they gain more than they lose as in Caney’s ‘rainbow coalition’. 
The moral basis of Political Liberalism 
The initially plausible suggestions of both the epistemic strategy and the search for 
stability are thus open to fatal objections. Neither offers either a secure basis for 
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liberal politics or a compelling account of the importance of pluralism. The 
epistemic approach seems to lead inexorably towards doubting our own 
convictions.  Such scepticism about the good is a deeply unhelpful basis for liberal 
politics. Furthermore, this epistemic strategy faced a problem in the form of the 
many citizens whose views cannot plausibly be assumed to rest on the best 
available evidence. 
The second strategy focused on the question of stability. While I noted that there 
would be some instances in which concern for stability would lead to a preference 
for neutral politics, this strategy is ineffectual in a wide range of other cases. Many 
liberal societies do not face serious problems of social stability, so would lack the 
motivation to pursue neutral policies on this account. Moreover, even where 
states do face a problem of stability, it is far from clear whether neutrality 
provides the best response. While liberal neutrality might sometimes ameliorate 
problems of religious or ethnic tension a concern for social stability certainly 
cannot underwrite the kind of philosophical neutrality, between different abstract 
accounts of the nature of goodness, as advocated by Rawls.  Finally, I noted that 
the argument from stability is premised on objectionably pragmatic 
considerations. 
Given the problems with these two strategies, neither is appropriate as a basis for 
political liberalism.  Neither offers us a compelling account of how to deal with the 
diversity we find in modern societies. In order to avoid the problems facing both of 
these strategies, I attempted to show how Rawls could offer a different defence of 
political liberal principles. I showed that the burdens of judgement need not imply 
scepticism, once we recognise that they represent a normative and sociological 
claim rather than an epistemic one. The difficulties plaguing the search for stability 
are ameliorated once we consider Rawls’ unusual use of the term, and the fact 
that stability is only achieved if it exists and endures for the right reasons. 
Therefore, instead of a picture of an acceptance of pluralism driven by a deep 
scepticism about the good, or a need to secure peace between warring factions, 
the notion of neutrality put forward in political liberalism is explicitly moral.  We 
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begin with the notion that citizens in a liberal state will forever disagree over 
matters of the highest good or ethics. This is not because holding justified 
knowledge about these matters is impossible, but simply because given the 
personal and complex nature of these issues citizens are bound to disagree. This 
poses a problem in so far as we are concerned about the forces that secure the 
permanence of the liberal state.  Rawls argues, rightly in my view, that, as liberals, 
we cannot be content if liberal institutions survive only because of the 
preponderance of force which they hold, or because they represent a convenient 
Modus Vivendi between different religions or creeds.   
Since we are concerned with securing stability for the right reasons, we must be 
concerned with what circumstances must obtain for citizens to accept liberalism 
for moral, rather than prudential, reasons.  It seems reasonable to think that 
individuals will not accept liberal institutions if they promote a comprehensive 
view which they do not share, since this would imply that the state is basing its 
policies on reasoning that is alien to them. The combination of the burdens of 
judgement, understood as the fact of disagreement amongst liberal citizens, with 
the search for stability for the right reasons, thus explains the character and 
implications of the liberal principle of legitimacy, which for Rawls is that ‘the use of 
public power is only fully legitimate if it can be justified by reasons citizens could 
reasonably be expected to accept’ (Rawls, 1993: 136). 
This notion of legitimacy matters because, as liberals, we ought to care about the 
reasons citizens have for endorsing their state. The just society does not endure 
because it represents a Modus Vivendi between warring factions, or because each 
citizen has been bought off by the state. Rather, the state endures because 
enough citizens recognise that liberalism represents the fairest solution as to how 
to live together.  Once we add the assumption that citizens who live under free 
institutions will always disagree, it follows that the only way to act in accordance 




Therefore, the argument for neutrality comes as a direct and unavoidable 
consequence of the fact of reasonable pluralism if our goal is truly to secure a 
legitimate state which is stable for the right reasons.  Since this argument is 
premised on the moral significance of disagreement, not its epistemic causes or its 
practical consequences, it can thus escape the critiques advanced by Sher and the 
other critics of political liberalism that I have considered. 
 
Liberal neutrality and education  
 
This concludes the investigation into the foundational theories of liberalism.  I 
began by outlining the theories of perfectionism and political liberalism which 
dominate the debate amongst liberal theorists. I argued that liberal perfectionism 
suffers from serious flaws due to its reliance on the theory of value pluralism. This 
weakness was shown to have important consequences for educational debates, 
since value pluralism is a foundational premise of the instrumental argument 
developed by Brighouse and Arneson.  Characterising pluralism as the existence of 
many differently valuable ways of life undermined the response open to these 
theorists, and implied that the liberal state would adopt positions that were both 
antagonistic to many of its citizens and, often, simply implausible. 
Thus the first lesson of this section is that pluralism must be viewed as the 
persistence of disagreement, not as the existence of many different valuable 
options, although I do not deny that this may also be the case since value 
pluralism is one of the many reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  Alone, the fact 
of disagreement carries no normative significance.  In some cases, the correct 
response to disagreement is to ignore the claims of some parties; this would be 
the case if individuals were behaving unreasonably. To assess the normative 
importance of pluralism, I considered two different strategies by which we might 
respond to the persistence of disagreement in liberal societies.  
The first attributed this disagreement to the fundamental inability of human 
reason to produce definitive answers in matters of ethics or metaphysics. The 
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second route used liberal neutrality as a means of securing social stability. Both of 
these strategies were rejected. In their place, I argued that the best defence of 
political liberal principles rested on normative considerations.  Given that we must 
accept that citizens of liberal societies will disagree over matters of ethics or 
theology, we ask what significance this has. It is important in so far as the state is 
simply the shared power of all citizens, and ought not to act in ways they could not 
reasonably accept.  Given the existence of disagreement, only a neutral state can 
be endorsed for the right reasons by citizens across many different sections of 
society. 
This conclusion has significance for education.  Most obviously, accepting that 
some version of political liberalism is the most appropriate response to pluralism 
entails that the account must be developed in accordance with the liberal principle 
of legitimacy.  This implies that educational institutions cannot rely explicitly on 
the content of any single comprehensive view.   
 Further, exploring the best defence of the political liberal framework shows which 
considerations ought to be relevant in assessing any scheme of education.  
Citizens are considered reasonable if they are willing and able to participate in a 
fair scheme of cooperation.  Where we have reason to suspect that individuals are 
not willing to act fairly towards other citizens, namely where they are behaving 
unreasonably, we have good cause to reject their claims regarding the appropriate 
use of public power.   
However, as we have seen, we should not though treat citizens as unreasonable 
simply because we believe their comprehensive views to be philosophically 
dubious; these epistemically unreasonable citizens are just as much a part of 
society as philosophically sophisticated individuals. Nor should we use education 
to secure stability at any cost. What matters is not simply securing blind 
allegiance, but rather that the citizens of a liberal state can come to endorse their 
shared institutions because they understand that those institutions represent a 
fair solution to the circumstances of pluralism. 
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Therefore, this section has set out an account of both what pluralism is, and why it 
matters.  Pluralism consists in disagreements between individuals about how best 
to understand the world and to live in it.  These disagreements do not arise out of 
only bad faith or bias, but are the natural result of life under free institutions, even 
if all parties are fully reasonable. This disagreement matters because it is 
fundamentally important that citizens can understand and, in principle, endorse 
the reasons that guide the actions of the state. Since no comprehensive view can 
serve as such a public basis of justification, we must instead justify policy in terms 
of public reasons which can be understood by citizens across the overlapping 
consensus. When taking these ideals into the sphere of education, the relevant 
goal is thus designing institutions that are justifiable to all members of the political 
community and that enable children to come to act as reasonable citizens who 





































Chapter 4 –Parental Authority in Political Liberalism. 
Defining the scope and extent of parental authority has been a perennial issue in 
liberal theory.  Historically, this question was addressed by core figures of the 
liberal tradition such as Locke and Rousseau.9 These issues remain live questions 
amongst contemporary political philosophers and have prompted a myriad of 
diverse theoretical positions. The reason for the continuing interest in parental 
authority is that the parent –child relationship has features which are not shared 
with any other in modern society, and is a relationship which can appear troubling 
in the light of core aspects of liberal thought.   
A defining tenet of liberal theory is that individuals ought to be free to shape their 
own lives. This theoretical commitment gives rise to the legal rights of free 
movement and association.  In a functioning liberal state, citizens cannot impose 
their beliefs on others but must attempt to change minds by persuasion or 
argument.  The parent-child relationship differs significantly from this liberal 
paradigm.  Parents have significant rights of control over the lives of their children, 
and can legitimately make important decisions that affect those lives.  These rights 
of control imply that parents wield enormous influence over their children’s 
development.  Through the selection of school, by choosing which community  
children grown up in, and by controlling many other early influences, parents can 
guide their children towards accepting some ideas while rejecting others. 
From a liberal perspective, the authority wielded by parents over their children is 
complicated by the fact that it is non-voluntary. Obviously, individuals cannot 
choose the family into which they are born. Nor, except under the most 
exceptional of circumstances, can they voluntarily choose to leave one family and 
join another, or to live alone.  The parent-child relationship is thus non-voluntary, 
of immense importance, and backed by coercive force.  Each of these aspects is 
troubling to liberals, in so far as they have often attempted to justify the use of 
coercion through the actual or hypothetical consent of the governed.   
                                                          
9 Perhaps the most notable text dedicated to these issues is Rousseau’s Emile (1762). 
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One possible way of justifying the authority of parents is to posit that parents own 
their children in some sense. On this account, parents are legitimately allowed to 
use their children for almost any purpose or to teach them whatever values they 
wish. However, the assertion that one individual can own another, akin to a 
relationship of slavery, is deeply counter-intuitive to modern citizens. As such, this 
ownership based account has been comprehensively rejected by almost all 
contemporary liberal theorists (for instance, see Archard, 2002: 142-160). 
Instead, contemporary accounts of upbringing have usually focussed on the value 
of parenting to the children themselves, and used this value to justify a variety of 
different ways of understanding the role of parents and the basis for their 
authority. One leading strategy compares the parent-child relationship to the 
fiduciary relationship that obtains between lawyers and their clients. On this 
account, parental authority is justified because children lack the ability to live 
independently and to make autonomous choices. They thus need someone to 
make these choices on their behalf. As such, parents only have the authority to act 
in the best interests of their children, although in practice they will have wide 
latitude to decide what these interests consist in (Noggle, 2002, Reich, 2002). 
Another leading account, developed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, locates 
parental authority in the value of the parent-child relationship to both parties 
(Brighouse and Swift, 2009). They argue that children will likely flourish only if they 
have a secure relationship with one or two adults, and that many adult’s lives will 
go much better if they are able to raise a child. Since this relationship requires a 
high degree of intimacy, privacy and partiality, parents must be given wide leeway 
if this relationship is to prosper. The limits of legitimate parental partiality are thus 
those necessary to sustain this relationship. 
Debates between these differing accounts of upbringing are thought to have 
important implications for two critical issues for liberal philosophy. The first is 
distributional. Many parents wish to further the welfare of children in ways that 
might cut against the distributive aims of liberal egalitarians. So, many might send 
their children to expensive private schools, use connections or networks to further 
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their careers or leave them large sums of money as an inheritance.  Liberal theory 
thus needs a way of showing the limits of these actions, and to differentiate those 
instances of parental partiality which are legitimate from those which ought to be 
banned or somehow redressed through the tax system. 
For the purposes of this enquiry a more important issue is the scope of the 
legitimate authority of parents to shape their children’s beliefs.  It seems natural 
to think that the question of how far parents can pass on beliefs depends upon a 
prior question of the justification and scope of parental authority. Thus we might 
expect that theorists who endorse a robust notion of parental authority will also 
argue that parents have a wide leeway to inculcate whatever values they choose. 
At the extreme, those few theorists who believe parents own children will allow 
the parents to shape the values of their children with almost no constraints. 
Brighouse and Swift allow parents to take their children to Mosque or Sunday 
school, but with the proviso that these children also encounter other systems of 
belief. By contrast, some theorists who reject parental rights altogether argue that 
parental freedom to pass on their beliefs is much more constricted, and that 
parents cannot legitimately inculcate their own beliefs in their children.10 
In much of the literature, then, the question of how far parents ought to be able to 
pass on values is thought to be determined by the basis of parental authority. 
However, I believe that this assumption is misguided. At least for political liberals, 
the basis of parental authority is in fact largely irrelevant to the separate question 
of how far parents ought to be able to pass on their beliefs. While the scope of 
legitimate parental authority is still a significant question, in light of the 
distributional issues, it is thus in fact a largely irrelevant one for this enquiry. 
To show this, the argument in this chapter will proceed in three parts. The first is 
to show that the political liberal principle of legitimacy implies that the state 
cannot take a position on which non political values children ought to learn in 
school and at home. Despite the arguments of some theorists, this restriction 
                                                          
10 For an example of an account which premises a ban on inculcation of values on a rejection of fundamental parent’s rights 




applies only to the actions of the state; as such some other actor might 
legitimately shape children’s values and beliefs.  The second section argues that 
there are strong reasons to think that children ought to have an authority figure of 
this kind within their lives.  Section three argues that there are other elements of 
political liberalism, chiefly the search for stability, which create strong pro tanto 
reasons in favour of letting a child’s parents take up this role. 
Taken together, these arguments show that political liberals are, in most cases, 
committed to giving parents significant control over their children’s non-political 
education. This commitment to parental control, and the absence of a state 
mandated curriculum designed to promote ideals relevant to non-political life 
follows directly from deep seated aspects of the political liberal project. Crucially, 
the presumption in favour of parents does not depend at all on a premise about 
parental authority. As such, altering this position will require re-evaluating core 
aspects of the political liberal position. 
Legitimacy and parents 
Recall that the political liberal principle of legitimacy states that the use of public 
power is ‘fully proper only when the reasons we offer for our political actions may 
reasonably be accepted by other citizens as justification of those actions’ (Rawls, 
1993: xlvi). As I outlined in chapter three, it is this principle which implies a move 
to a purely political liberalism. Under conditions of pluralism no comprehensive 
view will be accepted by all reasonable citizens, thus none can serve as the basis of 
public justification.  Instead, we must appeal only to public reasons, and as such 
invoking the tenets of any one comprehensive view when designing educational 
institutions is illegitimate.     
At least in theory, an education geared only towards the civic concerns of the state 
can be pursued in accordance with this principle.  The role of education on this 
model is to secure stability for the right reasons.  Of course, in practice the use of 
education for this purpose will be subjected to serious criticism, perhaps from 
parents who wish to withdraw their children from school altogether. However, 
these parental objections alone cannot imply that civic education is illegitimate. 
88 
 
While political liberals should aim to accommodate differences of opinion where 
possible, when legitimate interests of the state are present there may be grounds 
to overrule the claims of some citizens. It is not actual consensus that is sought by 
political liberalism, but rather ensuring that political actions are justifiable, in 
principle, to all reasonable citizens. 
 In the ideal world envisioned by political liberals all reasonable citizens will be 
part of an overlapping consensus. This implies that despite their divergence on 
matters of the good each citizen will be able to endorse liberal institutions from 
within their own comprehensive view (Rawls, 1993: 133-140). Since the aim of 
civic education is the stability and endurance of this liberal settlement, we can 
assume all reasonable citizens will be in favour of civic education.  Thus while 
many parents will object to civic education in practice, there still seems room for 
the liberal state to enforce a curriculum designed to promote stability without 
invoking the tenets of any one comprehensive view, and therefore this policy can 
meet the test of liberal legitimacy.11   
However, while liberal legitimacy will permit an education designed for civic 
purposes, it seems to rule out any attempt by the state to foster values to guide 
children’s non-political lives. If we object to parents teaching children values which 
we think are misguided, or beliefs which we think are unjustified, we must surely 
do so by invoking a different set of beliefs and values and asserting that they are 
superior in some respect.  Promoting any set of non-political values will thus 
require the state to take a position on precisely those controversial issues which 
Rawls sought to avoid. By allowing a child’s adult guardian to take the lead, the 
liberal state is seemingly able to bypass this problem by refusing to favour any one 
set of parents’ views above the others. Allowing different sets of parents to teach 
different sets of non-political values does not involve a relative judgment about 
any of these values. The state does not condone or condemn any of these 
                                                          
11
 Harry Brighouse has argued that the liberal principle of legitimacy ought to rule out using education to guide children 
towards accepting liberal values (see Brighouse, 1998). He argued that the most plausible interpretation of the principle of 
legitimacy requires both the hypothetical consent of all individuals, and the actual consent of a majority of citizens. Since 
this actual consent cannot be achieved if children have been guided towards liberalism, such civic education would become 
illegitimate. However, political liberals have responded forcefully to this charge, pointing out that legitimacy does not 
require actual consent (See Clayton,2006). Rather, legitimacy requires democratic government which in fact compatible 
with citizenship education.  As such, an education designed to create reasonable citizens would be a legitimate one. 
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different ways of raising children, and maintains a posture of neutrality by 
avoiding these questions altogether. 
Therefore, the belief that the state should not intervene in children’s upbringing 
(except to ensure political reasonableness) follows directly from core aspects of 
the political liberal position. As such, it is unsurprising that it is a view shared by 
other prominent political liberals such as John Tomasi and Bruce Ackerman.  
Tomasi writes that: 
      ‘Political liberals, but not ethical ones, are bound to defer to the wishes of 
parents when reintergrative questions arise for developing children.  There is no 
one else, from the political liberal perspective, with the standing to fill that 
crevasse’ (Tomasi, 2000: 97).  For Ackermann, so long as parents are able to 
provide their children with a relatively coherent upbringing, a requirement he 
argues to be minimal, he believes they ought to be able to raise their children in 
whatever way they wish. (Ackermann, 1980139-163) 
 
In both cases, this view about the upbringing of children is a consequence of the 
principle of legitimacy for the same reasons that I outlined in my discussion of 
Rawls’ account.  For Tomasi, the state is incapable of guiding children’s 
development because it cannot privilege any one comprehensive doctrine. For 
Ackermann, citizens cannot object to any particular method of upbringing without 
making claims based on their own comprehensive view, which is impermissible on 
his model of justification.  As such, for both authors, as long as a scheme of 
education meets the civic standards required by political liberalism it will be 
permissible.   Thus, far from being an idiosyncratic aspect of Rawls’s account, the 
lack of state involvement in upbringing follows directly from core aspects of the 
political liberal position. 
 
Therefore, one critical implication of the principle of legitimacy is that it rules out 
attempts by the state to shape children’s non-political values.  Indeed, for some 
theorists its implications for education and upbringing go much further. Most 
notably, Matthew Clayton argues that just as the principle of legitimacy applies to 
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the actions of the state it should also apply to the conduct of children’s adult 
guardians (Clayton, 2006: 87-112). He believes that those features of the state 
which necessitate that it be bound by the principle of legitimacy are also found in 
the parent-child relationship. As such, this principle should bind parental actions 
as well. In Rawlsian terms, he argues that the family should be considered part of 
the basic structure of society. If this contention is accurate, it would follow that 
the family should be subject to the same set of limits as the institutions of the 
state and the other conventions and practices which define the background 
conditions of society. To show the similarity between the relationships of state 
and citizen and parent and child Clayton draws attention to Rawls’ criteria for 
what defines the basic structure, and notes that these features are also present in 
the relationship of parent and child.  
The most important criteria which define the basic structure, Clayton argued, 
characterise that structure as coercive, non-voluntary and as having an influence 
on life prospects right from the start. Clayton is right to point out that these 
features also seem to be present in the parent child-relationship. Specifically, 
children do not choose which family to be born into, and are therefore subject to 
their parents’ authority in a non voluntary way. This authority is, at least possibly, 
coercive in nature. Children cannot leave their family, and the institutions of the 
state give parents the right to act to keep them there. Finally, it seems fairly 
obvious that the family a person is born into will affect life chances right from the 
start. 
For Clayton, these similarities imply that there is a parallel between the parent-
child relationship and that which obtains between citizens and the state. The 
implications of this argument would be a radical change in the way we view 
legitimate parental conduct. As he says,  ‘In our parallel case, then, liberal 
legitimacy insists that parental conduct should be guides and principles that do not 
rest on the validity of any particular reasonable comprehensive doctrine. The 
ideals that guide parents must not, for example, be secular or religious ideals’ 
(Clayton, 2006: 95). Clayton’s position thus implies that parents ought not to be 
able to pass on any comprehensive view to their children. He believes that 
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common religious practices such as baptism or circumcision are illegitimate. 
Likewise, he believes parents ought to refrain from attempting to inculcate into 
their children ethical and political beliefs such as vegetarianism or socialism 
(Clayton, 2006: 107).  
While Clayton is persuasive in arguing that the parent-child relationship is similar 
to the relationship between the state and its citizens, he ignores critical 
differences between the two cases which imply that his ‘parallel case’ argument is 
eventually unsuccessful. While parents do indeed wield enormous authority over 
their children, this authority is not final in the same way as is the state’s.  Parental 
authority is itself superseded by the authority of the state, which can step in to 
alter or even break familial relations if they are judged to be harmful to the child. 
This means that older children can make claims to the state if they feel their 
parents are acting in a way which they find profoundly unacceptable. Given the 
final authority of the law and government, this possibility does not exist with 
regards to the state. 
Secondly, and most importantly, Clayton’s parallel case argument misunderstands 
the reasoning behind the principle of legitimacy, and indeed the broader project of 
Political Liberalism. While ‘non-voluntary’ and ‘coercive’ describe the basic 
structure, and underpin its importance for philosophical theorising, they are not in 
themselves the reason it is subject to the principle of legitimacy.  Instead, the 
principle of legitimacy derives from the fact that the power of the state is in fact 
the shared power of citizens themselves. 
 
Rawls argues (rightly) that liberals should not view the state as an independent 
power with authority over citizens, but rather as the pooled power of citizens 
themselves. This is one of his general facts which apply to societies like ours. He 
argues that ‘In a constitutional regime political power is also the power of equal 
citizens as a collective body’ (Rawls, 1993: 250).  It is precisely because political 
power is the shared power of citizens that the principle of legitimacy applies to 
actions of the state. Since the state is the pooled power of everyone, its actions 
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must be justifiable to all. The criterion of public justification rules out any attempt 
to govern on the basis of a single contested comprehensive conception. A 
government based on such controversial ideals cannot be justified to citizens who 
endorse radically different, but nevertheless still reasonable, comprehensive 
ideals. 
In this regard, the role of parents within families is fundamentally different from 
the role of the state within society.  A family is not a cooperative venture formed 
between equal citizens. Instead, it is a group formed by relations of intimacy in 
which some parties occupy a fundamentally different position to others. Most 
importantly, the parallel case argument breaks down because whatever the 
similarities between children and citizens, children do not yet have comprehensive 
views of their own.  As described above, the injustice of a sectarian state consists 
in the fact that citizens would be required to live in accordance with 
comprehensive ideals that they do not share. Since children, at least very young 
children,12 do not have comprehensive views of their own, it is impossible for a 
similar injustice to be done to them. 
 Parents, or other adult guardians, thus stand in a very different relationship to 
their children than that of the state to its citizens.  Since it is the nature of the 
relationship between the government and the governed which justifies the 
principle of legitimacy, these differences undermine the parallel case argument. 
Therefore, parents face a very different set of circumstances than does the state, 
their authority is less final and it is justified for different reasons.  For each of 
these reasons the parallel case argument is overstated. There certainly are 
similarities between the parent-child relationship and that which obtains between 
the state and its citizens, but these similarities are not sufficient to support the 
conclusion that each should be subject to the same normative constraints.  
                                                          
12 The age of children may well be relevant here. While it seems certain that toddlers do not have beliefs which could 
sensibly be called a comprehensive doctrine, it is also likely that elder children do have such beliefs. This fact does not 
impugn my general conclusion that the principle of liberal legitimacy would allow parents to shape their child’s beliefs. 
However, it might mean that older children had some claim of justice if their parents ignored their sincerely held beliefs, for 
instance by refusing to serve special meals to children who have decided to become vegetarians.  
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Thus, while the principle of legitimacy has important consequences for the 
upbringing of children, they derive only from its implications for the actions of the 
state. Since the state cannot take a position on matters of the good it cannot 
assess the relative merits of different sets of non-political values. It is therefore 
unable to guide children in their choice amongst these values.  This limitation is 
one which is applied specifically to the state, because this body represents the 
shared power of citizens, as such this constraint does not apply to other 
individuals or organisations. Thus, the principal of legitimacy forbids the state 
guiding children’s upbringing but keeps the door open for another actor to take 
this role.  
Intimacy 
A consideration of the implications of the principle of legitimacy thus shows that 
adults –whether parents, communities or other institutions – can legitimately 
inculcate values into children, so long as those children are still able to act as 
reasonable citizens.  However, showing that a policy is legitimate does not show 
that it is necessary or sensible.  While adults can legitimately guide children’s 
development, it might still be the case that there are good reasons to stop them 
from doing so, and to conclude instead that children should be left to develop 
independently, or that they should be raised in large institutional settings.  Either 
of these models could also meet the test of legitimacy since they could be 
formulated in a way that would not privilege any one comprehensive doctrine. 
However, while the principle of legitimacy is silent as between these competing 
methods of raising children there are other strong reasons to prefer children being 
raised primarily within a small family unit within which there is a clear hierarchy.  
This family unit need not be based around a child’s parents, and certainly need not 
include their biological parents, but in practice would probably have to be led by a 
single adult or small group of adults.  These adult guardians must be committed to 
a child’s wellbeing and will hopefully come to share a close relationship of 
intimacy with the child as they grow up.  
94 
 
Such an authority figure is beneficial in two distinct ways. Firstly, we have good 
reasons to think that children’s lives will go much better if they have a guide 
through development. This figure can provide a consistency and stability which 
would otherwise be lacking.  Further, giving adults responsibility for children is 
vital in developing a relationship of intimacy in the child’s early life. The second 
reason we have to favour this arrangement is that supporting these relationships 
of intimacy between carers and children is important for the civic aims of liberal 
education. In the context of political liberalism, such an authority figure will be a 
key player in the early stages of the development of the sense of justice.   
An adult authority figure with a coherent set of beliefs and a plan for children can 
be a valuable shield against what would otherwise be a very confusing world for 
children.  As they grow up, children will inevitably be exposed to a great many 
influences, some of which will point in different directions.  For instance, many 
individuals are concerned with the amount of violence and sexuality that children 
are exposed to through popular culture.  While the law attempts to discriminate 
between the items that can be shown to children and adults, in practice this is 
difficult to enforce. In the age of the internet, many children have access to 
material intended for individuals much older than them.  The fear is that these 
aspects of popular culture popularise or glorify a certain, self destructive, way of 
life.  In addition to music and television, children are likely to encounter adherents 
of all manner of different faiths and creeds and to be encouraged by some of them 
to adopt aspects of these world views. 
The traditional role of parents or guardians is to guide children through 
development in a way that is consistent. To achieve this, adult guardians can (try 
to) block access to certain items until an appropriate age, take children to certain 
places and away from others, and perhaps intervene in the relationships a child 
has with their peers or other adults.  Each of these actions will obviously require 
significant authority over children. The adult authority must have the final say over 
where children can go, with whom they can associate, etc.   
95 
 
Moreover, these interventions will only produce a more coherent upbringing if the 
adult acts in accordance with a plan, which will necessarily involve assumptions 
about human flourishing and the good. Thus, creating a more consistent 
upbringing can only be achieved if parents both have significant authority over 
their children and are able to act to promote one (often contested) view of the 
good life.  In guiding children’s upbringing, adults must decide which relationships 
are likely to be valuable to children, and which might be dangerous or 
undermining of their future flourishing.  In the case of younger children, they must 
choose which activities should be promoted and which discouraged. 
 In a wide variety of mundane cases, these choices have virtually no relevance to 
the goal of forming children’s sense of justice. For instance, this might include 
decisions about whether to enrol children in music courses or sports classes, or 
whether to allow them to see certain films.  Instead of being choices which are 
civically relevant, these are choices which depend almost entirely upon our 
opinion on matters of the good.  Since we live in a pluralistic society, parents will 
inevitably disagree about the correct responses to these questions. Some might 
consider music an important part of life that allows for self expression, others 
might disagree and believe that being engaged with sports is much more valuable.  
Likewise, there is unlikely to be a consensus on which cultural influences are in the 
best interests of children. However, no parent could possibly sidestep many 
controversial issues which arise during upbringing. Attempting to do so would only 
exacerbate the inconsistent messages sent to the child. Instead of trying to satisfy 
all sides in the debates over, for example, the appropriate age for children to 
develop intimate relationships, parents must raise their children in the way that 
seems best them. This is with the proviso that they are willing to explain their 
decisions to their children, and that their decisions are based on accessible 
reasons. Thus, the importance of a coherent upbringing supports allowing a child’s 
guardian to act on the basis of their own comprehensive doctrine.   
In addition to providing consistency in upbringing, having a single authority figure 
is greatly beneficial towards developing a relationship of intimacy in children’s 
early lives.  This relationship of intimacy, with the child vulnerable to the actions of 
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the adult, is important in children’s development. This importance is stressed most 
compellingly in the work of Schoeman, for whom protecting and defending this 
relationship of intimacy ought to be the primary goal of our family policy.  He 
writes that: 
        ‘For the infant, the family as here defined involves an intimate relationship 
with at least one adult. Since the psychological evidence suggests that children 
need this kind of relationship for their cognitive and emotional wellbeing we may 
conclude that children must be provided with such an arrangement’ (Schoeman, 
1980: 10). 
The empirical research Schoeman stresses the importance of children coming to 
have a close and affectionate relationship with an adult as they grow up. This 
relationship of intimacy is beneficial across a number of measurable indices of 
children’s mental and emotional development.  In the context of political 
liberalism, accepting the importance of this relationship does not depend upon 
advancing a single comprehensive doctrine.  The importance of love and nurture in 
early years, usually between parents and their own children, is common across the 
vast majority of different cultures and faiths, and is thus found in a multitude of 
different comprehensive doctrines. Its value can thus plausibly be assumed as part 
of the overlapping consensus. 
Schoeman convincingly argues that sustaining this relationship of intimacy 
requires a relatively small number of guardians who are able to act as an authority 
figure in children’s lives.  This is because the relationship will need to be largely 
private from others, and as such beyond the ability of the state or society to watch 
closely or to censure.  Only if parents are able to view most of their decisions as 
final and beyond revision are they able to act independently. Of course, such 
privacy need not be total or unquestionable. There are a whole variety of things 
which individuals in a liberal state cannot do to one another under any 
circumstances, such as violent or abusive conduct, and these limitations apply to 
parental conduct as well13. Nevertheless, unless most choices are made in private 
                                                          
13
 At this point, some commentators may wish to insist that there are legitimate differences between the rights against abuse 
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it is difficult to see how a relationship of intimacy could thrive in the necessary 
way. 
There are then good reasons to think that having a single authority figure in 
children’s lives, one who is permitted to advance her own comprehensive 
doctrine, is both legitimate and provides great benefits to the children themselves.  
In addition to these benefits to children, the civic goals of liberal education are 
also aided by having children’s upbringing guided by an adult guardian. Indeed, it 
is notable that parents or other adult guardians play a key role in Rawls’ account 
of the development of the sense of justice.  He writes that: 
        “In light of this sketch of the development of the morality of authority, it 
seems that the conditions favouring its being learned by the child are these.  First, 
the parents must love the child and be worthy objects of his admiration. In this 
way they arouse in him a sense of his own value and the desire to become the sort 
of person that they are. Secondly, they must enunciate clear and intelligible (and 
of course justifiable) rules adapted to the child’s level of comprehension.  In 
addition they should set out the reasons for these injunctions as far as these can 
be understood, and they must also follow these precepts insofar as they apply to 
them as well. The parents should exemplify the morality which they enjoin, and 
make explicit its underlying principles as time goes on. Doing this is required not 
only to arouse the child’s inclination to accept these principles at a later time, but 
also to convey how they are to be interpreted in particular cases.” (Rawls, 1971: 
466). 
Rawls’ account of children’s development sketched out here explicitly borrows 
from the work of child psychologists such as Maccoby (Rawls, 1971: 465n). For 
both theorists, the initial development of children’s impulse to behave as morality 
requires comes from mimicking the behaviour of their parents.  The first step of 
this account is a relationship of intimacy and affection between the child and their 
guardian. Indeed, the affectionate nature of this relationship is explicit in Rawls’ 
                                                                                                                                                                  
held by children compared to those held by adults. For instance, many believe that smacking children is appropriate in a way 
that smacking adults is not. Personally, I am not persuaded by this distinction, but I do not wish to develop that argument 
here. Instead, note that even if there are some legitimate differences between the ways we can treat children this would clearly 
not licence the most troubling kinds of abuse or neglect. 
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account. He writes that ‘the child comes to love the parents only if they manifestly 
first love him’ (Rawls, 1971: 463). The love felt by children motivates their desire 
to emulate the behaviour and values of their parents.  A relationship of affection 
and intimacy between parents and their children is thus the first building block in 
the development of the sense of justice 
As we have seen above, developing this relationship of intimacy is itself dependent 
upon allowing the adult guardian significant authority over children’s lives and 
allowing them to make many decisions in private.  In the context of Rawls’ 
account, the benefit of this private relationship is that children will come to 
understand that it is their guardian, rather than some remote state authority, who 
makes many decisions on how they spend their time.  This guardian will also be 
the prime figure who enforces moral norms, and should be on hand to explain the 
reasons which guide this moral scheme.  As such, the guardian is critical in children 
coming to understand the justification for morality and justice, rather than their 
obeying rules merely because they emulate others or see the prudential benefits 
of doing so.  Indeed, the sense of justice is defined as an acceptance of the duties 
of justice for principled reasons rather than simply carrying out one’s obligations 
for pragmatic reasons. Specifically, Rawls defines the sense of justice as ‘an 
effective desire to act from the principles of justice and so from the point of view 
of justice’ (Rawls, 1971: 567). 
Thus far, I initially showed that careful consideration of the principle of legitimacy 
showed that adults could legitimately act to guide the development of children’s 
comprehensive view. Following this, I argued that there are independent reasons 
in favour of children having such a guide through upbringing.  Such a guide can 
provide consistency in the messages and influences children receive, which in turn 
helps to sustain a vital relationship of intimacy in children’s development. Finally, 
having such a guide is critical to the civic purposes of political liberalism, since such 
a guide plays a key role in the development of children’s moral personality and 
sense of justice.  Taken together, these reasons seem far more powerful than any 
which could be advanced in favour of institutional upbringing of children, or a 
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system by which guardians raise children but have significantly less control over 
their lives. 
The importance of respecting families for stability  
The discussion so far has shown that allowing an adult or group to guide children’s 
development is both permissible and provides several important advantages. 
However, neither of these arguments show who such a guide should be. This final 
part of the chapter will argue that, other things equal, there are good reasons to 
let parents play this role in children’s lives. To some, who might take it as common 
sense that parents are more qualified to act as their children’s guardian than other 
adults, this argument might seem somewhat superfluous. However, in fact there 
are seriously challenges to the view that parents have such a strong claim over 
their children. 
We might reflect for instance on the relative arbitrariness of genetic bonds in 
establishing claims of ownership or priority of care. This might be taken to show 
that merely because a parent gave birth to a child does not imply that she is best 
qualified to raise him, or even that there are strong normative reasons in favour of 
allowing her to raise him. However, denying a strong notion of parents’ rights does 
not, in itself, answer the question of who should raise the children in society. All it 
shows is that we should not automatically presume that children ought to be 
raised by their parents. 
In place of this presumption in favour of parents, one possible way to assign 
parenting duties would a standard of adequacy.  At its most extreme, we could 
think that children should be raised by whoever is best qualified to raise them. Put 
this strongly, this principle is vulnerable to what Hannan and Vernon term ‘The 
Plato worry’, in that this principle seems to licence the state to carry out mass 
redistribution of children (Hannan and Vernon, 2008: 174). A more modest, and 
therefore appealing, principle is simply to suggest that parents must ensure that 
children meet an adequate standard of wellbeing or lose their parental rights. 
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However, while this principle is intuitively plausible, it is a standard which the 
political liberal state simply cannot adopt. Judgements about the merits of 
different schemes of upbringing will, inevitably, require comparisons between 
different comprehensive accounts and their implications for children’s welfare. 
This is of course precisely what is forbidden by the principle of legitimacy.  
This does not imply that any actions by parents will be permissible.  The state can 
act against parental neglect or abuse without invoking the tenets of a contested 
comprehensive doctrine.  What it does mean is that where parents have a 
developed plan of upbringing the state cannot intervene on the basis that some 
other comprehensive doctrine is superior. As such, in many cases, the state is in no 
position to compare the choices made by parents to those of other parents or 
groups.  
 A model of adult authority premised on children’s welfare is thus a non-starter for 
political liberals. Instead, we must base such an account on values and goals which 
do not depend upon any contested comprehensive view, and can thus be 
endorsed within the overlapping consensus. One such important goal is that of 
securing the assent to liberalism of as many different individuals, and hence 
different doctrines, as possible. Other things being equal, political liberalism 
should always try and be as inclusive as possible. The point of political liberalism is 
to make liberal principles acceptable to individuals who hold a wide array of 
different views. Of course, this aim does not mean that we should alter liberal 
principles to cater to citizens who are clearly behaving unreasonably, but it does 
mean that the presumption should always be in favour of accommodating 
diversity of opinion rather than imposing any section of society’s view on the rest. 
In this light of this goal, it is important to consider the value many adults place on 
having children and in guiding their development.  Recognition of this fact shows 
that there are strong reasons to allow them to act as their children’s guardian. 
Many, if not most, parents will wish to pass on important beliefs and values to 
their children.  After all, most individuals believe their beliefs and values are not 
merely one possible set of beliefs and values but rather a particularly good or right 
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one.  Given the intensely close relationship which often obtains between parents 
and their children, parents will usually have a far stronger connection to the 
choices that their children make compared to those of other members of society.  
Added to these wishes of parents, many comprehensive doctrines also provide 
reasons to allow parents the prime role in children’s upbringing. For many 
religious comprehensive doctrines there are pre-established rituals and practices 
which govern the inculcation of beliefs to the next generation.  These range from 
symbolic gestures of faith, such as circumcision, to the inclusion of children in 
religious teachings by taking them to Mosque or Sunday school. Indeed, many 
comprehensive doctrines actually require parents to inculcate certain values into 
their children. For instance, at a baptism ceremony parents pledge to bring up 
good Christian children. As such, believers of these doctrines might feel they are 
failing in their duties if they cannot raise their children in this way. 
In a sense, both of these factors are contingent on the actual wishes of individuals 
in society and the comprehensive doctrines we are likely to find there.  That is, we 
could imagine individuals who want all individuals to hold their beliefs, and place 
no special significance on guiding their children’s development. Likewise, we could 
imagine comprehensive doctrines that command inculcating values into randomly 
selected young individuals rather than one’s own children. The argument from 
stability to parental control thus does not apply in every conceivable case. 
Nevertheless, given the actual doctrines and individuals we are likely to find in 
society the balance of reasons will, in most cases, favour allowing parents to take 
the lead in raising children. 
An obvious objection at this point is that this account is political in the wrong way. 
The charge is that in allowing parents to raise their children because of the 
benefits to stability, my account bends political principles to the realities of 
political power, rather than attempting to find a reasonable consensus between 
comprehensive doctrines. The implication would be that my account is guilty of 
letting parents guide their children’s development not because it is in the child’s 
best interests, or for some other principled reason, but merely because the 
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parents wish to control their children’s upbringing and it would be a problem for 
the state if this wish was denied. 
The problem with this line of thought is that, as I have shown, the political liberal 
state cannot legitimately judge what is in children’s best interest in many cases.  
By allowing parents to take the lead in upbringing we are not bending what would 
otherwise be the just course towards that which is pragmatically required. Rather, 
this is an area in which the state cannot legitimately prefer one course over 
another. As such, there will often be no countervailing reason against allowing 
parents to raise their children as they see fit, while there are clear benefits to 
stability if the state does allow this. 
 Ceding children’s moral and ethical education to parents is thus a natural step for 
political liberalism.  If we accept the principle of legitimacy we cannot also accept 
a model of state-sanctioned parental authority based on furthering children’s best 
interests.  Accepting a child centred view of the role of parents requires a 
developed account of children’s interests against which we could assess the value 
of various different schemes of upbringing. Except in relatively easy cases, such as 
abuse or neglect, creating such a model will require assessing the merits of 
competing comprehensive doctrines, which of course is beyond the purview of the 
political liberal state. Since we cannot assign the role of guardian on the basis of 
children’s interests, we must look for other relevant factors which do not depend 
upon assessments of different comprehensive doctrines. A critical factor here is 
the importance of the role of parents to many individuals and widely held 
comprehensive conceptions. Blocking parental wishes risks casting liberalism as 
antithetical to these widely held and deeply ingrained understandings about the 
role and authority of parents, a move that would be deeply detrimental to Rawls’ 
wider project. 
Conclusions  
Taken together, consideration of these three issues creates a compelling argument 
for letting parents guide their children’s development, so long as they meet the 
civic requirements of political liberalism.  To recap: I began with a consideration of 
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legitimacy, and showed that this implied that the state could not take a role in the 
development of children’s non-political values, since it could not legitimately 
favour any such set of values over another.  This requirement applied only to the 
state, and as such other actors in society are still able to play such a role.  
The importance of having such a guide to development is given by the need to 
have a consistent upbringing, which is helpful for children in developing their own 
comprehensive view of the world.  Within the framework of political liberalism, 
having development led by a single individual (or group) is the first step in the 
development of the sense of justice.  Therefore, political liberal principles both 
permit individuals to guide children’s development and give us strong reasons to 
want them to do it. 
Finally, I showed that, other things being equal, political liberals have good reason 
to think that parents should be this guide within children’s lives.  This is not 
because of any claim about ownership or the genetic bond between parents and 
their children, but rather focuses on the value of achieving stability for the right 
reasons.  Passing on values to children is a central component of many 
comprehensive doctrines, as well as a strong desire of many parents. If political 
liberals opposed parents passing on values to children they would thus become 
hostile to these views, or force their adherents to make radical changes to their 
tenets before being admitted to the overlapping consensus. Doing this would 
undermine the ecumenical nature of the project, and should be avoided if 
possible. Since political liberals can have no decisive reason to favour any 
particular scheme of upbringing, these other reasons will usually be decisive in 
favour of letting parents take the lead. Although this is always with the proviso 
that parents will raise children who are able to act as reasonable citizens.  
Two points emerge from these discussions which are important for the broader 
project.  The first is that this argument for parental control flows from central 
components of the political liberal position. The desire to include as many diverse 
doctrines within the liberal polity as possible favours giving parents a relatively 
free hand, bound only by the shared civic goals of the liberal state.  Most 
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significantly, the principle of legitimacy limits the scope of the state to challenge 
parents’ wishes, since to do so may require favouring one comprehensive 
conception over another. The deference to parental wishes is thus not an 
accidental or easily modifiable aspect of Rawls’ position.  It seems unlikely political 
liberals could show how a set of values to govern children’s non-political lives 
could be promoted by the state without violating the principle of legitimacy. As 
such, the state lacks grounds to challenge the views passed on by parents. 
The second point is that this argument holds independently of any account of 
parental authority or genetic reasons to favour giving authority to a child’s parents 
rather than to other adults. Indeed, my account would apply even if we assume 
that parents have absolutely no natural rights at all to make choices for their 
children. Even on this, rather extreme, view it would still be the case that having 
an adult guide children’s development has many important benefits. As we have 
seen, for political liberals the state cannot legitimately pursue this goal, thus some 
non-state actor must thus be found.  
 At this point, many theorists would argue that decisions should be made by the 
party best able to make choices that will be in a child’s best interest. However, 
given the political liberal principle of neutrality, the state cannot assess the merits 
of different sets of non-political values, and thus the decision must be made on 
other grounds.   A powerful reason which applies here is that giving this role to 
parents is highly beneficial towards the goal of creating a society which is stable 
for the right reasons. There is thus a compelling case for ceding children’s 
upbringing to their parents that would hold even if we were to assume that being 
a child’s biological parent has no moral weight at all. 
This conclusion is significant for both the shape and content of the thesis.  Because 
theories of parental rights do not affect the implications of political liberalism for 
children’s upbringing they are irrelevant to the scope of this thesis.  Of course, this 
is not to say that such work is irrelevant to other areas of inquiry; settling these 
questions is vital to the distributional issues I mentioned earlier and will still be of 
importance to theorists who reject the political liberal principle of legitimacy. 
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Nevertheless, the argument of this chapter explains why contested theories of 
parental rights are not discussed in detail within the thesis, despite their seemingly 
close connection to the overall topic.  
 As well as determining the issues discussed in the thesis, this argument has 
important connotations for the continuing argument.  I have shown in this chapter 
that the preference in favour of parental control follows from the central goals of 
Political Liberalism, the impetus to create a society which is stable for the right 
reasons. Further, I have demonstrated that because the inclination to favour 
parents follows from the search for stability it is a conclusion which applies 
independently of theories more specifically concerned with parental rights, and 
thus applies to political liberals whatever their beliefs about the nature of the 
parent-child relationship.  In the next section, I will show this implication to be 
deeply problematic for political liberals.  The argument of this chapter shows we 
cannot avoid these implications merely by arguing against a notion of parental 
control, the argument of the next shows that we must alter deep seated aspects of 


















Chapter 5-The Requirements of Civic Education. 
The previous chapter showed that within a political liberal framework, parents will 
have broad authority to control their children’s upbringing.  The most significant 
restriction on this authority is that their children must be able to act as reasonable 
citizens when they grow up.  Understanding what constitutes a reasonable citizen, 
and what kind of upbringing is required to produce one, is thus key to 
understanding the educational implications of political liberalism. 
 For Rawls himself, the framework laid out in Political Liberalism implies a 
relatively lax set of requirements.  On his position, political liberalism requires far 
less in education than other varieties of liberalism. If Rawls is correct about the 
implications of political liberalism it would imply that parents have much more 
leeway to guide children in the way that they desire.  However, many prominent 
authors argue that the requirements of political liberalism are in fact much more 
stringent than Rawls believes. Indeed, for a number of influential theorists the 
practical implications of political liberalism are indistinguishable from those of 
comprehensive varieties of liberalism which seek to promote autonomy. 
 Theorists such as Amy Gutmann and Eamonn Callan posit that when the 
requirements of political liberalism are set against the most plausible assumptions 
about human nature and society they require a similar set of policies to those 
required by ‘education for autonomy’ (although for different reasons). I term this 
view the convergence thesis.  If the convergence thesis is correct, political 
liberalism will have very different implications for education to those posited by 
Rawls.  All children in a well ordered society will grow up believing that autonomy 
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is fundamental to living a good life, and each will have the skills necessary to act in 
an autonomous way.  An important consequence of the convergence thesis for my 
own argument would be that parental choices would be much more constricted 
than they are on Rawls’s account. 
Perhaps the leading article supporting the convergence thesis is Amy Gutmann’s 
‘Civic Education and Social Diversity’ (1995). In this piece, Gutmann states that ‘the 
two educational practices [those of political and comprehensive liberalism] 
amount in practice to largely, if not entirely, the same thing’ (Gutmann, 1995: 
574). Her thesis is echoed by other leading educational scholars such as Eamonn 
Callan, who believes his argument brings Political Liberalism ‘out of the closet’ and 
reveals it to be simply another species of comprehensive liberalism (Callan, 1997: 
41). 
Given the existence of these arguments we cannot simply take at face value Rawls’ 
own account of the implications of his principles. Instead, we must take a closer 
look at the role education is supposed to play in a political liberal society and at 
why Rawls believed this role implied a very different kind of education to that 
advocated by other liberal theorists.  
When laying out the goals of education in his own account of political liberalism, 
Rawls states that: 
 ‘the liberalisms of Kant and Mill may lead to requirements designed to foster the 
values of autonomy and individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life.  But 
Political Liberalism has a different aim and requires far less.  It will ask that 
children’s education include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and 
civil rights…  Moreover, their education should also prepare them to be fully co-
operating members of society and enable them to be self supporting, it should 
also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of 
social co-operation in their relations with the rest of society’ (Rawls, 1993 : 199). 
The goal of education within Political Liberalism is thus to ensure that children are 
prepared to become fully co-operating members of liberal society.  Under 
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conditions of pluralism, becoming a fully co-operating member of society requires 
being able to live with individuals who hold comprehensive views different from 
one’s own.  There is thus a requirement to tolerate other citizens’ beliefs.  Being a 
fully co-operating member of society also means having an understanding of the 
rights and responsibilities of citizens. Educators thus do have an important role to 
play in children’s moral upbringing. Nevertheless, for Rawls education has a much 
more limited role than would the case under most influential varieties of 
comprehensive liberalism, and certainly one which held that the role of education 
was to promote autonomy. 
This chapter will look in detail at each of these three requirements laid out in 
Political Liberalism.  In each case, while the proponents of the convergence thesis 
are right to point to some overlap they greatly overstate their case. The 
requirements of political liberalism do, unavoidably, have implications for the non-
political aspects of life.  The kind of education that is needed to produce good 
liberal citizens will undoubtedly favour some types of comprehensive view over 
others. However, the existence of this overlap does not imply anything like full 
convergence. Instead, a well ordered political liberal society would allow a far 
more diverse range of educational outcomes than those required by a liberalism 
directly committed to promoting autonomy.  
Toleration and mutual respect 
Holding tolerant views of other citizens’ cultures and beliefs is an essential part of 
becoming a reasonable citizen. Given the context to which Political Liberalism is 
addressed, namely a modern pluralistic democracy, it is all but inevitable that 
children will encounter a myriad of other faiths and creeds.  In order to participate 
fully in such a society, citizens must be able to live peacefully with other citizens 
despite their differing creeds, faiths or perspectives on life. However, as Gutmann 
points out, simply being able to tolerate other citizens is not enough.  A political 
liberal state cannot endure simply as a pragmatically justified modus vivendi but 
must instead secure stability because its citizens recognise that all of their fellow 
citizens have an equal place in their society. As I discussed in chapter three, for 
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Rawls this requirement is that liberal states must be stable for the right reasons 
(Rawls, 1993: 390).  
To establish her case for the convergence thesis, Gutmann begins by arguing that 
the development of the virtue of tolerance in citizens requires that they have an 
advanced education. The suggestion is that if children grow up within the confines 
of a single family or community, they will be unable to appreciate the claims of 
other very different communities.  Legally mandating that children attend school 
until their late teens is necessary to ensure that they encounter a variety of 
different views, and ensures attendance at lessons in which they will develop a 
tolerant attitude towards other citizens. Gutmann’s assertion is reinforced by a 
series of empirical studies that suggest a strong positive correlation between 
higher levels of education and more tolerant attitudes.   
The broad strategy of Gutmann’s paper then hinges upon what she calls a ’spill-
over’ effect (Gutmann, 1995: 572). While promoting autonomy is not the aim of 
political liberal education, it is the inevitable by-product and hence the 
convergence thesis is sustained. As an example of this she cites the case of 
Wisconsin vs Yoder, where she believes political liberals ought to side against the 
parents because education beyond the age of fourteen is necessary to promote 
toleration. Since this will also inevitably involve advancing a variety of skills and 
offering the children a series of opportunities it will to some extent also promote 
their autonomy. Thus, in this case at least, the implications of both political 
liberalism and liberal perfectionism would be similar. 
The empirical work cited by Gutmann is compelling, and when it is combined with 
the normative requirement for children to respect one another, her conclusion 
that we should reject the wishes of the parents in the Yoder case seems valid.  
However, it is unclear how much this line argument of argument can justify except 
in cases, such as Yoder, in which the parents wish their children to be removed 
from school entirely.  Indeed, a general problem with Gutmann’s account is an 
over-reliance on a rather narrow set of examples. Specifically, the paper uses the 
cases of Mozert and Yoder as ‘test cases’ and then generalises from these to show 
110 
 
a more general convergence between political liberalism and liberal perfectionism. 
However, while obviously of enormous importance - and of great value in showing 
the practical relevance of theoretical reasoning - there are features of both Yoder 
and Mozert which obscure important aspects of the theoretical issues at stake.  
Thus concentrating on a few specific cases may cause political and comprehensive 
liberalism to appear closer than is in fact the case. 
The unusual elements of Yoder are obvious. As discussed earlier, the case dealt 
with the children of the old order Amish community, who lived separately from 
the mainstream of American life and did not participate in shared civic institutions.  
The parents wished to remove their children from school after the age of fourteen, 
since only education up to this level was necessary for the Amish lifestyle, and 
they felt that further education would endanger their community since exposing 
their children to ‘English’ culture might lead them away from the Amish way of 
life.   
The case of Mozert vs. Hawkins dealt with the claim of Vicki Frost, a deeply 
religious Christian Evangelical, who believed that the curriculum of the Hawkins 
county school in which three of her children were educated was offensive to her 
religious beliefs.  She argued that imposing the curriculum on her children 
constituted a violation of her right to practice her religion freely. While this can be 
read as a classic case of religious parents arguing against liberal views being 
passed on to their children, the case is in fact atypical in a number of respects. 
Frost herself held an unusually fundamentalist interpretation of the demands of 
her Christian faith.  Stephen Macedo quotes her as suggesting in court that the 
word God as found in the bible formed ‘the totality of my beliefs’ (Macedo, 1995: 
471). This, the court found, went beyond the commitments of most of the other 
members of her Church, indeed even of her pastor.  Her hard line creed led Frost 
to have objections to the curriculum beyond those parts specifically dealing with 
other cultures or faiths.   
Any analysis of these specific parental concerns risks obscuring a number of salient 
issues.  Thus, while Gutmann seems right to say that both a political and a 
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comprehensive liberal could have strong reason to reject the parents’ demands in 
both cases, that might be largely due to the extreme nature of the particular 
claims made.  In light of this, her conclusions about specific cases may tell us little 
about how each framework deals with the issue of finding the appropriate place 
for religion in schooling or other religiously motivated objections to state policy.  
As Shelley Burtt rightly says, a wide assertion that the major religions are opposed 
to critical thinking or informed debate is an unhelpful generalisation (Burtt, 1994). 
She argues that many religious schools encourage debates on ethical issues and 
interpretation of texts more rigorously than some public schools. 
Of course, religious schools may restrict teaching about other faiths, and conduct 
ethical debate solely through the lens of one doctrine.  These are things with 
which liberals of all stripes might legitimately find fault, but that is simply to say 
the problem of faith in schooling is finer grained, and demands a more subtle 
response, than considering solely the objections of the parents in Mozert or Yoder 
may suggest. 
Within the context of this chapter, both Yoder and Mozert represent cases in 
which the parents’ wishes both compromised their children’s autonomy to a 
significant degree, and rely on accepting principles that could seriously undermine 
the civic aims of political liberalism.  They are thus the easiest cases in which to 
show largely convergent outcomes between the two competing understandings of 
liberalism.  Perfectionist liberals would reject the parents’ demands because those 
demands would compromise the children’s development into autonomous adults, 
whereas political liberals would have good grounds to reject them for other 
reasons, but the practical result may well be similar in the way Gutmann describes. 
A more general test for convergence must thus look at more frequent, and 
moderate, cases of parental objections to a state curriculum. More often than 
wishing to withdraw their children entirely parents will object only to one aspect 
of the curriculum.  Classic cases might be parents objecting to their children 
learning about another religion, about sex, or about Darwin’s theory of evolution.  
Since Gutmann’s case is reliant on the spill-over effect, only if these specific 
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aspects of education are necessary for the promotion of toleration does the 
political liberal have a compelling reason to overrule the parents. 
Here Gutmann’s case seems a great deal less compelling. She argues that ‘the 
effective teaching of toleration, for example, typically requires at least a high 
school education’ (Gutmann, 1995: 567).  While this assertion is plausible, the 
convergence thesis does not follow from it since I have argued that the more 
interesting cases are not those in which parents oppose a high school education 
outright but where parents oppose only one aspect of the curriculum. All that the 
empirical data show is that there is a correlative relationship between attending 
school and developing appropriate attitudes towards other children.  It is still an 
open question whether those aspects of education that are usually the focus of 
disputes with religious parents are essential for the inculcation of toleration.   
There are many aspects of attending school that might plausibly encourage 
children to develop tolerant attitudes towards others.  While at school, children 
will likely encounter other children who hold differing views from their own. They 
may well make friends with such individuals, or at least learn that they must be 
able to co-exist peacefully with them.  In so far as these early experiences foster 
attitudes of toleration, political liberals may well have reason to require 
educational institutions to draw attendees from across different backgrounds and 
social strata and require children to attend such schooling (hence the convergence 
with comprehensive liberals in Yoder).  However, these general positive outcomes 
of a high school education do not entail the convergence thesis, since there might 
still be reasons why the curriculum required by political liberalism is significantly 
different from that required by comprehensive liberalism.  
As I have suggested, more usual cases than the extreme of Yoder are those in 
which parents demand that their children are removed only from certain aspects 
of schooling, for instance science lessons which refer to the theory of evolution, or 
in which they send their children to schools which place special emphasis on the 
teaching of one faith over others. Liberals who are concerned directly with the 
promotion of autonomy have reason to worry about such restrictions on children’s 
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education. Learning only about the tenets of one creed restricts our choice 
between the various competing doctrines found within society.   However, if a 
‘faith school’ can ensure that children are tolerant of others and accept a liberal 
polity, then political liberals would not have reason to object.  Therefore, in so far 
as a religiously motivated education can meet the demands of teaching toleration 
while restricting the curriculum presented to students, there are a whole series of 
real world cases in which the two theories might reach different outcomes.   
Indeed, it is in fact crucial to the broader purposes of political liberalism that 
devout believers of one faith might nevertheless tolerate the presence of others 
within a liberal regime.  As discussed in the review of Political Liberalism, stability 
within a political liberal society depends upon establishing an overlapping 
consensus between all the reasonable comprehensive conceptions held in society. 
Thus, this idea depends upon support for liberal principles being found within, or 
at least being compatible with, the doctrines of each the various creeds and faiths 
found within society.  If a certain religion is within the overlapping consensus, and 
thus its tenets are themselves supportive of, or at least consistent with, liberal 
values, it is unclear how exclusive education in only this doctrine would undermine 
the commitment to liberal principles.   
This implies that political liberals cannot always object to children receiving a 
religiously guided education solely on the grounds that it will be detrimental to the 
formulation of appropriate attitudes to other citizens’ beliefs.  If the political 
liberal model is functioning properly then these religious beliefs themselves ought 
to be sources of support for liberal principles. 
Therefore, when considering the relationship between educating for tolerance and 
promoting autonomy the case of Yoder is not always a helpful guide.  In Yoder, the 
parents wished to remove their children from school such that they would not 
meet individuals from other backgrounds.  Further, the parents aimed to inculcate 
them into a value system which is somewhat inimical to liberal politics. Under such 
circumstances we would expect a convergence between the promotion of 
autonomy and the civic aims of education.   
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However, in many other cases parents will wish to remove their children only from 
some aspects of the curriculum, or will ask that their children be brought up within 
the teachings of a single faith.  In both of these examples, the case for 
convergence is much weaker.  Where parents object only to one aspect of the 
curriculum, Gutmann’s case relies on establishing that it is this particular set of 
lessons which is necessary for gaining tolerant beliefs, a position which is doubtful 
in many cases, such as teaching the theory of evolution.  Moreover, political 
liberals cannot coherently argue that faith based schools will necessarily 
undermine their civic aims. If the doctrine is within the overlapping consensus it 
ought to promote these aims within itself. Therefore, in both of these cases, 
liberals concerned with promoting autonomy would still have reason to object, 
whereas political liberals would not.  This suggests that while at the extreme of 
Yoder the two approaches will reach similar conclusions, for a variety of other 
cases the balance of reasoning will be different.   
At this point, defenders of the convergence thesis might object that while 
comprehensive and political liberals would reach differing outcomes in some 
cases, the outcomes of the two theories in education might still be the same. All 
Gutmann must claim is that those cases in which the theories do reach similar 
conclusions are sufficient to sustain a more general convergence between political 
and comprehensive liberalism.   However, this argument is undermined by 
examples of plausible cases which I have already outlined in which the two 
theories would have reasons to come to different conclusions. I will now show 
basing the convergence thesis on those cases in which the comprehensive and 
political liberalism come to the same conclusion requires holding a narrow, and 
implausible, view of the notion of autonomy. 
A general convergence between comprehensive and political liberalism could be 
sustained by the assumption that individuals are either autonomous or they are 
not. On this model, all we would need to show is that political liberalism can be 
said to make children autonomous. From this it would follow that the theories 
converge because both would create autonomous citizens. However, more 
plausible than thinking individuals are simply either autonomous or not is 
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recognising that autonomy is a complex notion that admits of degrees.  Thus, we 
recognise that while Amish children’s autonomy might be restricted relative to a 
child who completes high school, a high school education does not exhaust the 
possibilities for autonomy promotion. Once this is recognised, we can grant that 
while some ‘spill over’ does exist, this does not imply that the convergence thesis 
is correct.  The education demanded by political liberalism may end up promoting 
autonomy to some degree (given that, for example, political liberals ought to side 
against the Amish in the case of Yoder).  However, there is strong reason to think 
that a political liberalism, as it is understood by Rawls, will promote autonomy to a 
far lesser degree than would most plausible varieties of comprehensive liberalism. 
In practical terms, a consideration of how we might promote the virtue of 
tolerance shows that there are a number of actions which parents will be 
legitimately able to take in a political liberal state which they would be unable to 
do in a state with perfectionist aims.  We have seen, for instance, that 
perfectionist liberals are likely to support children having the knowledge and 
ability to choose between many different religious alternatives, whereas political 
liberals should be comfortable with children receiving education through the lens 
of only one doctrine. Moreover, while parents may not be able to remove their 
children from education entirely, they are still able to guide their children’s 
development in a way liberals committed to autonomy could not accept.  They 
could do this by objecting to aspects of the curriculum which were hostile to their 
comprehensive account, and ensuring their children do not participate in these 
lessons, or perhaps by educating their children at home. 
Knowledge of constitutional essentials and liberal citizenship. 
The second role of education for Rawls is in ensuring that children become fully 
co-operating members of society.  Liberal citizens are co-operative members of 
society in a variety of ways.  They participate economically through their jobs and 
as consumers.   Further, for political liberals the just society is a democratic one. 
Therefore, there is a requirement for laws to be debated amongst citizens 
themselves.  Future citizens must become co-operating members of society if the 
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liberal values and institutions to which we are committed are to survive and thrive 
over time.   
For the purposes of this chapter the essential question is what is required in order 
to be a ‘fully’ co-operating member of society. That is, how far political liberal 
purposes require children to be educated such that they are able, and willing, to 
participate in the political and economic life of the state.  The extent of the 
requirements of being a liberal citizen determines whether the convergence thesis 
is accurate. Relatively lax requirements will allow more diversity in upbringing and 
education, whereas relatively stringent requirements will tend to push children 
towards a certain way of life.  
A relatively robust notion of the requirements of liberal citizenship is present in 
Gutmann’s article, as well as forming the central plank of other leading political 
liberal works on education, such as Stephen Macedo’s Diversity and Distrust 
(2000). Furthermore for both Gutmann and Macedo, the requirements of 
becoming fully co-operating members are phrased in ways which seem to include 
a commitment to personal autonomy. For Macedo, the requirements of liberal 
citizenship imply that ‘Children must at the very least be provided with the 
intellectual tools necessary to understand the world around them, formulate their 
own convictions and make their own way in life’ (Macedo, 2000: 238).  The 
requirements of democratic citizenship thus seem fertile ground for the 
convergence thesis. Since children must be able to grow up into individuals 
capable of participating fully in a democratic polity, there will be stringent limits 
on any parental conduct which might imperil their ability to do this.  
However, before moving too swiftly with this argument, it is worth looking again 
at Rawls’ understanding of the characteristics necessary to function as a citizen.  In 
his terminology the capacities necessary to become a fully participating member 
of society are the two moral powers, the reasonable and the rational.  The rational 
denotes the ability to form and revise a coherent plan of life, the reasonable the 
ability to propose and accept fair terms of co-operation with others (Rawls, 1993: 
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48-54).  Qua citizens, individuals in a liberal state are assumed to have a higher 
order interest in the development of these moral powers. 
The goal of educating children so as to promote these capacities is thus consonant 
with Rawls’ own interpretation of the requirements of political liberalism. 
However, there is a critical distinction to be made here between mandating that 
children must be educated so that their moral powers are sufficient to co-operate 
in society, and arguing that those moral powers ought to be promoted in 
education as far as is possible. 
The assumption that citizens have a higher order interest in the development of 
their moral powers is common to both Political Liberalism and Rawls’ earlier work, 
A Theory of Justice.    This assumption underwrites the interests of the parties in 
the original position, and thus is an essential component of Rawls’ constructivist 
methodology.  However, in Rawls’ later work this higher order interest cannot 
form part of a wider theory about human flourishing.  For it to do so would be in 
clear violation of his principle of legitimacy.   
Instead, the moral powers are assumed to be good for citizens in so far as their 
own conceptions of the good are rooted in a political context.  Apart from perhaps 
the most ascetic of lives, pursuing any conception of the good will require access 
to primary goods.  This, in turn, necessitates co-operation with others.  Thus Rawls 
states that:            
      ‘we view citizens, for the purposes of political justice, as normal and fully co-
operating members of society over a complete life, and thus as having the moral 
powers that enable them to assume this role.  In this context we might say: part of 
the essential nature of citizens (within the political conception) is their having the 
two moral powers which root their capacity to participate in fair social 
cooperation‘ (Rawls, 1993: 202). 
The exercise and development of the moral powers cannot then be viewed as 
intrinsically valuable within the political conception of persons, because to do that 
would be illegitimate. Instead, their use is viewed as instrumentally valuable given 
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the value of social co-operation, which is assumed to be essential for the broad 
range of comprehensive views held in society.  Given this instrumental account of 
the value of co-operation, it does not follow that the goal of promoting the pre-
requisites of citizenship can give licence to the strongly liberal programme in 
education outlined by Macedo or Gutmann. In fact, focussing upon the nature of 
the moral powers seems to preclude this stance.  Political Liberalism counts 
persons as equal citizens, and thus fully co-operating members of society by virtue 
of their possessing these moral powers to a sufficient degree. From this, we must 
conclude that development of the moral powers beyond this threshold does not 
improve the sense in which one is regarded as a ‘fully cooperating citizen’. 
Rawls is able to claim that citizens have a higher order interest in the development 
of the moral powers because it is reasonable to assume social co-operation is 
necessary for all reasonable comprehensive views.  Since the moral powers are the 
pre-requisites of social co-operation, all reasonable citizens have an interest in 
possessing them despite their differing plans of life.  However, it is far from clear 
that this convergence can be extended to imply that political liberals should 
always wish to promote the moral powers. For instance, while it may be true that 
pursuing a devoutly religious life requires some resources and some co-operation 
with others, it does not seem right to suggest that such a life will require active 
engagement with the democratic process or high level skills which are valuable in 
the market place (and this argument can surely be applied to less strict 
commitments that are nonetheless relatively asocial).  Thus while Rawls can 
plausibly suggest that a limited education is valuable to all, or almost all, 
conceptions of the good, this will not hold for a more advanced education. It is this 
advanced education which is needed to sustain the convergence thesis, since 
Ceteris Paribus perfectionist liberals have reason to promote children’s education 
as far as possible.   
Thus far then, I have attempted to draw out a distinction between educating 
children to develop the qualities that allow them to become participating citizens 
in society and regarding the aim of education as the promotion of those qualities.  
The former position takes the development of children’s faculties as a standard 
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which must be met; the second takes the promotion of these skills as an end in 
themselves. In light of political liberalism’s purpose in securing stability, and basic 
political equality between all co-operating members of society regardless of their 
occupation or capacities, it must be this former position to which political liberals 
are committed.  
In order to tie this distinction to the central question of this chapter, I will now 
attempt to show that it is one which results in important practical differences in 
educational provision between political and comprehensive liberalism.   Again, the 
focus upon Mozert and Yoder might serve to obscure these differences.  In both 
cases, one could argue that the parents’ wishes would in some way compromise 
their children’s abilities to become fully co-operating members of liberal society.  
This is most obviously true of in Yoder, in which the parents sought to withdraw 
their children from the wider society. However, in Mozert too, the sheer volume of 
information and debate which the parents sought to keep from their children 
would have served to exclude the children from any number of aspects of liberal 
democratic society. 
Once again though there seem to be a host of other cases in which parents might 
have wishes for their children that may seem illiberal, and possibly damaging in 
the view of some comprehensive liberals, but whose overall civic impact would be 
negligible.  Take for instance a hypothetical case in which girls are discouraged 
from undertaking advanced schooling because their parents believe that a 
woman’s life is more appropriately spent in the home. This might be for religious 
reasons, but there may be many secular individuals who also believe this.  For 
instance, we could imagine communitarian reasons for removing children from 
schooling, so that they are more likely to stay in the area in which they grew up or 
pursue low-skilled careers associated with a certain community or area.   
Liberals who wish to promote autonomy have clear grounds on which to oppose 
parents wishing to prevent their children from engaging in further education.   Of 
course, counter reasons drawn from parental authority or practical feasibility will 
still apply; no liberal will always favour granting more opportunities in all 
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circumstances.  However, for perfectionist liberals there will be pro tanto reasons 
in favour of opening up further opportunities to all children, no matter their 
parents’ comprehensive views. 
The case seems much less clear for a purely civically minded education. 
Housewives and domestic carers must surely constitute ‘full and cooperating’ 
members of society. As, of course, would individuals who did not attend advanced 
education but instead pursued low-skilled occupations. Referring back to my 
earlier theoretical distinction, they will therefore meet the threshold set by 
political liberalism.  Thus, whilst counter-factually higher education might 
engender in these girls a desire to participate more fully in political and economic 
life, this alone cannot be a sufficient reason to object to the parents’ actions.  To 
argue that the stability of liberal institutions is threatened by individuals choosing 
careers which do not require an advanced education seems untenable. 
Therefore, as was the case regarding the issue of toleration, there is indeed some 
overlap between the civic requirements of political liberalism and the promotion 
of autonomy.  Again though, the link is far weaker than the assertion of 
convergence implies.  Therefore, returning to the proponents of the convergence 
thesis, Macedo is right to suggest that ‘democratically constituted educational 
institutions may – and should – promote the ideal of a broadly educated and 
engaged citizenry’ (Macedo, 2000: 239).  However, I have argued that these 
institutions may only do this up to the point at which the aim of stability for the 
right reasons is met. This is co-terminous with the point at which children are 
capable of becoming fully functioning liberal citizens.  Furthermore, I have posited 
that these criteria are far more minimal than the convergence thesis requires.  
This can be demonstrated by any case in which parental actions that seem to 
compromise autonomy have little, if any, significance for the continuation of 
liberal values and institutions within society. Given a plausible understanding of 
this criterion of stability, parents will be able to influence their children’s 
development to a far greater extent than they would under more comprehensive 
accounts of liberalism.  
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Ensuring children hold a reasonable comprehensive view 
The final legitimate end of education for political liberalism I will consider concerns 
the status of the beliefs and creeds which are present in pluralistic society.   Rawls 
states that reasonable citizens ‘accept the consequences of the burdens of 
judgement’ (Rawls, 1993: 54-58).  As such, they will recognise that there are a 
myriad of other reasonable comprehensive views in society, and they will not 
consider their own view to have special political status.  As education’s purpose 
for political liberalism is in creating reasonable citizens, it thus has a role to play in 
shaping the status children give to their own views and those of others. 
Eamonn Callan offers a subtle argument that attempts to show that this goal 
provides a link between political liberalism’s educational agenda and the kind of 
education which will also promote autonomy.  He argues that in order to accept 
other doctrines as reasonable we must learn about their tenets, and think critically 
about the advantages of their approach to our own.  He writes that: 
     ‘the attempt to understand the reasonableness of convictions which may be in 
deep conflict with doctrines learned in the family cannot be carried through 
without inviting the disturbing question that these might be the framework of a 
better way of life, or at least one that is just as good.  The question is unavoidable 
because to understand the reasonableness of beliefs that initially seem wrong or 
repellent I must imaginatively entertain the perspective those very beliefs furnish, 
and from that perspective my own way of life will look worse, or at least no better, 
than what that perspective affirms (Callan, 1997: 36).’  
The link to autonomy, then, is through those capacities needed to understand and 
engage with other cultures and creeds and to see why their views are reasonable. 
Callan believes that properly engaging with other beliefs requires the ability to 
dissociate oneself from one’s own view.  This allows one to assess other systems 
of thought in an unbiased fashion. Further, one must possess sufficient capacities 
to understand a variety of different claims, made from within radically different 
frameworks, and be able to weigh these arguments against one another.  
Educating children to meet these standards will require questioning ‘the moral 
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authority of the family and the various associations in which the child grows up’, 
and encouraging children to encounter a whole host of other views.  Taken 
together such measures seem to ‘look like a pretty familiar description of the 
central elements in an education for autonomy’ (Callan, 1997: 40). 
My argument against this account will centre on the understanding of the burdens 
of judgement which drives Callan’s argument. With this in mind, it is worth looking 
at the context in which Rawls introduces the burdens of judgment and the role 
they play within his argument.  These factors explain why disagreement still occurs 
between citizens behaving reasonably, and include such things as our different 
upbringings and the difficulties of weighing evidence.  As Rawls defines it, 
disagreement between reasonable citizens is between those individuals ‘who have 
realized their two moral powers to be free and equal citizens in a constitutional 
regime’ (Rawls, 1993: 55).  As I argued in chapter three, accepting the existence of 
the burdens of judgment is therefore not best understood as an epistemological 
matter at all, but rather as a matter of accepting the inevitability of disagreement 
in liberal societies and having an appropriate normative reaction to this fact. 
Understanding the requirement to accept the burdens of judgment as largely 
normative rather than epistemological explains why Rawls sets the criterion of 
reasonableness in a relatively lax way.  Indeed, he explicitly differentiates the 
standards of reasoning we might use within our private debates and the standards 
of reasoning appropriate to Political Liberalism, he writes that:  
           ‘Certainly, comprehensive doctrines will themselves, as they present their 
case in the background culture, urge far tighter standards of reasonableness and 
truth. Within that culture we may regard many doctrines as plainly unreasonable, 
or untrue, that we think it is correct to count as reasonable by the criteria in the 
text.  That criterion we should see as giving rather minimal conditions appropriate 
for the aims of political liberalism’. (Rawls, 1993: 60f)  Indeed, Rawls goes as far to 
say we should count as reasonable doctrines we ‘could not seriously entertain for 
ourselves’ (Rawls, 1993: 59).  
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For Rawls, then, accepting the burdens of judgment is essentially a normative 
commitment to put aside certain metaphysical and theological views when 
engaging in political argument. We must come to see that the disagreements we 
may have with other citizens over ethics or theology, however important they may 
be in our personal lives, are not relevant to our views of other citizens’ political 
status. As I argued in chapter three, it follows from this account that distinguishing 
between reasonable and unreasonable views is largely a matter of deciding 
whether the view in question is held in good faith by other citizens.  Assessing the 
reasonableness of other citizen’s views does not therefore involve a serious 
consideration of the actual reasons backing up their opinions. This conclusion 
undermines Callan’s arguments, since it is this precisely the requirement that 
citizens engage in deep reflection about other citizens’ views which drives Callan’s 
iteration of the convergence thesis.  
To illustrate the differences between my understanding of reasonableness and 
the burdens of judgment and the way Callan understands these concepts, consider 
the following passage:                                                          
  “After all, it would be absurd to teach citizens to adopt the required 
interpretation of their general ethical or religious convictions when they address 
fundamental political questions while insisting that they are at liberty to reject it 
whenever they are thinking or acting in a non-civic capacity. That would be to 
invite them to oscillate between contradictory beliefs about the rational status of 
their deepest beliefs, and that is hardly an alluring fate for anyone” (Callan, 1997: 
31). 
Note that Callan here refers to the rational status of our deepest beliefs. This 
reflects his belief that accepting the burdens of judgment is primarily an epistemic 
commitment. For Callan, coming to understand that another view is reasonable 
means engaging imaginatively with its tenets and practices. As this quote implies, 
his account of coming to accept the burdens of judgment has significant 
implications for the ways in which one must conceive of the rational status of 
one’s own doctrine.   
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By contrast, on my account of the role of the burdens of judgement the rational 
status of citizens’ beliefs was never at the heart of the issue. As I argued above, 
the burdens of judgement should be seen as primarily a normative commitment, 
not an epistemic one. Thus the point is that the agent must come to see that even 
if she is convinced about the true status of her comprehensive beliefs it is still 
unreasonable to impose these beliefs on others. Therefore, on my model it is not 
true to say that agents oscillate between a belief set that is applicable for the 
public domain and ones that are only applicable in private. Indeed, Callan is surely 
right to suggest that this kind of oscillation between acceptable beliefs is 
psychologically untenable. Instead, a good political liberal citizen understands that 
the level of certainty in their private beliefs is not the issue in public debate, and 
instead the role of public decisions is to strive for reasonable consensus.  
The public/private distinction is thus about the kinds of arguments which are 
applicable in a given context, not about the kinds of reasons which are accurate or 
which are liable to reach sound conclusions. Therefore, understanding what is 
appropriate public argument does not require a different view about the rational 
status of one’s view, or about the validity or plausibility of other views. Instead, it 
requires an understanding of the moral limits of argument in a democratic society.  
In light of this distinction, some of Callan’s critiques of Rawls’ interpretation of 
political liberal principles can be seen to be misguided. Consider his remarks that 
‘To retain a lively understanding of the burdens of judgment in political contexts 
while suppressing it everywhere else would require a spectacular feat of self 
deception that cannot be squared with personal integrity’ (Callan, 1997 : 31). On 
my account, the burdens of judgment simply are a set of considerations with an 
explicitly political purpose; it therefore makes little sense to suggest that citizens 
suppress them in a private context. Citizens are perfectly at liberty to dismiss some 
of the other views held in society as being mad or misguided, as long as they 
accept the thought that this should not count against their adherents when 
deciding matters of basic constitutional essentials.  
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This interpretation of the role of the burdens of judgment as being primarily 
normative rather than epistemological is further reinforced when we consider 
again the broader aims of Political Liberalism.  As we have seen, political liberals 
aim at finding a reasonable and just consensus between competing 
comprehensive views.  It seems farfetched to argue that all citizens must come to 
hold a deeply reflective view of their own beliefs, and their relationship to other 
doctrines, in order to create such a consensus. Instead, liberalism seeks to find 
common ground between different philosophies around which to base a 
principled acceptance of our shared institutions. 
Indeed, the far more demanding approach required by Callan would in fact be 
deeply detrimental to this goal of finding a reasonable consensus. If we believe 
that political liberalism requires that citizens take the imaginative stance 
suggested by Callan, we would be forced to admit that our current experience 
suggests that relatively few citizens ought to be classed as reasonable. Most 
obviously, many religious believers do not imaginatively entertain the possibility 
God might not exist.  Likewise many, if not most, atheists would fail to meet the 
criterion because they do not imaginatively entertain the possibility that He does.    
This situation would only become more serious if we consider just how many 
different and varying views exist in a modern pluralistic society. Citizens hold 
fundamentally different views on questions of ethics, metaphysics, etc.  
Appreciating the reasonableness of all of these views on Callan’s model (or even a 
representative sample of them) would thus involve a hugely demanding 
imaginative consideration of a wide variety of diverse questions each from a 
variety of differing perspectives.  Living an acceptable life within a political liberal 
society would thus become an intensely demanding experience, indeed it seems 
likely that it would become one which was both inimical to many individuals and 
one which many might be unprepared to live.  
Were this demanding understanding of reasonableness actually necessary to live 
appropriately with other citizens, political liberals would thus be faced with a 
difficult decision, whether to abandon their project or accept that it would exclude 
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a great many citizens.  Fortunately, our actual experience of life in liberal societies 
suggests that citizens who are religious or secular can nevertheless accept that 
citizens with other views ought to have an equal political status, even though they 
have never imaginatively engaged with the content of views so alien to their own.   
It is entirely consistent to believe that another’s doctrine is absurd, and perhaps 
even worthy of pre-emptory dismissal, and still accept that there are principled 
reasons not to treat one’s own beliefs as superior or more important for political 
purposes.  Moreover, many individuals who live relatively unreflective lives 
nevertheless possess a deep commitment to the kind of liberal values which are 
required to sustain a just and tolerant society.  Therefore, understanding 
reasonableness as a commitment with primarily normative rather than 
epistemological implications both widens the scope of political liberalism, in 
accordance with the aim of the project, and fits better with our understanding of 
the requirements of being a good liberal citizen. 
Given this understanding of reasonableness, we can clearly accept that other 
individuals hold reasonable beliefs without subjecting our own views to the 
intense scrutiny Callan believes follows from accepting the consequences of the 
burdens of judgement.  Citizens accept that adherents of other faiths and creeds 
are political equals, but they do not have to consider the tenets of their own views 
and others to see why each is, from a certain perspective, as plausible or 
metaphysically reasonable as the other.  Since it is from this intense scrutiny of our 
own beliefs that Callan derives his argument for a convergence, this thesis must 
once again be rejected. Instead, political liberalism makes the far less demanding 
claim that citizens come to accept that all citizens are of equal political status no 
matter what their comprehensive views. Educating children to see this can still be 
done while giving parents broad leeway to guide their children’s upbringing. 
Indeed, parents can be free to inculcate a belief system which is deeply inimical to 
self reflection and autonomy, so long as this doctrine does not make political 




The purpose of the previous two chapters has been to spell out the implications of 
political liberalism. This begins from the thought, argued for in section one, that 
political liberalism stems from a normative relationship between citizens and the 
state, rather than from a pragmatic search for social stability. Thus, when 
investigating its educational implications, we do not look for those institutions that 
will best support social order, but rather those which further these normative 
goals. 
Chapter four argued that the nature of these goals implies that parents will, in 
almost all cases, be responsible for guiding their children’s development. Since the 
state cannot legitimately hold a view about what sort of people children ought to 
become, it cannot design its educational institutions to foster any one conception 
of the good life. Since children’s development requires a close connection with 
one authority, some other actor must thus step in to fill this role.  Given the 
importance of securing a liberal state which can secure the principled 
endorsement of its citizens, there are strong reasons to allow parents to have this 
authority. 
Since the political liberal state cannot take a position on which non-political values 
children ought to acquire, the only limits on parental authority will be that 
children grow up to be able to act as reasonable citizens.  Chapter five investigated 
these requirements, in light of the arguments of Gutmann and Macedo, that the 
kind of education necessary to fulfil these requirements is indistinguishable from 
that which would be required by most versions of comprehensive liberalism. I 
rejected this argument, and showed that in fact in a wide variety of cases political 
liberalism will diverge sharply from comprehensive liberalism.  Just as Rawls 
himself believed, the requirements of political liberalism are relatively lax, and are 
compatible with a much wider variety of educational institutions than merely 
those which would be required by proponents of ‘education for autonomy’. 
Thus far then, the thesis has both outlined why political liberalism represents the 
best solution to pluralistic society, and shown the implications of political 
liberalism as it is commonly understood in the case of education. Briefly, this story 
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runs at follows. We begin with the recognition that liberal societies will always 
disagree about matters of the good. Since the state represents the shared power 
of all citizens, it cannot legitimately promote one of these comprehensive views at 
the expense of the others. This principle of legitimacy implied that the state could 
not take a position on what sort of person children ought to become. Thus, 
parents are able to choose any life at all for their children, so long as they are able 
to act as reasonable citizens, a requirement that, I argued, is far less stringent than 
it is often taken to be. 
Taken together, this story seems to imply that the existence of pluralism means 
that the state ought to cede almost total authority in education over to parents. 
However, as I said at the beginning of this section, the purpose of elucidating the 
implications of political liberalism in education was not to defend these practical 
policies but to show their reasoning as a first step to changing them.   These 
policies must be altered because as they stand they are subject to a serious 
objection.  To anticipate the argument of the next section, a problem with the 
framework of political liberalism is that it ignores important interests of children 
themselves.  This implies that political liberalism as currently conceived and in 
relation to education cannot be justified to this group of society, and will thus fail 



































Chapter 6-Liberal legitimacy and children 
As we have seen, the political liberal principle of legitimacy states that institutions 
must be justifiable, in principle, to all reasonable citizens.  Accepting this view thus 
invites consideration of which individuals count as citizens for the purposes of 
political liberalism. Rawls himself, as well as many other political liberal theorists, 
largely dispense with this question by considering only fully able, adult, individuals 
who are born within the state and never leave except by death.  While these 
idealised circumstances may be useful in abstract theorising, there is a risk that 
they obscure a much messier political reality. In the idealised world Rawls 
considers, we can reasonably assume that all individuals can be considered to be 
free and equal citizens. By contrast, in political practice there are several hard 
cases in which the political status of various individuals is far from clear.  Familiar 
examples here are individuals who have entered a country seeking political 
asylum, or who have entered a country illegally.  There is also the extremely 
difficult case of individuals who have severe mental disabilities, which might call 
into question their ability to act as citizens of the state.   
For our purposes, the most significant hard case is that of the children in society. 
Following the victories of the civil rights and feminist movements in the 20th 
century, children are now the only numerically significant group in society that is 
denied political and civil rights as a matter of course.  Note that this observation is 
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not made to imply that these cases are strictly analogous. While the treatment of 
ethnic minorities and women in previous centuries was based on flawed or 
pernicious reasoning, children are a genuinely special case in a number of 
respects.  
Children live fundamentally different lives compared to older individuals; lives 
characterised by a reliance on adults and constant and profound changes in their 
physiology and psychology.  These differences have political significance since they 
imply that there are good reasons to doubt the wisdom of allowing children to live 
independent lives or to participate in complex public decision making.  Thus, the 
circumstances of childhood seem to imply that the basic rights which we liberals 
believe should be held by all adults appear deeply inappropriate if held by 
children.    
This judgment is reflected in political practice. In all current liberal societies 
children cannot vote in public elections or exercise a series of important legal 
rights. This differential treatment of adults and children raises important 
theoretical issues since the foundational commitment of liberalism is that all 
individuals should be political equals, despite the many differences between them. 
Indeed, were any other group in society treated in the same way as children it 
would seem reminiscent of the worst failings of our societies in previous centuries.  
 Liberal theory must therefore have a way of showing which features of children 
justify their being treated in these ways. As I alluded to above, this account will 
surely refer to children’s diminished faculties and physical vulnerability. 
Nevertheless children, at least older children, are distinct and functioning 
individuals who are in many ways as capable as most adults. In light of this, no 
defensible theory of justice can ignore them entirely. Furthermore, we can usually 
assume that children will become future citizens, and thus political decisions made 
now will have an impact upon them when they are adult citizens.  Children are 
therefore often taken to occupy an ambiguous position with regards to the liberal 
state, lying somewhere between the full and equal political status of adults and 
not having any political status at all.  
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The Threshold view 
Both in contemporary political theory and in practice the usual way of assessing 
the political status of young individuals is by means of a threshold.  This means 
that under a certain age, usually eighteen, individuals are classed as minors in the 
eyes of the law. Minors lack many of the important rights and privileges which are 
held by other citizens, such as the right to vote in elections and to enter into 
legally binding contractual obligations with others. Minors also have a different 
status with regards to the institutions of the criminal law, in that they are treated 
as holding diminished responsibility for their actions which may imply different 
sentencing for offences than would be the case for adults who committed the 
same crimes. 
 This differentiation between the class of minors and that of adult citizens is 
justified by reference to the differences between children and adults.  Children are 
taken to have less developed mental and physical capacities, as well as being less 
emotionally mature. These differences between adults and children are seen as 
being significant enough to imply that children must hold different legal rights.  
However, notice that above this threshold differences between the emotional, 
mental or physical maturity of individuals cease to matter.  Thus, the fact that 
some adults are more cognitively developed or emotionally mature than others 
has no impact at all on their political status. Above the age of majority all (sane, 
able-bodied) adults are counted the same.14 
As well as guiding political practice, this threshold view is also found in Political 
Liberalism.  For Rawls, the relevant capacities that ground our claim to equal 
liberal citizenship are the two moral powers, the reasonable and the rational.  The 
rational denotes the ability to form and revise a conception of the good, the 
reasonable refers to the ability to propose and abide by fair terms of co-operation.  
                                                          
14 This is with the partial exception of the legality of some substances, such as alcohol in the United States which can only 
legally be purchased by those above 21.  While significant, these legal differences do not seem sufficient to trouble the 




Together these two moral powers ‘root the ability to participate in society’ (Rawls, 
1993: 34).  For Rawls, individuals are counted as full members of society, and thus 
as free and equal citizens, by ‘virtue of their possessing the two moral powers to 
the requisite degree’ (Rawls, 1993: 34). 
Notice that while Rawls makes a link between an individual being counted as a 
citizen and an assessment of their motivations and abilities, he does it by way of a 
threshold in the way I described.  So long as individuals possess the moral powers 
to the ‘requisite’ degree they are counted as equal members of society.  Below the 
requisite threshold individuals are not counted as full citizens.  Above it, all 
individuals are counted as free and equal citizens in exactly the same way, thus 
differences in abilities or motivations cease to matter.  
The implication of the threshold view is that children are not full citizens of the 
state in the same way as adults, an implication that has important consequences 
for the way they fit into a political liberal society. This chapter will now explore the 
rationale behind the threshold view, and argue that the attraction of this view is 
that it is seemingly able to reconcile two contradictory impulses in our intuitions 
about the proper political status of children. The first such impulse is that any 
differentiation between the status of children and adults must be rooted in 
differences in capacities. The second is that a general link between an individual’s 
capacities and their political status is anathema to liberal theory and to political 
liberalism in particular. The threshold view is seemingly able to satisfy both of 
these considerations, and is indeed the only way we could legitimately exclude 
children from citizenship without also unfairly excluding some adults. 
Children must be divided from adults via consideration of their capacities  
The first point to note in explaining the initial attraction of the threshold view is 
that any plausible understanding of the status of children must allow for some way 
of differentiating the rights of children from adults.  Given the sharp differences 
which I have alluded to between the cognitive capabilities, physical stature and 
emotional maturity of adults and children, many of the liberal rights which are 
granted to adults would seem deeply inappropriate if held by children.  These 
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cognitive, emotional and physical differences I will collectively refer to as 
‘differences in capacities’ between children and adults.  These differences in 
capacities are large enough to imply that any defensible theory must show that 
children ought to be treated as a different class of individuals, with a different set 
of right, from adults. 
Indeed, given the extremely vulnerable position of very young children, drawing 
some line between adults and children seems unavoidable. We must surely 
concede that babies and toddlers must be treated as a different class of individuals 
in light of their diminished faculties. Thus, even the work of ‘child liberationist’ 
theorists is largely directed to the age at which the divide between children and 
adults is appropriate rather than at the eradication of the distinction between 
adults and children altogether.15  While I am not ultimately persuaded by the work 
of child liberationists, it is important to notice that this chapter is silent over the 
question of where the divide between adults and children ought to be drawn.  
Rather, my argument assumes that there must be a line drawn somewhere and 
then explores the consequences of this distinction for the notion of political 
equality in particular, and for political liberalism more generally. 
The second point to note in explaining the attraction of the threshold view is that 
these differences in capacities are the only relevant feature which divides children 
from adults. It is only by considering their different physical, emotional and 
cognitive development that we can meaningfully distinguish what it is to be a child 
rather than an adult. The only other alternative is to differentiate children from 
adults simply on the basis of age, which would be an arbitrary and unfair basis for 
exclusion.  As Steven Lecce puts it, ‘to discriminate against the young because they 
are young is as bad, morally speaking, as discriminating against, say, blacks or 
women because of the colour of their skin, or their sex, respectively.   That kind of 
ageism, as it is now called, is indeed reprehensible’ (Lecce, 2009: 6). 
                                                          
15
 Consider here Philippe Aries’ claim that the notion of ‘childhood’ is socially constructed, which is often taken as an 
extreme argument against our current understanding of the appropriate role of children (Aries, 1962).  Even he argues that 
it was only after the age of 5 or 7 that children could join the world of persons. 
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Thus, this initial discussion of the status of children has revealed a valuable insight 
into the notion of liberal equality more generally.  This concept must include some 
link to a non-arbitrary distinction.  Only in so doing can our notion of liberal 
equality avoid both the deeply counter-intuitive result of treating extremely young 
children as the same as adults and the problem of treating children differently 
simply because of the arbitrary fact that they are of a different age.  
Linking capacities to status is inappropriate in the case of adults 
Unfortunately, attempting to account for differences in treatment between adults 
and children via a reference to their differing capacities is a highly dangerous 
move for liberal theorists.  Just as there are differences in capacities between 
adults and children, so there are significant differences between many adults.  
Asserting a link between individuals’ political status and their capacities thus risks 
undercutting the basic fairness enshrined in liberal principles.  Indeed, it is 
particularly problematic for political liberals. As we saw when differentiating 
political from comprehensive liberalism, political liberals do not base their theory 
in a wider account of the good life or the metaphysical status of humans. Instead, 
the appeal of political liberalism is that it represents the fairest and thus most 
reasonable account of justice for a pluralistic society. 
According to political liberals, liberal rights are equally distributed between all 
adult citizens (as is the case in Rawls’ own first principle of justice) because only an 
equal distribution can be justified as fair to all citizens.  This contrasts with an 
account in which rights and status are equally distributed because of an actual 
similarity between either the abilities or inclinations of all citizens.  
 Indeed, an account of liberalism premised on fairness would be undercut by a 
direct link between citizens’ capacities and their political status.  To illustrate, 
consider John Stuart Mill’s suggestion that ‘the wise’ ought to receive as many as 
seven times as many votes as less educated individuals.  Underpinning this 
suggestion is the thought that there are some individuals within society who are 
better qualified to make decisions about the issues facing the polity than others. 
As David Estlund and other leading democratic theorists concede, this claim is 
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difficult to dispute (Estlund, 2008: 210). All Mill’s account rests on is that some 
individuals are better prepared to grapple with aspects of public policy than 
others.  
 However, despite the seemingly undeniable fact that some individuals are better 
able to understand and respond to questions of public policy, the suggestion of 
plural votes is one that all liberal democratic societies have rejected, and one 
which would gain little currency with most contemporary democratic theorists. Of 
course, current liberal societies operate on the basis of representative democracy 
rather than more direct versions. Nevertheless, the rights to participate and 
influence public affairs are evenly distributed despite the fact that some 
individuals may be more qualified to participate than others. Our current 
practices, backed by deeply held intuitions, suggest that a fair distribution of 
certain basic rights is an equal one, despite the differences in capacities and 
abilities of citizens. This is in response to the close connection these basic rights 
have to an individual’s political status. 
This notion of fairness is not the only reason we might reject Mill’s suggestion. To 
begin with, we might note that there are several important practical 
considerations which would lead us to question the wisdom of Mill’s suggestion.  
We might, for instance, be sceptical of the suggestion that individuals who have 
been educated at a university are necessarily wiser or better qualified to make 
decisions than those who chose not to attend or who did not meet the entry 
requirements.  It also seems plausible that concentrating votes in the hands of an 
educated minority would lead to a government which failed to represent society 
properly, and perhaps would thus be insensitive to important concerns arising 
from members of different social groups.  Estlund refers to this as the 
‘demographic objection’ (Estlund, 2008: 215). 
However, while practical considerations like this are undoubtedly highly 
significant, they do not capture the real force of our rejection of Mill’s arguments.  
After all, neither of these considerations seems entirely unavoidable.  It is 
implausible to argue that we can never point to individuals who will be better able 
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to weigh the various considerations relevant to public policy, even if we are 
sceptical such skills are dependent simply on higher education. There are surely 
institutional devices which could measure how informed and engaged an 
individual was with political issues, and we would tend to think that these factors 
correlate generally with better decision making.  Likewise, we could also imagine a 
sophisticated institutional remedy to the problem of representation caused by 
Mill’s suggestion. For instance, the legislature could be weighted to map onto the 
demographic and social characteristics of the population at large. 
 However, even with these modifications, our contemporary understanding of 
democratic principles would, I think, reject distributions of rights and liberties that 
are systematically unequal.  The real force of this rejection then is not that 
unequally distributing political rights is unwise or misguided, though it may be, but 
rather that it is unfair.  We think that unequally distributing these basic rights 
undermines this notion of fairness, even when there are seemingly sound reasons 
for doing so.   
Therefore, our intuitive understanding of fairness cuts against linking the basis of 
liberal equality to a notion of capacities.  This poses a significant problem for 
political liberal theorists when addressing the status of children, since it is 
precisely these differences in capacities which must be appealed to when 
differentiating adult individuals from children.  We must claim that children have 
different rights, and indeed lack some rights entirely, because their diminished 
faculties imply that they cannot utilise these rights effectively. However, to assert 
that some adults ought to hold different rights because of their greater abilities is 
seen as unfair and inconsistent with fundamental commitments of liberal 
egalitarianism. A link between an individual’s capacities and their political status is 
thus necessary in the first case but objectionable, perhaps even offensive, in the 
other.  
The attraction of the threshold view is that it is seemingly able to reconcile these 
two conflicting intuitions about the proper relationship between an individual’s 
capacities and their place in society.  Recall that this view states that below a 
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certain threshold it is legitimate to treat individuals differently but that above the 
threshold everyone must be counted as equals.  Since the threshold will be cashed 
out in terms of capacities, children are excluded from the political community for 
the right reasons.  In this way their differing status is acceptable in a way that 
refusing to grant rights to women or minorities would not be.  Further, all 
individuals are equal above the requisite threshold. Thus the link between 
capacities and political status is not allowed to infect the basic equality between 
all adult citizens, despite their differing abilities. 
Not only is the threshold view seemingly able to accommodate both the need to 
treat children differently and the desire to treat adults the same, it is in fact the 
only way we could exclude children without being unfair to either adults or 
children.  It is unfair to exclude children from the rights and privileges of 
citizenship for any other reason than their diminished capacities. To do so would 
be prejudiced against children simply because they are children. However, any link 
between capacities and status risks undermining liberal equality amongst adults. 
Therefore, only a threshold view, which states differences in capacities only 
matter up to a certain point, can possibly exclude children from full citizenship 
without undercutting our commitment to equal citizenship between all adults. 
Problems for the threshold view 
On the face of it, the threshold view is thus able to account for the two seemingly 
contradictory impulses in our thinking about liberal equality.  However, I will now 
argue that a closer look at the actual course of human development presents fatal 
problems for the threshold view. The first fact which presents a problem is that 
human beings gain mental, physical and emotional capacities in a gradual fashion, 
meaning that there are no discrete changes which would provide a natural point 
to act as the threshold.  While it might sometimes be helpful to refer to children as 
coming to the age of reason, or to say that a child is not autonomous but will be 
someday, using such language risks obscuring this important fact.  Given this 
gradual process of development, it makes little sense to suggest that after some 
certain point children are capable of acting as citizens in a way they were not 
139 
 
before.  Instead, people will slowly gain in skills and experience and concurrently it 
becomes increasingly more justified to treat them as independent members of the 
community. 
This poses a political problem in so far as it will tend to make any single age limit 
for acquiring the status of an equal citizen seem arbitrary.  While it seems clear 
that a three year old cannot possibly be qualified to take up a role as a citizen in 
debates over public policy, whereas a thirty year old obviously is, there are no 
discernible difference between the skills someone possesses on their eighteenth 
birthday compared to the day before.  This is not a trivial point; someone who is 
only one day off being eighteen on the day of an election will not be able to vote.  
This basic fact of biology seems to suggest that there will be no compelling reason, 
at least one premised on an assessment of the individual’s capacities, why this will 
be true. 
The standard response to this problem is to point out that there simply must be 
some line at which people come to possess the privileges of adulthood. Thus, 
despite the arbitrary nature of mandating that individuals acquire rights on their 
eighteenth or sixteenth birthday, there is simply no alternative. However, while in 
practice this may be the only possible solution, it does not fully dissolve the 
problem for liberal theory.  At the very least it introduces an uncomfortable 
degree of arbitrariness into what purported to be a well-defined understanding of 
free and equal citizenship.  
More serious problems for the threshold account are caused by the fact that 
children develop at different rates.  Biologically, people go through puberty and 
other changes at different times in their lives. Children mature at different rates, 
for a whole range of genetic and environmental reasons, and will thus have very 
different sets of skills by the time they reach their teenage years.  Anyone who has 
attended school will know that the personalities and abilities of children at any age 
vary tremendously, and further that age alone is a poor predictor of children’s 
levels of maturity or cognitive development.  This observation is shown most 
markedly by so called ‘child prodigies’ who are capable of amazing feats well 
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beyond the capabilities of many adults, but applies more generally to many 
children who are capable of complex reasoning or mature decision making. 
A capacity based criterion for determining the distinction between childhood and 
adulthood thus cannot deliver any fixed point, say age eighteen that will link to a 
level of development achieved by all children.  For any age group, some children 
will be as mature and capable as older children, whereas some will be less. 
Therefore any age limit, even if it is appropriate for the development of an 
average child, might seem unfair to those whose progression is faster than 
average.   
This problem is well captured by Joe Coleman in his article ‘Answering Susan: 
Liberalism, Civil Education and the Status of Younger Persons’ (2002).  The Susan in 
question is a gifted young child attending a political theory conference on 
education.  She listens to the various arguments about the content of mandatory 
education that children ought to receive, and responds with a simple question 
‘how do you know I am a child?’ (Coleman, 2002: 161).  That is, what qualities 
does Susan necessarily possess by virtue of her age that imply that she ought to be 
forced to go to school, and not be able to vote, whereas adults cannot be treated 
in this way. 
The two features of human development I have outlined above suggest no such 
account will be forthcoming.  Assuming Susan is only slightly younger than the 
legal age of adulthood, we saw that there is no biological reason why she would be 
different from marginally older individuals who are classed as adults. Given that 
individuals develop at different rates, there may well be no capacities at all in 
which Susan is deficient compared to an average adult citizen.  Cases such as 
Susan thus expose the fundamental unfairness of the threshold view.  Recall that 
unless we treated children differently because of their different capacities, our 
policy towards them would be ethically similar to objectionable treatment of 
ethnic minorities or women. In Susan’s case though, there are no differences in 
capacities between her and some individuals classed as adults. We are then 
treating her differently simply because she is young. 
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Further, this problem is compounded once we consider the mirror case to Susan’s. 
This is the case of someone who only recently passed the age of adulthood but 
who has developed relatively slowly compared to his peers, and would thus have 
similar capacities to the average for a ‘child’ age group.  An age based threshold 
would count such an individual as an adult, despite the fact that the same reasons 
which justified excluding children would seem to apply to him as well.  In both 
cases then, the link between the treatment of an individual and that individual’s 
abilities has broken down. Since it was this link which rooted the appeal of the 
threshold view this represents a serious problem. 
The only plausible way that a direct link between an individual’s capacities and 
their status can be maintained is to have individuals acquire the political status of 
adults at different points in their lives.  So, exceptionally capable children might be 
thought of as full citizens at the age of thirteen or fourteen, whereas other 
individuals might not be until much later in their lives.  This view would still be a 
threshold view, but the threshold would be disentangled from any set age limit.  
As such, the legal and ethical ‘age of adulthood’ would be different for different 
individuals. In this way, we might be able to reflect better the differences in 
capacities between people in society.  
However, this suggestion is open to serious objections. Some of these are practical 
in nature.  For instance, all of the possible capacities to which we might attach 
rights - say,  intelligence or some conception of maturity - are likely to be 
extremely controversial.  Moreover, any potential candidates for differentiating 
persons would be extremely difficult to measure effectively.  Many theorists have 
long pointed to the difficulties of the IQ measure of ‘intelligence’, even in its 
stated aim of measuring academic ability.  Connecting any such numerical value to 
the notion of citizenship would be likely to be even more problematic. 
However, just as with the case of plural votes, these practical objections do not 
capture the chief reason have to be sceptical about this proposal. Beyond these 
practical concerns there a more serious objection rooted in the norm of fairness.  
Specifically, the notion that individuals of the same age ought to be treated 
142 
 
differently by the state seems intuitively at odds with the principle of liberal 
equality. 
Psychologically, it seems plausible to suggest that individuals will judge themselves 
most often relative to individuals of the same age.  So, if at age twenty five I do 
not have the right to vote but all of my similarly aged friends do then this will likely 
strike me as unfair.  This situation will likely seem deeply demeaning if the reason 
given for my differing status is that I have been judged by the state to be lacking in 
various capacities relative to my peers. Indeed, it would seem to undermine the 
sense in which I could regard myself as a free and equal member of society. 
In fact, given the process of human development, the discrepancies between the 
appropriate ‘age of adulthood’ for different individuals would be relatively large.   
As an example, consider again the criteria of the two moral powers. As I stated, 
individuals must be both able to form and pursue their own rational plan of life, 
and be able to recognise the claims of others and their place in common 
institutions in order to co-operate fairly with them. Assessing the rational would 
thus refer to things such as intelligence, maturity and the ability to plan for the 
long term.  
It seems plausible to suggest that, in most cases, the older an individual gets the 
better they will be at forming a coherent plan of life. Individuals generally develop 
mental faculties, as well as gain experience of life which allows them to better 
assess their own needs and goals, as they grow older. Robert Noggle has argued 
persuasively that children do not have a developed comprehensive view, and 
instead alter their plans on fairly regular basis. He writes that ‘infants and very 
young children do not have what we could call commitments, values or projects at 
all. The infant’s motivational system is better described as a set of biological 
drives, together with whatever pre-social impulses are acquired soon after birth... 
Later the child begins to develop preferences that are less grossly biological. 
However, most of the young child’s not purely biological preferences are simple 
and fleeting…This lack of stability in the child’s preference structure makes her 
agency far less temporally extended than that of an adult. Abrupt and radical 
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changes are part and parcel of childhood, whereas they are unusual events for an 
adult’ (Noggle, 2002: 103). 
However, while these assertions may be generally accurate, they cannot possibly 
establish a necessary connection between a person’s age and her ability to make a 
coherent plan of life.  There are, after all, numerous examples of people following 
through their childhood dreams much later in life, or marrying their childhood 
sweethearts. Further, many individuals hold the same basic belief system across 
their whole lives, remaining committed to the church or institution they followed 
in childhood.  In contrast, many of us know adult individuals who seem incapable 
of making long term plans or who radically change their beliefs and goals on a 
regular basis. 
Assessing whether individuals are able to participate on reasonable terms with 
others is largely a question of character, which will again refer back to an 
individual’s emotional development.  Since citizens must also be able to play their 
part in common democratic institutions, we might also consider their levels of 
political understanding and civic engagement.  Again, variation across each of 
these criteria is likely to be relatively large. This is particularly the case with the 
latter two which are heavily dependent upon the education an individual has 
received, and which engage with issues some citizens will find fascinating but 
others will find uninteresting.  
Once again though there seems no decisive reason to think that children will 
necessarily be less qualified to act as political citizens than adults. Many children 
display an intuitive understanding of appropriate conduct and fair play at a very 
young age. By contrast many adults, not merely those truly unreasonable 
individuals who engage in disreputable or criminal behaviour, are at times selfish 
or unwilling to consider the fair claims of others. As with the political requirements 
of citizenship, we see that some young children are articulate and able to debate 
at a high level with others, whereas many studies point to a worrying lack of civic 
knowledge amongst a large number of citizens of current liberal democratic 
societies.  Therefore, across either of the relevant dimensions distinguishing a neat 
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class of children that can clearly be distinguished from the class of adults is likely 
to be impossible. 
These factors imply that a large number of adult individuals may fall into the same 
political class as children if we use a capacity based criterion for membership.  
Thus, some individuals who are highly motivated and mature will be thought of as 
citizens from a young age. By contrast, other individuals will not be thought of as 
citizens by the state until far later in their lives. Indeed, if we begin with the 
thought that it is inappropriate for most children to have the full rights of 
citizenship, then a capacity based criterion would imply that many adults would 
never receive these rights at all. For this to be true, it would only have to be 
plausible that some adults never reach the level of cognitive development and 
civic engagement reached by an average eighteen year old. This political 
implication, a class of individuals who would be permanently denied the rights and 
status of equal citizens, seems reminiscent of the worst features of liberal 
societies before the latter half of the 20th century, and is surely unacceptable to 
any contemporary understanding of the principle of liberal legitimacy.   
These troubling implications can be largely (although never entirely) avoided if we 
revised the criteria for citizenship to a lower set of required capacities.  However, 
the obvious cost associated with this move is that we would no longer be able to 
show satisfactorily why children ought to be treated differently.  If we set a 
standard designed to include all, or almost all, adults it would have to be relatively 
lax, which would imply a large number of children would also count as full citizens.  
A threshold that includes all of the adults we intuitively want to be included is thus 
redundant, since it fails to show why children should be treated differently from 
adults. 
The threshold view is thus presented with fatal problems once we consider the 
actual processes of human development.  If there really were a well defined ‘age 
of reason’ that all individuals reached at a similar point in their lives it might make 
sense to argue that individuals below this line should not be counted as members 
of the political community in the same way as full citizens.  However, once we take 
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account of the facts that no such clear cut line exists, and individuals’ 
development occurs at different rates, this position collapses.   
Underlying these problems is a tension that has been running through the chapter.   
The only plausible candidate for differentiating adults and children is some notion 
of capacities, but foundational notions of liberal equality suggest that this concept 
must be blind to the differences in capacities between individuals.  This 
understanding of liberal fairness is demonstrated when thinking both about plural 
voting and the point at which we define adulthood. This tension is fatal to the 
threshold view. Any threshold will be either vacuous, and in attempting to accept 
that all adults are equal citizens fail to show why children ought to be treated 
differently, or become exclusionary and risk creating an underclass of 
disenfranchised children and adults. 
 
Whole lives view 
 
To meet the challenge posed by children’s status, what is needed then is a way of 
preserving the commitment to basic fairness enshrined in the view that all citizens 
deserve equal status irrespective of differences in capacities, while accepting the 
fact that children’s different capacities mean that they must be treated differently 
by the state. My solution to this problem is to break the close connection between 
equal status and identical rights.  Thus, I believe it is possible to accept that 
children have an equal political status to adults, but deny that this implies that 
they must have an identical set of political rights. 
This solution in turn depends upon a different understanding of equality. My 
account is inspired by the work of Norman Daniels in his seminal text Am I My 
Parents’ Keeper: An Essay on Justice Between Young and Old (1988). The key 
insight of this account is that discrimination on the grounds of age is 
fundamentally different from discrimination on the basis of gender or race.  He 
writes that ‘if we treat people differently by race or sex, then we risk violating 
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principles governing equality among persons.  Treating the young and old 
differently, however, may not mean treating people unequally. Over a lifetime, 
such differential treatment may still result in our treating people equally’ (Daniels, 
1988: 63). Since everybody ages, policies which appear to be unfair to older or 
younger groups might in fact be justifiable when looked at over the whole lives of 
the individuals concerned.    
Daniels’ work is directed towards the problem of distributing healthcare.  Here he 
argues that when assessing the fairness of any given institution, we should not 
compare all individuals living now and see if they receive equal treatment.  Rather, 
we ought to look at the outcomes provided to each cohort and see if they are 
broadly equivalent.  So, it is inevitable that pensioners and young children will 
receive an entirely different bundle of health care resources from the state, but 
this is not an incidence of injustice.  The test of fairness is to look at each 10 year 
old, 30 year old, 70 year old, etc., and see if each is receiving equal treatment with 
others of the same age, then to compare the resources devoted to people who are 
being born now to those born 50 years ago and see if they are justifiably similar 
(Daniels, 1988: 66-83). 
 While the problems of healthcare are very different from the ones with which I 
am concerned, I propose that the best understanding of children and liberal 
citizenship follows a broadly similar model.   We saw above that only an equal 
distribution of rights is a fair response to the claims of free and equal citizens. 
However, on my account, the equality referred to here is conceived of as being 
measured across a person’s whole life, rather than comparing all citizens at any 
one moment. What matters is the totality of the benefits and burdens that an 
individual receives over the course of their lives. Thus on this view, we can treat 
individuals differently so long as each receives the same treatment over the course 
of their lives. Each individual born in the liberal state will thus live for some time 
with one set of rights (those deemed appropriate for children) and after the age of 




In contrast to the difficulties faced by the threshold view, the whole lives view has 
a natural way of responding to the tension between our intuitions about the 
relationship between children and adults, in which differences in capacities 
matter, and relations between adults, in which they do not.  Key to the whole life 
account’s success is that it breaks the link between political status (and thus 
inclusion within the justificatory community) and the bundle of rights a citizen has 
at any one time.  This move is necessary since it allows us to posit that political 
status is insensitive to an individual’s capacities while still claiming that the actual 
rights and privileges allotted to each group can differ because of their differing 
situation.  We can accommodate the fact that citizenship should not be dependent 
on abilities and maintain that all citizens are of equal status despite their different 
abilities. Simultaneously, we can hold that because many children are unable to 
participate in democratic procedure or live independent lives there are good 
reasons to give children a very different bundle of rights from that given to adults.   
This model can also deal with the case of children who seem just as capable as 
adults.  Recall that I argued that, in many instances, individuals will compare 
themselves to others of the same age, and will regard differences in treatment as 
unfair even if it is actually true that the others possess greater capacities.  To 
illustrate, consider again the case of Coleman’s Susan. While it could well be true 
that developmentally she is more capable than another child of the same age, 
there would still be a perceived unfairness if she were regarded as a full citizen at 
an age at which other children are not so regarded.  The whole-lives view can 
account for this intuition by opting for equality between individuals across the 
totality of their lives.  
Therefore, while the implications of the whole lives view are similar to those of the 
threshold view, the whole lives account has a much more persuasive answer to 
Susan when she argues that she should be treated in the same way as adults.  
Proponents of the threshold view must respond to Susan by arguing that some 
difference in capacities between her and an adult justifies her different status. In 
effect, they must argue that in some respect she is less able than adults. However, 
we saw that this reply is unconvincing since such differences in capacities may well 
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not exist. By contrast, on the whole lives view, we say to Susan that while she is 
treated as a child now, she will receive the rights and privileges held by an adult at 
same time as everyone else in her society. Thus, she has not been unfairly 
penalized, and in fact only in this way can our liberal society maintain the basic 
equality to which Susan herself is appealing. 
 
Possible objections 
Interestingly, Coleman himself considers a response to Susan that is similar to the 
one I am proposing. He calls this ‘the response from equal treatment’.  He says 
that ‘Liberals might try a second response, by arguing that Susan’s parents were 
required to undergo civic education…Susan is not being  treated differently from 
her parents’.  He argues though that this response is inadequate.  To show this he 
imagines: 
           “a society very much like or own except for one fact: the older generation in 
this society never experienced any formal program of civic education. Now 
suppose this older generation decides to impose some form of civic education on 
the younger generation.  Would liberals feel the need to say that for this to be fair 
the whole society must be subject to these programs?  I do not think so.  Liberals 
would instead say older persons do not need this civic education in the same way 
younger persons do” (Coleman, 2002: 162). 
Coleman is right to suggest that liberals should reject enforcing education on all 
adult citizens.  There seems something importantly different about making 
children go to school compared to adults. However, he is wrong to think that 
forcing adults to go to school is an implication of a principle of equal treatment, 
once this commitment is properly understood. I have suggested that the best 
understanding of this principle demands equality within a generation, and that the 
policies of the state are justifiable to all generations.  It is misguided though to 
think that this burden of justification will imply identical treatment to individuals 
who are members of different generations.  Equality of this kind would ignore the 
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fact that the circumstances faced by society are liable to change dramatically over 
time.  Thus, certain policies might be affordable for one generation but not for the 
next, or some institutions might be designed as solutions to temporary problems. 
Instead, the principle of equality only demands that the reasons given in 
justification of institutions cannot favour one generation over another.  We might 
imagine some sort of original position here to model this requirement, but the 
details are not essential to my argument.  All that we must show to rebut Coleman 
is that the changing situations faced by society imply that different treatment to 
different generations need not violate the principle of equality.   In the case 
Coleman mentions, we therefore have to ask for the reasons for the change in 
policy that he describes.  If, for instance, we had made advances in educational 
policy which showed new ways of promoting civic virtue, it seems entirely sensible 
to enforce children to undergo a regime which was not forced upon their parents. 
Based on his article, Coleman’s response to this line of argument would be to 
point out that many adults have a similar lack of civic knowledge as children. He 
lists a series of deeply worrying statistics about the lack of essential public 
knowledge amongst citizens of the United States (Coleman, 2002: 162). Therefore, 
if circumstances have changed such that children ought to be forced to undergo 
civic education, surely these under-informed adults ought to do so as well. 
Here though, the whole-lives view has a compelling response.  Recall that the two 
components of this account were that institutions must be justifiable to citizens of 
all ages, and that citizens living in the same generation ought to receive similar 
treatment.  This second condition derives from the assumption that individuals 
will compare themselves to others of the same age in a way that they will not for 
members of different generations. Differential treatment within cohorts offends 
the liberal equality in a way that differential treatment between cohorts does not, 
and the state must therefore treat all members of any one cohort the same so that 
they see that they are treated as civic equals. The whole lives view thus has a 
reason for treating all adults of the same age in a similar way, even if some lack 
important skills which others do not. 
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 So, we can agree that Coleman is right to think that current level of civic 
engagement and understanding amongst citizens of the United States (as, no 
doubt, elsewhere) is deeply troublesome.  We would hope that a stronger 
commitment to civic education might ameliorate this problem for the next 
generation.  However, it does not follow from the principle of equal treatment 
that under-informed adults ought to receive the same treatment as children.  To 
do so would imply that only a selected set of adults would be forced to return to 
school while other, better informed, adults would not.  This would again create a 
deep sense of unfairness on the part of these adults who are now treated like 
children, and would thus undermine the degree to which they felt themselves to 
be equal members of society.  The whole lives view would thus reject sending only 
some adults back to school since differences between those individuals within a 
single age cohort violates the principle of liberal equality in a way that differences 




 While the arguments in this chapter have focused on the status of children, they 
have touched upon important issues in caching out the implications of liberal 
equality and political liberalism.  A foundational goal of the political liberal project 
is to construct laws which treat citizens as civic equals. The most important 
consequence of this is that the distribution of rights and liberties ought to be 
relatively insensitive to the capabilities and inclinations of citizens within society. 
This condition would be met by Rawls’ first principle, and by all reasonable 
political conceptions.  This equality between citizens cannot be based on a thick 
notion of equality that held between citizens, since this would seem dependent 
upon a (at least partially) comprehensive account of non-political values. 
However, this understanding of the value of liberalism opened up a serious 
problem in our treatment of children.  It did so because it seemed to rule out the 
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only plausible ground for differentiating the rights of children from those of adults: 
viz., the relative capacities of the different groups.  In so far as we wish to make 
our institutions insensitive to these differences between adults, we seem to lose 
the basis on which to make them sensitive to the differences between children 
and adults.  However, this is a troublesome conclusion, since any plausible account 
must accept that some line must be drawn between these two groups. 
In answer to this problem, I showed there are powerful reasons to endorse a 
whole –lives view of liberal equality.  This view states that basic equality between 
citizens means all must have the same package of rights over the course of their 
lives.  This view allows that two differently aged citizens, although both of the 
same political status, might have different rights and responsibilities at any one 
moment.  The essential fairness of liberal equality is preserved by ensuring all 
citizens are equally situated in relation to individuals of the same age.  Thus rights 
and responsibilities will come in at a fixed age for all citizens, despite differences in 
capacities between these individuals. 
The whole lives account thus offers a way of justifying the currently existing legal 
situation in modern liberal states in a way that avoids the serious difficulties that 
plague other accounts. Practically, it is not troubled by the fact that children are 
often very similar to adults and each child develops at a different rate. These 
undeniable facts of human development were fatal to the threshold account.  
Normatively, the whole-lives view justifies different treatment of children while 
recognizing a crucially important fact, that children are just as much citizens as 
adults. This view therefore suggests that children are owed justifications for the 
laws that apply to them in just the same way as adults.  This view follows naturally 
from the core purposes of political liberalism and the principle of legitimacy. The 
force and intuitive appeal of this principle is the thought that the state is simply 
the shared power of citizens themselves and its actions must thus be justifiable to 
all of them. Laws and institutions must take account of each citizen’s relationship 
to the state and the principle of legitimacy which governs this relationship. 
Children are just as much a part of society as adults, and are equally subject to the 
152 
 
laws and policies of the state.  We cannot ignore their status as individuals simply 
because they are, for the moment, in a more vulnerable position than adult 
citizens. These differences in capacities can, and indeed must, imply that children 




Chapter 7- Justification to children 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that the principle of legitimacy must incorporate 
children as well as adults. This implies that political liberals must design 
institutions with children in mind, and must consider the possible objections that 
might arise from the perspective of the children in society. Liberal institutions face 
a serious problem of legitimacy if they fail to take the special circumstances of 
childhood into account.  
One implication of this is distributional.  Children have different physical and 
mental capabilities, as well as different nutritional needs from adults. Their 
different faculties and requirements imply that they will not normally be able to 
participate in the economic life of the state. They will therefore require special 
care in order to ensure that their needs are met.   
For the purposes of this thesis, the more important aspect of the principle of 
legitimacy concerns the inculcation of beliefs to the next generation.  While it is 
usually reasonable to assume that adults hold a developed comprehensive view, 
children’s views are in the process of being formed.  This implies that liberal 
institutions play a very different role for children than they do in the case of 
adults. When it comes to adults, liberal institutions respond to the existence of 
different comprehensive views within society. Political liberals thus ask whether a 
given set of institutions can be justified without contradicting the tenets of the 
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comprehensive doctrines held in society. In the case of children, the role of 
institutions, principally schools, is to play a part in shaping the content of those 
comprehensive views.  We must therefore ask whether children could fairly object 
to the way in which they come to acquire beliefs and the content of the education 
they receive. 
This raises the further of question of how to model children’s possible objections 
to policy proposals. Obviously, this test cannot imply that we actually justify 
policies to the children in society as they are now. This would imply creating a 
defence of liberal institutions that can be understood by young children, and then 
a debate with children about the effects these institutions will have on them.  
Clearly this idea is a non-starter. The reasoning behind liberal institutions is 
nuanced and complex and it is patently unreasonable to ask all children to be able 
to grapple with these questions.  
Instead we must use some theoretical device to model the possible objections of 
children. One possible solution is to rely on a hypothetical agent who is modelled 
such as to be able to make claims on children’s behalf.  This account is reminiscent 
of the original position, in which hypothetical parties reason over the principles of 
justice on behalf of actual members of society. A model on these lines is defended 
by Robert Noggle (2002), who proposes that adults act in a fiduciary relationship 
towards children, similar to the role played by lawyers in relation to their clients. 
Just as most people are incapable of making a complex legal defence in court, we 
assume that children are incapable of making their own claims to society’s 
resources. Thus just as lawyers act solely with their clients interests in mind, we 
model a figure who makes claims on whether any given policy can be reasonably 
rejected from the perspective of a given child. 
There are two main ways this agent could be modelled. On the first account, the 
fiduciary agent would hold a given view about children’s welfare and make claims 
on children’s behalf. On the second, the fiduciary agent is modelled as neutral 
between the competing comprehensive doctrines held in society. The first 
approach is inappropriate because it is unclear what comprehensive views the 
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fiduciary agent should hold, and hence what kind of education they believe would 
be beneficial to individuals as they grow up. Citizens with different comprehensive 
views will, naturally, take different positions on whether a given upbringing is in a 
child’s best interests.   Religious individuals might believe that an education 
encouraging religious faith is enormously beneficial to children. By contrast, other 
individuals might think such an education to be superfluous or even harmful. In 
acting on someone’s behalf, we must therefore have a deep knowledge and 
understanding of their beliefs and values, even if we do not share them. However, 
the fiduciary actor cannot have this knowledge in this case. We are faced with this 
problem since we do not know what the child’s view will be. Indeed, decisions 
about the legitimate content of education are one of the things which will affect 
the shape of the views which the child will eventually come to hold. 
In light of the problem of deciding which views to give the fiduciary guardian, the 
second strategy I referred to might seem more promising. On this account the 
fiduciary guardian is modelled as an actor who is neutral between different 
comprehensive views. On such a model this guardian would not raise objections 
that depend upon the acceptance of any once comprehensive doctrine. They 
would not therefore object to a secular education on the basis that it is contrary to 
a certain religious creed. Unfortunately, by definition this model of no use when 
considering what form a child’s non-political upbringing should be, since the 
relevant question is precisely which non-political values are appropriate to teach 
to children and which they might legitimately object to. Modelling an adequate 
protector of children’s interests will thus require factoring in some assumptions 
about what kind of life is good for children to live.  
Future Reasonable Rejection  
Therefore, the model of a fiduciary guardian is not applicable in this case. A 
different way of modelling children’s objections is offered by Matthew Clayton. On 
this view, we are concerned with the possible future reasonable rejection of 
institutions and policies. That is, while children themselves cannot raise objections 
to different schemes of education we should take seriously their interests by 
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considering the objections that they might be able to raise against their own 
upbringing once they have grown up.  The advantage of this approach is that it 
takes seriously the possible complaints of children, without forcing the state itself 
to make judgments between competing comprehensive views. We do not ask 
whether a certain upbringing has itself disadvantaged a child (a judgment reliant 
on an opinion of non-political values) but rather whether a child was treated 
unfairly. 
However, while Clayton’s model is superior to Noggle’s, his specific use of it is 
open to objection. According to Clayton, any scheme of non-political values is 
open to the possibility of future reasonable rejection. For him, this follows directly 
from the circumstances of reasonable pluralism, which imply that no 
comprehensive doctrine will be held by all reasonable citizens.  As such, there are 
reasonable grounds to reject any doctrine.  Thus, just as no doctrine can be 
reasonably imposed by one group of society on the rest, so parents and schools 
cannot aim to inculcate any scheme of non-political values since this set could be 
reasonably rejected by the citizens the children will one day become. 
The argument from future reasonable rejection is thus used to support Clayton’s 
overarching position, which as I outlined in chapter four, is that parents ought not 
to be able to pass on any comprehensive view to their children. Since any 
comprehensive values could be reasonably rejected in the future, the only values 
we can legitimately pass on are encapsulated in the notion of a ‘sense of justice’. 
We must teach children to be good and just citizens, but we cannot shape their 
lives beyond this requirement.  Critically, the argument is structured around the 
intentions of parents and other adults. The fundamental concern is not over what 
beliefs children come to hold, but how they came to hold them. Specifically, 
whether the beliefs they hold are the result of other individuals intentionally 
inculcating these views in them. 
 The problem for Clayton’s position in the context of this argument is that we 
might have reason to worry about the content of the views children come to 
acquire, not merely the intentions of those who pass them on. This will be 
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discussed at length later, but at this point I suggest that we might have reason to 
worry about children acquiring views which lead them to self-harm, even if no one 
had intended them to have such beliefs. Once this is recognised, it is clear 
Clayton’s blanket ban on passing on beliefs is not necessarily the best way to 
safeguard the interests of children.  
On any plausible account of children’s acquisition of beliefs and values, the nature 
of their parents’ views, and those of the community in which they grow up, will 
still play an important role. This would be true even if no parent intentionally tried 
to shape their children’s beliefs. The mechanisms by which beliefs are transmitted 
from one person to another are various and complex. However, to take a simple 
case: even on Clayton’s model, adults will still be permitted – and will – converse 
about their beliefs in the presence of their children. In so far as parents tend to be 
important role models for children we might then expect children to come to hold 
similar views to those of their parents. The effect of communities will only 
increase this trend. If children grow up in communities defined by one set of 
beliefs or creeds, then many of their early experiences and relationships with 
others will be defined by these beliefs. Again, there is thus a powerful reason to 
expect children to be pushed towards the views of their adult guardians, even 
when adults do not intentionally seek to advance their own views. 
Thus, Clayton’s revised political liberal position fails to consider the possibility of 
children coming to hold views that might prove troubling and harmful to them in 
later life. In fairness to Clayton, this is not his intention. His theory attempts to 
ensure that children come to hold beliefs in the right way. Nevertheless, it is 
instructive that Clayton’s model cannot avoid the possible problem identified 
above.   We can imagine individuals who have serious objections to the beliefs 
that they learnt as children, not merely to the intentions of the people who raised 
them.  In the end, it might be the case that we cannot accept these complaints. 
However, Clayton’s model cannot take such objections seriously since it focuses 
entirely on the way in which children acquire doctrines and not on the content and 
implications of the doctrines themselves. 
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Therefore, gauging the possible objections of children will require more than 
simply an assessment of the intentions of their parents or other adult guardians. 
Instead, we must look at the content of the beliefs they acquire, and the 
environment in which they grow up. Reflecting on the implications of political 
liberal principles shows that children will indeed have strong grounds to object to 
an education which has only civic aims. Specifically, I will show that the most 
significant feature which distinguishes reasonable doctrines from unreasonable 
ones is whether their adherents are able to act as good liberal citizens. This 
understanding of reasonableness downplays the importance of the effects of 
holding a doctrine on one’s own life.  This understanding of the criteria of 
reasonableness has important implications for the beliefs that parents can 
legitimately pass on to their children.  
To show how this criterion might be problematic, I outline a range of cases in 
which, intuitively, the parents’ actions are troubling and perhaps open to 
objection. For each though, I show that political liberals have difficulty in taking 
seriously the damage that might be done to children. The conclusion of these 
arguments is that political liberalism is blind to features of doctrines which might 
be critically important when we consider their effects on children who are taught 
them. The implication of this is that political liberalism does not meet children’s 
interests in the way that liberal institutions must do in order to remain legitimate. 
The political criterion of reasonableness 
In this section I analyse what kinds of views parents might want to pass on to their 
children. This is important if we are to consider whether allowing parents to pass 
on these beliefs can be justified to children. In the ideal case political liberalism 
considers, all citizens will hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This is 
because holding a reasonable comprehensive view is a necessary condition of 
being a reasonable citizen. Thus, while individuals who hold unreasonable views 
might still want to pass on these beliefs, and this may indeed prove problematic, 
this is a side issue. The core issue for a properly functioning political liberal model 
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is whether there is a possible problem with those doctrines that are classed as 
reasonable. 
Analysing this problem will thus require engaging with one of the most difficult 
issues raised by Political Liberalism: what differentiates a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine from an unreasonable one. A useful tool in doing this is 
differentiating two different senses of the notion of the reasonable. Following Erin 
Kelly, we can distinguish between the political and the metaphysical aspects of the 
reasonable (Kelly and McPherson, 2001: 38-55).  
The political aspects of reasonableness concern citizens’ relationships to the state 
and to one another. Citizens are reasonable in so far as they are willing to propose 
and abide by fair terms of co-operation with other citizens, whom they view as 
their civic equals. Metaphysical notions are those that relate to a doctrine’s 
internal coherence and plausibility. We would consider a doctrine metaphysically 
reasonable if we believe there are strong reasons in support of its conclusions, 
whereas we consider a doctrine metaphysically unreasonable if we believe it to be 
held on the basis of faulty logic or dubious evidence. 
Views are obviously reasonable if they are both politically reasonable and 
metaphysically plausible. Likewise, we have no trouble classing views which are 
both dangerous and absurd as unreasonable. The pertinent question is thus how 
to class views which meet one, but not both of these criteria, which means we 
must understand which takes precedence when classifying the reasonableness of 
any given view. We face this issue because many of the most difficult cases occur 
when these two aspects of the reasonable diverge. That is, when a doctrine is 
metaphysically plausible but is politically unreasonable, or when it is politically 
reasonable, but metaphysically unreasonable.  
Our society contains numerous comprehensive conceptions which fit both of these 
possible outcomes. On the one hand, perhaps the most disturbing incidences of 
violence or other illiberal acts are those which are carried out on the basis of some 
well formed and at least loosely coherent ideology. The basis of such an ideology 
might thus be classified as metaphysically reasonable, but clearly politically 
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unreasonable. An example would be a violent interpretation of a major religious 
faith or political ideology. On the other hand, we can think of many doctrines that 
seem deeply implausible when considered by generally accepted standards of 
reasoning but whose adherents are law abiding and politically engaged citizens 
(for example, individuals who believe that the Earth is flat).  
Critically for the issues raised in this chapter, Rawls and other political liberals are 
committed to thinking that the political aspects of the reasonable take precedence 
over the metaphysical. That is to say that Political Liberalism considers citizens 
whose doctrines are implausible but compatible with liberal principles as 
reasonable, whereas citizens whose doctrines are coherent but illiberal are 
considered unreasonable. Rawls suggests as much when he writes ‘observe here 
that being reasonable is not an epistemological idea (though it has epistemological 
elements). Rather it is part of a political ideal of democratic citizenship that 
includes the ideal of public reason’ (Rawls, 1993: 162).  
More specifically, classifying doctrines as reasonable or unreasonable is done on 
the basis of political factors. Rawls writes that ‘we avoid excluding doctrines as 
unreasonable without strong grounds based on clear aspects of the reasonable 
itself’ (159). The reasonable in this sense is a moral power distinct from the 
rational, and refers to the ability of citizens to propose and abide by fair terms of 
co-operation. Thus it is only when doctrines imperil the ability of citizens to co-
operate on fair terms that we should consider them to be unreasonable.  
Indeed, Rawls recognises that this understanding of reasonable doctrines implies 
adopting much more lax criteria of reasoning than we would generally find 
appropriate in other matters. He suggests that ‘within that *background+ culture 
we may regard many doctrines as plainly unreasonable, or untrue, that we think it 
is correct to count as reasonable by the criteria in the text. That criterion we 
should see as giving rather minimal conditions appropriate for the aims of political 
liberalism’ (Rawls 160). 
As is suggested in this passage, setting these metaphysical criteria loosely is 
essential for the project of Political Liberalism. Philosophers are familiar with the 
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fact that even the relatively well developed ethical theories Rawls considers (such 
as Kantianism and utilitarianism) can be argued to be misguided. Since these 
arguments show no signs of abating, it would be disastrous if the liberal state were 
in the business of trying to settle them. It would be even more damaging, and of 
course illegitimate, if the state were to deliberate and decide on whether religious 
doctrines were correct in their interpretations of their sacred texts, or whether the 
beliefs on which they are founded are metaphysically plausible.  
Furthermore, our intuitive understanding of liberal politics supports this emphasis 
on political factors. Acting unjustly for sophisticated or complex reasons is not 
fundamentally different from acting unjustly for any other reason. Nor do such 
sophisticated unreasonable people seem to present a particular problem of 
justification; we are not worried about the fact that a terrorist cannot reconcile 
laws which preserve freedom of religion with their own doctrines. Conversely, 
where religious believers or secular individuals are law abiding and civil to their 
fellow citizens then we are inclined to treat them as reasonable citizens no matter 
what their fundamental beliefs.  
Therefore, there is both strong textual evidence, and there are good independent 
reasons, to believe that Rawls’ position emphasises the political implications of 
doctrines rather than their inherent plausibility when classifying them as 
reasonable or unreasonable. We should not then think of reasonable doctrines as 
only those that we would ourselves consider to be ‘reasonable’ answers to the 
many questions with which we are faced in life. The sense of reasonable employed 
by Rawls is much wider and employs a laxer standard of reasoning. Furthermore, 
setting these standards loosely is essential if political liberal principles are to have 
the wide scope envisioned for them by Rawls.  
Indeed, one notable theorist has claimed that even the loose metaphysical criteria 
outlined by Rawls are both irrelevant to the purposes of political liberalism, and 
pernicious in their implications for liberal principles. Stephen Lecce argues that 
political liberalism ought to drop the epistemic criteria of reasonableness entirely, 
and that it is the fact of simple pluralism rather than reasonable pluralism which 
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has normative importance. The consequence of this is that individuals will be 
counted as reasonable as long as they act appropriately towards other citizens; 
the content of their views is entirely irrelevant. This is premised on the attractive 
thought that ‘philosophical enlightenment should not be a precondition of moral 
status in a political society founded on the idea of a social contract’ (Lecce, 2008: 
173). Thinking about the aims of Political Liberalism, and our intuitive 
understanding of the criteria for membership in a liberal community, thus pushes 
towards lax metaphysical criteria or even doing away with these criteria entirely. 
Damage done by doctrines 
In the previous section of the thesis, I argued that political liberals are committed 
to giving parents a relatively free hand in decisions regarding their children’s 
education. Added to this, I have now shown that political liberalism is bound to 
regard doctrines as reasonable largely on the basis of political rather than 
metaphysical factors. In both cases, political liberals are led to this position by the 
core aims of the project. It is illegitimate for the state to foster ideals to govern the 
whole of life, thus the aims of education are restricted to engendering an effective 
sense of justice. This implies that the state will be silent with regards to aspects of 
education which are not related to this civic aim. Likewise, the relatively lax 
understanding of reasonableness is explicitly developed in light of the purposes of 
political liberalism. 
However, a significant problem emerges as a result of the combination of these 
two positions. The implication of these theoretical views is that a multitude of 
parents will pass on to children doctrines which may be dubious or unjustified if 
viewed from more conventional standards of reasoning. I will now argue that we 
intuitively think that some of these doctrines might be harmful to the children 
concerned. That is, that children acquiring some sets of beliefs, or non-political 
values, might itself be a problem. 
 To help shape this argument, I will sketch out various actions that parents might 
perform on their children. We might think of these as on a continuum from the 
most seriously harmful to the relatively benign. At the one end are those actions 
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which seem obviously unjustifiable on any plausible theory of children’s rights and 
parental authority. However, next to these, I will argue, are other actions which 
seem somewhat similar, but which political liberals have serious difficulty in 
countering. The difficulty emerges from the unwillingness of political liberals to 
consider either the plausibility of doctrines, or their implications for individuals 
beyond their relevance to civic matters. 
At one end, then, are actions that are simply abusive or neglectful. Ex hypothesi, 
the parents’ reasons for their actions are not plausibly derived from any 
comprehensive view or conception of the good, but are simply the result of, for 
example, spite or anger.  This obviously includes parents who physically abuse 
their children, and we would also include some cases of criminal neglect. The only 
countervailing reason against the state intervening here is parents’ rights of 
control over their children, but surely no plausible theory of parents’ rights 
extends to the right to abuse their children. 
Standing next to these cases are individuals who perform superficially similar 
abusive actions, but who do so for reasons which arise from a reasonably coherent 
comprehensive view. Similar to cases of abuse we might think here of religious 
individuals who induct their children into a faith via a painful procedure. Related 
to neglect, we might imagine parents who fail to meet their children’s basic 
nutritional or developmental needs because of the tenets of their comprehensive 
doctrine.16 
Once again, this case calls into question the sphere of parental rights. Notice 
though that the fact that parents have reasons which are based on their beliefs 
does not seem to give them a significantly stronger case than that which could be 
offered by merely neglectful parents. In those liberal democracies to which 
political liberalism is addressed, it is against the law to abuse one’s children no 
                                                          
16 A recent example of this is the case of Areni Manuelyan, who died because of a chest infection induced by malnutrition. 
Areni had been raised on a purely fruitarian diet., http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1542293.stm [check the rules for how 




matter what the reason. Thus, these cases do not seem to pose a significant 
challenge for political liberals. Political liberals can coherently support a limit to 
parental authority without violating the principle of legitimacy. Just as the state 
can restrict those who would attack or harm other adult citizens because they 
believe that they are required to do so by their religion, so the state can limit what 
parents can do to children even in cases where the regulated action is inspired by 
the parents’ beliefs.   
As we progress along the continuum, though, things become more difficult. Here 
we have cases where the harm caused by parents is not physical abuse, but 
instead results directly from children accepting the content of parental beliefs. 
That is, cases where parents’ beliefs are so troubling to young children that they 
develop recognisable and sometimes severe mental health problems. Clear 
examples of this emerge when we consider so called ‘cults’ and other fringe belief 
systems.  
For instance, consider the case of those children who were inducted into a cult 
called the House of Judah. These children, who were used as a case study for a 
psychological investigation, had received an extremely intense education, a key 
tenet of which was the utter avoidance of sin (mainly of sexual sins), and a 
continual focus on the extreme punishments sinners will receive in the afterlife. 
The study found that ‘ex-cultists appear to be much younger than their 
chronological age and display an asexual innocence. They act childlike although 
they may be well into their twenties. Unsurprisingly, these children were prone to 
develop a series of serious mental health conditions later in life.’ (Goldburg, 2006: 
167). 
Many people’s immediate reaction is to consider this case as analogous to that of 
parents who physically harm their children for religious or doctrinal reasons. While 
we accept that the parents may sincerely believe their creed, and are thus 
differentiated from merely negligent or lazy parents, their beliefs do not seem in 
any way sufficient to allow them to treat their children in a way that causes harm 
and suffering.  
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However, notice that the reply we used in the case of physical abuse is not open to 
us when we consider mental and developmental harm. In the former case, I said 
political liberals would tend to argue that there was a principled boundary to 
parental authority which did not extend to harming children, no matter what the 
parents’ reasons. In this way, political liberals can avoid any consideration of the 
doctrines parents use to justify these actions, and merely focus on the limits that 
govern citizens’ conduct towards one another. In the case of mental health 
problems that arise from having been brought up in a certain faith or other 
conception of the good, this response is not effective. In these cases, all the 
parents did is to teach their children their beliefs. It is the very content of their 
beliefs, not the actions they prescribe, which has led to what appears to be 
obvious harm to children.  We might also think here of children who are taught by 
their parents that it is wrong to receive blood transfusions, who then go on to lose 
their lives in operations or accidents. Again, it is the content of their ethical beliefs 
which appears to have harmed them.  
At this point, we may feel inclined to argue that the beliefs that these parents are 
attempting to pass on are foolish or absurd. We might conjecture that it is only the 
fact that children are impressionable at a young age which leads them to accept 
these bizarre beliefs. Thus, we might think that the state could intervene in these 
cases because of the fringe nature of the parent’s beliefs. Unfortunately, this reply 
is inadequate for two reasons.  
Firstly, it seems difficult to separate out ‘fringe’ beliefs from more mainstream 
ones purely on what Kelly terms metaphysical grounds. Attempting to argue that 
parents cannot pass on such fringe beliefs will necessarily involve the political 
liberal state in precisely those discussions it wishes to avoid.  So, for instance, 
many consider Scientology to be a deeply misguided set of beliefs. Its tenets seem 
bizarre and their justification doubtful when judged by accepted standards of 
reasoning. However, political liberals would surely not feel comfortable attacking a 
doctrine on these grounds. We cannot feel confident that the tenets of scientology 
are patently more absurd than all of the Gods, spirits and afterlives which are held 
by the more established religions. Moreover, even if we did feel confident that 
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Scientology was different, it is unclear what standards of reasoning we could use 
to make this judgement while maintaining the standard of public neutrality. 
The second reason we cannot simply ignore this problem is that these problems 
are not only restricted to cults or other fringe belief systems.  There are many 
important examples in which, from a secular perspective, the beliefs which are 
passed down by members of well established religions cause serious and 
identifiable harms to children. We might think here of the difficulties faced by 
homosexual children growing up in some socially conservative religious 
communities in America. These will usually be two fold, there may be problems in 
reconciling one’s feelings with the beliefs one has learned in the community, and if 
children choose to express their sexuality they may face alienation from their 
friends and family.  
Where parents teach their children such anti-homosexual beliefs, there are 
essentially two ways of looking at the situation. From the parents’ perspective, 
while their children may have to go through difficult times because of their beliefs, 
attempting to push them away from homosexuality is undoubtedly the right 
course of action. If we take seriously the belief that homosexuality is a sin, then 
pursuing a homosexual life is contrary to the best interests of the child, and may 
lead to serious repercussions for his later existence.  
However, if we take the perspective of either secular individuals, or religious 
believers who do not take homosexuality to be a sin, the situation looks entirely 
different. From these perspectives, an individual can have a flourishing and rich 
life as a homosexual. Further, many secular individuals would not even accept the 
premise that people could choose to be gay or straight at all. Therefore, for many 
individuals who do not accept that homosexuality is a sin, demonising it and trying 
to turn children away from acknowledging and expressing their sexual natures, is 
both irrational and cruel.  
Our perspective on this case thus depends significantly, if not entirely, on our 
opinion of the doctrinal claims of the parents. In so far as the state has a particular 
duty to protect the children in its care it is thus difficult to avoid taking a position 
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on these controversial religious or metaphysical claims. Taking any side here 
though will involve the liberal state in precisely those discussions Rawls sought to 
avoid, namely, what ought to be considered the correct standards of reasoning 
about the deepest questions of metaphysics and ethics. 
Moving still further along the continuum are cases in which there is a possible 
harm to children which inheres simply in holding a bizarre or incoherent doctrine. 
In this case the possible harm is independent from any damage which might result 
from the effects this doctrine will have on their emotional wellbeing or interaction 
with others. For example, consider a case in which a child is taught that the Earth 
is flat. Further, imagine that the parents of this child decide to home-school their 
children, and use course books and work which reinforce this belief and they avoid 
material offering conflicting views. The result of this education might thus be 
adults who have this false belief.  While this example might seem trivial, it might 
still have serious impact on such an individual’s relationships with others. More 
serious cases of this type are those in which parents seek to teach their children 
beliefs which have been refuted by modern science, such that the earth was 
created in seven days or that the whole of history has occurred in only six 
thousand years. Again, we might perhaps point to problems which result from this 
belief, but the more fundamental worry must surely be that a child with these 
beliefs has been excluded from important evidence about the actual state of the 
world and our place in it. 
Looking at the range of cases I have sketched out, we see the serious problem for 
the political liberal position. There is, I conjecture, general agreement that the 
state has good cause to act in those cases at the extreme end of the spectrum. 
Where parents are abusive the state has good cause to intervene. This seems true 
if they are simply negligent or if their reasons are entwined with a conception of 
the good. There are also strong grounds to worry about the transmission of certain 
kinds of beliefs, even where this stops short of actual physical abuse. There may 
be serious mental and developmental consequences for children of being taught 
to believe certain things. 
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The problem, though, is differentiating these last cases from those that might be 
similar, but which arise from more mainstream comprehensive accounts. The 
obvious counter is to say that the beliefs of groups like the House of Judah are 
absurd, and the claim of the parents to be allowed to transmit them to their 
children cannot possibly justify damaging the long-term health of those children. 
However, this response is a difficult one for political liberals to pursue. The lax 
standards of reasoning used in classifying doctrines means that many doctrines 
which seem dubious must nevertheless be classified as reasonable. Moreover, 
these lax standards are essential if ordinary orthodox religious beliefs are not to be 
excluded as unreasonable.  
Furthermore, specifying a doctrine as harmful to children requires elaborating a 
view of what is in fact in children’s best interests. However, any such view will 
require taking a position on what is valuable in life, and as such will be ruled out by 
the principle of legitimacy.  Core elements of the political liberal view thus imply 
that the state will be silent in a number of cases where we may feel it has a duty to 
intervene.   
Here then we see the consequences of considering the political aspects of 
doctrines and setting loose metaphysical criteria. Rawls argues that we should 
consider reasonable even doctrines which we could not seriously entertain for 
ourselves. These doctrines are not worthy of serious consideration, presumably, 
because of manifest flaws in their reasoning or the pernicious effects of pursuing a 
life dedicated to their principles.  The problem for Rawls’ position is that while he 
would not seriously consider these doctrines for himself, political liberalism is 
committed to allowing parents to pass these doctrines on to their children.  
Returning to the issue of the legitimacy of institutions which affect children, this 
range of cases suggests that political liberalism as currently construed faces a 
seriously difficulty. By focussing almost entirely on the political implications of 
doctrines, it is far from clear that education will do enough to safeguard the 
interest of children. Many of the issues which are important here relate to the 
actual plausibility of a doctrine, and the kind of life it will recommend. Political 
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liberals thus ignore the effects of education on the children themselves, and only 
seriously consider whether education prepares children to live together with 
others. This creates a problem of legitimacy in so far as children can reasonably 
object to an institution designed without proper consideration of their own 
interests and claims.  Moreover, core notions of political liberalism entail it must 
remain silent even in cases where, at least intuitively, there seems clear reason to 
intervene. 
Conclusion and Recap 
The previous section outlined the implications of political liberal principles for 
education, and argued that these were consonant with Rawls’ own account rather 
than those of some of his critics. Critically, the argument running through that 
section was that parents would generally be allowed significant authority to 
control their children’s upbringing, with the only limits being that they must fulfil 
the civic requirements of liberalism. Chapter five considered these requirements in 
detail, and argued that they were far less stringent than is often supposed. This 
therefore implies that parents in a political liberal society will have significant 
freedom to pass on their beliefs, whatever they may be. 
This section considered the normative implications of this, and argued that this 
implication of political liberalism was unacceptable and in conflict with the core 
aims of the project.  To show this, I argued that political liberal institutions must 
be reasonably justifiable to children in society as well as to adult citizens. Children 
must count as full citizens because any attempt to exclude them will fail, as I 
showed through discussion and critique of the threshold view. This view is the 
natural device to exclude children from full citizenship, since it both excludes 
children for the right reasons (their diminished faculties) and allows for all adult 
citizens to be treated equally despite differences between them.  However, a 
closer look at the circumstances of human development revealed that this view 
was incoherent, and could not plausibly divide adults from children. Instead I 
posited that the whole lives view provided a better understanding of children’s 
political status.  The most important consequence of this view was that the 
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political liberal principle of legitimacy must in fact apply to children as well. The 
attraction of this principle was that laws must be justifiable to all individuals who 
are subject to them, a consideration which surely applies to children. 
This chapter considered the implications of this requirement. I argued that the 
best way to assess whether a policy which affected children was legitimate was by 
considering the future reasonable rejections adults might make to their 
upbringing.  Consideration of the types of claims adults might make showed that 
we must be concerned with the content of the views that children acquire, not 
merely with the process of acquisition.  Given this criterion, I argued that political 
liberal institutions (as described in section 2) face a serious problem. Deep seated 
aspects of political liberalism imply that this view focuses on the political aspects 
of doctrines, rather than on their metaphysical factors.  However, the 
metaphysical aspects of doctrines are hugely important to the children who are 
taught them. Children can legitimately object if they are taught beliefs which are 
incoherent or obviously implausible, and may have legitimate grounds to object in 
many other cases.   
On the face of it, this argument might seem a rather technical critique of political 
liberalism, focussing on the scope of the principle of legitimacy and on the 
relationship between the metaphysical and political aspects of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. However, taken together these discussions reveal a 
serious problem within the structure of political liberalism. The impetus for 
political liberalism is the desire to justify liberal institutions to all members of 
society, despite the divisions between citizens on matters of ethics, religion, and 
so on. Given this impetus, the principle of legitimacy must surely apply to children 
as well, who come into society through no choice of their own and are just as 
much subject to its laws as adults. Our common institutions have immense impact 
on children’s development and upbringing, both directly through education and by 
shaping the environment in which parents raise their children.  
To respond fairly to pluralism, the political liberal state refuses to compare the 
merits of different comprehensive views. However, as we saw in chapter five, this 
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refusal to compare comprehensive doctrines also leads to a general presumption 
in favour of the wishes of parents, who will want to pass on their beliefs to their 
children. Further, while parents will necessarily hold reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, the criterion of reasonableness is set by largely political rather than 
metaphysical factors.  Political liberals are mainly concerned with the effects a 
doctrine will have on social co-operation, not on the lives of those who hold it. 
However, it is precisely the implications of a doctrine on the life of a believer 
which concerns children who are being taught these views. Children can thus 



















Reaching this final section it appears as if I have argued myself into a corner.  On 
the one hand, I have defended Rawls’ account of liberal legitimacy and argued that 
it is the most appropriate response to pluralism.  On the other, I have argued that 
this approach encounters significant difficulties in the case of education. Precisely 
because of the principle of legitimacy, political liberalism seems bound to ignore 
some of the important effects of education on children’s lives. Political liberals are 
committed to focussing almost exclusively on the civic aims of education. This 
myopia is a serious problem since it implies that political liberals fail to address 
adequately children’s interests in the formation of institutions. Children’s 
reasonable rejection of the limits of what can be done to them being set by only 
the need for a purely civic education constitutes a serious threat to the legitimacy 
of the entire political liberal project. 
 The root of the problem for political liberals lies in two seemingly contradictory 
arguments that have been advanced in the thesis. The first of these was developed 
in section one. Here I argued that we cannot rely on contested theory of human 
flourishing when responding to circumstances of pluralism. To rely on any single 
comprehensive doctrine illegitimately privileges the views of one section of society 
at the expense of the many different reasonable views which are held by other 
citizens. However, in the later part of the thesis I argued that we cannot avoid 
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relying on some account of what is in children’s best interests when we consider 
different schemes of education. Attempting to eschew all views about the good 
leads unavoidably to a situation in which some children are raised in an 
environment which is deeply damaging to their future development and life 
chances.  Having the state’s policy based on an account of children’s interests is 
thus seemingly both impermissible and indispensible. 
Put in these terms, it might seem that the thesis thus far simply offers up a difficult 
choice.  We can either hold on to the thought that the state must be neutral 
between competing comprehensive views, but accept that this will sometimes 
have tragic repercussions in the case of upbringing and education. Alternatively, 
the arguments I have presented might be taken to show that the case of education 
implies that the goal of neutrality should be abandoned.  The conclusion of the 
thesis would thus be that liberals should adopt a perfectionist account premised 
upon promoting autonomy, despite the fact that autonomy will not be the guiding 
ideal in the lives of many reasonable citizens. 
However, seeing the choice in these stark terms is a deeply problematic response 
to the issues raised by the thesis.  Neither a complete abandonment of state 
neutrality nor avoiding our responsibilities to our children is a palatable course of 
action.  Fortunately, this dilemma is not as stark as it might appear. I will argue 
that this problem only seems intractable if we accept the hard line positions which 
currently prevail within the literature.  Specifically we should question the 
assumption made by political liberals that the principle of legitimacy implies that 
the state cannot take sides in disputes regarding non-political values, and thus can 
take no view on what is in any particular citizen’s best interest.   Likewise, we 
should reject attempts to develop accounts of children’s interests which rely upon 
assumptions that conflict with reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and will thus 
be deeply and fundamentally antithetical to many widely held beliefs in society.  
The goal is thus to develop an understanding of legitimacy that captures the most 
intuitively compelling aspects of Rawls’ view, but allows sufficient space for the 
state to act on a reasonable theory of what is in children’s interests.  This goal 
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cannot be met while the justification for political institutions remains entirely 
freestanding from non-political questions. Remaining entirely freestanding from 
questions of ethics and metaphysics seems to be an attractive way of responding 
to pluralism when we consider the case of adults, but once we consider the case 
of children we see that this position implies an abrogation of important 
responsibilities.  Instead, I propose that political liberals should aim to ensure that 
attending state education is an experience compatible with holding any of the 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines found in society, though this experience may 
change the way elements of these doctrines are understood.  
If this goal is met, it would imply that enforcing a mandatory curriculum on all 
students would not preclude them from endorsing any reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine. In this way, individuals do not have to give up on their core beliefs in 
order to reconcile themselves to the justification of liberal institutions and the 
school system in particular. In terms of justification, an education which is 
compatible with differing reasonable doctrines is far more likely to garner support 
from an overlapping consensus than more sectarian alternatives. The ideal 
scenario would be one in which each reasonable citizen would be able to see the 
value of state education from within her own doctrine. However, given the tenets 
of the doctrines actually held in society, and the attitudes of many citizens, this 
scenario seems unlikely. Protecting the interests of children is likely to require 
teaching children in ways that differ from their parents wishes.  
Despite being justified in a less controversial way than perfectionist theories, a 
political liberal education would thus still face serious objections if actually 
implemented in society. Indeed, the education policy I envision would likely be far 
more controversial (with parents) than the one implied by Rawls’ account. Given 
the ecumenical aims of political liberalism, these parental objections must be 
taken seriously. All things being equal, we should want as many citizens as possible 
to agree with the policies and institutions of the liberal state. However, in light of 
the claims that children have on society, these parental objections must eventually 
be overridden. The continuing hope is that by couching our defence of education 
in more neutral terms, rather than ones which are explicitly perfectionist or rely 
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on assumptions which totally incompatible with many comprehensive 
conceptions, we can offer a justification of policy to citizens which takes seriously 
the nature of their objections. 
The practical implications of this view are very similar to the kinds of liberal 
education proposed by thinkers such as Brighouse and Callan. Most importantly, 
my account is designed to foster children’s skills of debate and scrutiny in 
education.  I tie these skills to two different aspects of upbringing. These are the 
acquisition of comprehensive doctrines and giving children skills to help them 
prosper in whatever plan of life they eventually adopt. The argument running 
through these chapters is that the role of education in a liberal society ought to be 
giving children the skills to make an informed and reasoned choice between 
competing doctrines, and providing them with general skills that are useful to 
individuals who hold a wide variety of different beliefs. In contrast to more 
sectarian accounts, both of these roles of education can be performed while 
meeting the test of liberal legitimacy. 
 In chapter eight, I will be concerned with the value of children being able to think 
and reason for themselves, and to subject the views which are taught to them at 
home, in school, and in the community, to critical scrutiny. In chapter nine, I deal 
with the objection that the kind of education necessary to meet this goal will be 
inimical to the life plans of many reasonable citizens. This objection, if vindicated, 
would be deeply problematic since it would imply that my account of education 
faces a similar problem of legitimacy to that faced by a purely civic one. My 
response is that the skills provided by education, such as knowledge of science and 
history and critical reasoning, will be useful to individuals who hold a wide variety 
of different comprehensive doctrines. In particular, I will focus on giving children 













Chapter 8-Acquiring a Conception of the Good 
In light of the arguments of the previous sections, political liberalism must adapt 
to safeguard the interests of children, and take more seriously the ways in which 
comprehensive views come to be formed rather than simply responding to 
existing doctrines. The problem is that meeting these concerns will require moving 
beyond an education system which is designed solely to meet a series of civic 
aims. In turn, this move threatens the legitimacy of the liberal state since 
designing an education system to promote children’s welfare seems to require an 
account of children’s interests. Developing even a minimal account of children’s 
interests seems to rely on contested assumptions about human flourishing and the 
good life.  Protecting the interests of children thus seems to undermine the extent 
to which the state can fairly respond to the fact of reasonable pluralism.  
Instead of attempting to develop a theory of children’s best interest, I will propose 
that political liberals should concentrate on ensuring that children acquire 
comprehensive views in the right way.  Specifically, this means that children 
should, first, be aware of alternative positions to those which are held by their 
parents or communities, and, second, should be in a position to consider the 
reasons in favour of holding any particular view. To make an informed choice in 
this way will require children learn skills of debate and critique. To promote these 
skills, I advocate lessons devoted to thinking about ethical and political dilemmas, 
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during which children will learn about the responses to fundamental issues of 
ethics and theology which are offered by different members of society. Further, in 
order to make an informed choice about many important questions, children need 
a grounding in scientific and historical material. Given the ways in which these 
subjects interact with established comprehensive doctrines, education in these 
matters will likely be deeply controversial.  However, I aim to show that this 
account can be justified in a way that is consistent with the most intuitively 
appealing aspects of the principle of legitimacy.  
Ethical education 
Given that this thesis deals with the problems caused by pluralism over questions 
of the good, ethical and political questions are a natural starting point for 
developing my own account of education. Properly preparing children to live in a 
pluralistic society will require education to have a much stronger focus on the 
ethical dilemmas they will face as they grow up, and the different ways 
comprehensive doctrines attempt to resolve them.  
The kind of education I am proposing will mandate that children consider the 
fundamental underpinning of different comprehensive doctrines as well as 
seriously considering the implications of these views for controversial ethical 
questions. On my account, the curriculum would mandate that children discuss 
even highly controversial issues of the type from which parents can currently 
remove their children. Of course, given both common standards of civility and the 
aims of political liberalism, we must be extremely careful to teach controversial 
issues in a way that is respectful to each of the differing reasonable views held in 
society. Nevertheless, respecting pluralism should not mean simply avoiding 
discussion of these issues in class. Avoiding these issues, or covering them in a way 
that merely outlines the views of others rather than seriously considering the 
implications of each view, undermines the extent to which children can seriously 
evaluate the belief systems which exist in society.  It is counterproductive to avoid 
issues simply because they are controversial or possibly even offensive to some 
parents. Not discussing these issues in class only increases the chance that views 
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are held on these subjects simply because they are the views of parents or others 
in the community. 
 An important practical point regarding the consideration of these different ethical 
views is that a dry presentation from a teacher is rarely the best way to introduce 
children to the variety of views present in society. A better approach is one in 
which children receive lessons about different faiths and philosophical doctrines 
from committed believers.  Harry Brighouse quotes John Stuart Mill who writes 
that: 
      “Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his 
own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer 
as refutations. That is not the way to do justice to the arguments or bring them 
into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons 
who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest and do their utmost for 
them.” (Brighouse, 2006: 25) 
 Where possible, ethical lessons would thus be guided by ‘guest speakers’, 
members of different faiths or adherents of different ways of living, who would 
talk to children about the content of their view and the way it affects their lives.  
As well as these lessons devoted to learning about different doctrines, children 
would then talk through real world cases which raise controversial ethical 
questions. These kinds of lessons would likely face serious parental objections. 
While schools and teachers should obviously make every effort to create a safe 
and comfortable learning environment, we can imagine numerous cases in which 
these lessons might be difficult for children. Guest speakers may well present 
views that are very different from those to which the children are used, and some 
would hold views that some of the children might find offensive. A concern for 
children’s welfare might therefore suggest that schools should avoid contentious 
subjects and stick to matters about which children feel comfortable. 
However, while this response is understandable, it does not provide a compelling 
reason to restrict the content of schooling. Of course, we must make allowance for 
the fact that children may be too young to understand complex dilemmas fully. It 
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is obviously inappropriate to teach many issues to younger children. However, 
older children will encounter many of the same problems and issues faced by 
adults and will become independent adult citizens soon. Avoiding issues 
altogether in school on the grounds that children are too young may well imply 
that some children will either not consider these issues at all or will consider them 
in a different forum which may not be designed with appropriate constraints.  
In short, the parts of children’s education which deal with ethical and theological 
issues should aim to create a robust debate between children and qualified 
moderators. This debate is robust in the sense that I reject the two usual reasons 
to limit the scope of debate. These are children’s age and hence innocence or 
vulnerability, and objections made by parents to the content of the curriculum. 
Justification  
An intensive ethical education which teaches about a number of different 
philosophical and religious doctrines could be justified in a variety of different 
ways. Many liberals could see the value in these lessons for the civic purposes of 
education. By learning about the content of doctrines other than their own, 
children may become better prepared for life in a pluralistic society in which there 
will be many different perspectives on the questions facing the community. By 
understanding the viewpoints and perspectives of their fellow citizens, children 
may thus be better prepared to act as reasonable citizens. However, this civic 
value cannot alone be sufficient to justify this kind of education when it 
encounters parental complaints. As I showed in chapter five when considering 
Eamonn Callan’s rendering of the convergence thesis, children are able to become 
politically reasonable citizens without fully understanding the views of others. 
They must simply appreciate that others hold different views from theirs and that 
these different view should not affect the political status of those who hold them.  
Another possible way of justifying this kind of intense scrutiny of doctrines is in 
preparing children to make choices about which comprehensive doctrine they feel 
makes best sense for them. This approach is adopted by Harry Brighouse, who 
argues that a central goal of teaching children about a variety of different 
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doctrines is that they will be better prepared to make a choice for themselves 
about which way of life suits them. I discussed the example he uses to illustrate 
these kinds of choices in chapter two. This example is one of a homosexual child 
growing up in a conservative community in America (Brighouse, 2006: 17). As 
discussed then, Brighouse believes that while the lifestyle pursued in this 
community may be a valuable one, it is not one a homosexual can endorse from 
the inside. As such, an important role for education is in giving children like this an 
opportunity to choose a different way of life, hopefully one which is better suited 
to their nature and inclinations. His argument for teaching different doctrines is 
thus a version of the instrumental argument that I considered in chapter two of 
the thesis. As I argued then, the view that there are many different ways in which 
individuals can flourish, the theory of value pluralism, is antithetical to many 
comprehensive doctrines. 
By contrast, on my account the value of children learning about the attractions of 
other doctrines and thinking through ethical dilemmas is that it gives them the 
resources to understand and critically analyse the beliefs that they learn in the 
home and elsewhere. Children must come to understand that the views held, and 
taught, by their parents are not the only possible ones, and they must see the 
implications of the views they learn in the home when compared to those of other 
possible doctrines. However, the goal is not to push children away from their 
parent’s views, or even necessarily to lessen the influence of parents over their 
children, but to ensure that the views that children come to hold have been 
subjected to critical scrutiny.  
This policy will obviously be controversial. It will, for instance, imply that children 
will have to go to school longer than was wished by the parents in Yoder, and that 
they will be exposed to precisely the sort of reading material that was the source 
of the complaint in Mozert. The kind of education I am proposing is therefore 
likely to be less acceptable to some citizens than the purely civic education Rawls 
proposes. This is a serious issue; one of the chief advantages of political liberalism 
is that it is more hospitable to the diversity found in modern society. When the 
state overrules parental objections it is liable to reduce the amount of support it 
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has from within important sections of community, and to undercut the attraction 
of liberal institutions to certain religious communities. Nevertheless, parental 
objections cannot alone constitute a sufficient reason to reject this policy.  Undue 
deference to parental choices in upbringing is at the core of problem that I have 
argued arises from the political liberal model as it is currently understood, since it 
runs the risk of parents passing on beliefs which are not in their children’s best 
interests. 
Thus, while designing an education policy that is acceptable to parents is an 
important goal, it is not the paramount one. Instead the ongoing argument 
throughout the thesis has established two criteria to test any scheme of 
education. The first is whether the given policy fairly responds to children’s 
interests in education. As I argued in section three, a purely civic education will 
illegitimately ignore children’s concerns.  In this instance we must therefore ask 
whether promoting children’s skills of critical reasoning will be beneficial to them 
The second criteria of a justifiable  is curriculum is whether it illegitimately 
promotes one contested view of ethics or the good. While we must fairly respond 
to children’s interests in education, we must not do this by breaking the 
commitment to neutrality which formed the bedrock of a just response to the fact 
of reasonable pluralism. I will now argue that an advanced ethical education is 
both beneficial to children, and that it can be justified in terms of public reason. 
The value of debate and scrutiny 
There are two main ways in which an extended ethical education will be valuable 
for those children who undergo it. The first is that it will make the children’s 
developing comprehensive views more coherent. The second is that it will help 
them to understand the consequences of their view for their plans of life, and 
enable them to think carefully about whether the view is one to which they wish 
to adhere.  
Especially in a lively pluralistic society, children are highly likely to come to hold a 
set of beliefs that are somewhat incoherent or not well considered. This is true 
even where children are inducted into a relatively coherent comprehensive 
181 
 
doctrine by their parents. While such views, particularly religious views, may have 
applications to a wide variety of different situations they do not exhaust the set of 
beliefs and opinions a citizen might have. In addition to whatever philosophical or 
religious commitments children may come to have, they will thus also have 
opinions on a whole variety of ethical, political and aesthetic questions. Explaining 
how each child comes to hold their views will obviously be an incredibly 
complicated task, and one well beyond the purview of this analysis. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that for many children the views of their parents will be 
important, either through the children following, or forcefully rejecting, them.  In 
most cases a child’s education will also play a role, both through the content of 
lessons and by offering a chance to meet other children with different beliefs.  
 Understanding the interplay between these different influences is a question well 
beyond this thesis. The important point for my analysis is that in the vast majority 
of cases a child’s views are the product of a plethora of different influences. 
Further, these different influences will often come from different perspectives and 
thus guide children towards attitudes or beliefs that may be in tension with one 
another. We should thus expect children to hold a number of views some of which 
are contradictory.  Even when their views are not incoherent, we would expect 
children to face difficult situations in working out how each element of their 
beliefs fits with the others. 
In such a context, the first important contribution that a robust ethical education 
can make to children’s lives is to provide them with a forum to think through their 
opinions and discover the elements of their world view which conflict with 
another.  Thinking about difficult cases may force children to see areas in which 
different parts of their world view conflict with one another, and therefore to 
consider which elements of their world view are most important to them.   
The second value of this kind of ethical education is to force children to think 
carefully about what the views and opinions learned at home really commit them 
to. They would face this challenge through lessons dealing with ethical dilemmas 
and political problems. In these lessons children would be asked to consider their 
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own responses to issues, but also learn about the responses of individuals who 
hold different comprehensive views from their own. Through this discussion, 
children will come to hold a better understanding of the way different religions or 
philosophical views deal with actual problems. This scrutiny gives them a genuine 
opportunity to reject elements of the views that they learn at home.  
This possibility of children coming to reject elements of the views they learn at 
home is considered valuable in so far as individuals can meaningfully consider 
questions of the good and come to hold views which will serve them better in later 
life by weighing competing reasons. Of course, the suggestion that reflection and 
scrutiny leads to more justifiable views does not imply that reflection and 
argument are the only way to come to knowledge about the good. That is, my 
account does not rule citizens holding beliefs on the basis of faith or intuition. The 
aim is to try and avoid basing political principles on controversial claims about the 
nature of truth or the best way to come to knowledge of the good. Instead, my 
account rests on the much more modest claim that argument and deliberation 
with others is a useful way of clarifying the beliefs one holds, in seeing their 
implications and in rejecting elements of doctrines which one comes to find 
objectionable. 
 The paradigmatic case we imagine here is not one in which an individual 
renounces the entirety of their comprehensive doctrine when faced with critical 
scrutiny. We would not usually expect discussions in class to cause children to 
abandon entirely their beliefs or their allegiance to the traditions that they have 
learned in the home.  Instead, the role of critical scrutiny is to assess which aspects 
of these traditions or belief systems children find compelling and which they find 
unpersuasive. Most reasonable comprehensive doctrines are complex and open to 
numerous interpretations; this is certainly true of all the examples considered by 
Rawls in Political Liberalism.  Thus, even where a child is a committed Muslim or 
Christian, there is still important work to be done in showing how the different 
beliefs they learnt at home fit together, and how they cohere with other opinions 
the child may have. 
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The usual case will therefore be one in which children make rather modest 
alterations to the views they learn at home. In addition to these cases there will 
also be instances in which children radically alter their views, and abandon the 
beliefs taught to them at home or in the community. However, that this is a ‘live’ 
possibility is itself one of the advantages of kind of ethical education proposed 
here.  The hope is that through a more detailed scrutiny of their beliefs children 
will come to reject views which are bizarre or poorly justified.  To this end, it is 
worth noting that the easiest cases to show of children being badly influenced by 
the views of their parents often involve the children being cut off from contact 
with other individuals with different views. This is most obviously true in the 
extreme cases of cults that I considered earlier in the thesis. The supposition is 
that children may be willing to accept almost any set of beliefs if it is the only 
doctrine they encounter, but would reject it if shown alternatives.  
Therefore, the defence of ethical education rests on two arguments. Ethical 
education is a useful device to enable children to come to a more coherent set of 
beliefs and values, which is especially valuable for children growing up in an, often 
confusing, pluralistic society. Further, by scrutinising the beliefs learned at home 
and by showing children alternative systems of thought, this kind of education 
opens up the genuine possibility of children rejecting the beliefs they learn in the 
home. This possibility of rejection acts as a filter, and mitigates against the danger 
of parents passing on bizarre or unjustified beliefs without children fully 
considering the implications and justifications of these doctrines.  
While the arguments presented above are persuasive, they do not answer the 
crucial question for political liberals, which is whether a given policy or institution 
can be considered legitimate. This test of legitimacy can be considered in two 
separate but related ways. The first is whether this scheme of education promotes 
one contested conception of the good. Specifically, this is the charge that ethical 
education is designed to foster a distinctively liberal understanding of reasoning, 
an understanding of reasoning which is intimately linked with a sectarian liberal 
understanding of the good life. The second issue of legitimacy is whether 
reasonable citizens could reasonably object to this policy. I will now consider these 
184 
 
two separate problems of legitimacy in detail, and show that my account can meet 
both of these challenges. In both cases, I show that while a robust ethical 
education is definitely controversial, it is not sectarian in a way that would render 
it illegitimate.   
 
Problems of legitimacy-promoting liberal values  
 
The first possible problem with my argument in favour of ethical education I will 
deal with is that it rests on the assumption that citizens can reason and debate 
meaningfully about questions of the good. This is a possible problem because if we 
advance critical reasoning and debate as beneficial then we seem committed to 
the thought that the good is something about which we can reason and which 
careful consideration can reveal. As such, my account of the value of ethical 
education relies on judgements about the way to reach justifiable conclusions 
about ethical and theological questions. These are views about the nature of 
ethical questions with which citizens might disagree. One could think that views 
about ethics are acquired simply by faith in God, or one could think that ethical 
judgements should be driven purely by intuition or gut feeling.   
The core objection here would be that my account relies on an overly liberal 
understanding of practical reasoning, and as such smuggles more comprehensive 
liberal values through the back door. Put differently, the charge is that the 
assumption that these ways of reaching knowledge are better than the 
alternatives is a view about epistemology which fits much better with a liberal 
secular world view than with more traditional or religious ones. Stated in these 
terms a dependence on rational reflection would seem to pose a serious challenge 
to the neutrality of the state, and thus imperil its legitimacy.  
In response to this worry, it is important to note that there are two different 
senses in which a theory could promote liberal assumptions or liberal canons of 
reasoning. The first is if a state pursued liberal values as a comprehensive ordering 
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of values, and hence as an alternative way of living to other views found in society. 
If my account was liberal in this sense then it would indeed represent a failure of 
my thesis, since the guiding aim throughout has been to avoid a comprehensive 
liberal account of education. However, I will argue that a robust ethical education 
can be justified in a way that does not rest on liberal values in this sense; 
specifically, that the canons of reasoning it values are also valued across many 
different comprehensive views. For this reason, my account is able to avoid the 
objection that it rests on damagingly sectarian assumptions. The second sense of 
promoting liberal values is that this account of education rests on assumptions 
about the value of living together in a liberal way rather than under some 
alternative method of political organisation. While my account does indeed rest 
on liberal assumptions in this sense, this should not be a worrying conclusion for 
political liberals. 
To show the differences between my account and more substantively liberal ones, 
consider the examples of comprehensive liberalism that I have considered in the 
thesis. One version would simply hold that autonomy is of great intrinsic value and 
is constitutive of the good life. On this view, the reason we ought to promote 
autonomy is because an individual cannot live a good life without being 
autonomous. The second, weaker, claim is that advanced by Joseph Raz that I 
considered in detail in chapter two. This is the claim that due to the existence of 
value pluralism, and the context of our society, individuals will usually be better 
off living autonomously than not. The problem with both of these varieties of 
comprehensive liberalism is that they fundamentally conflict with the tenets of 
widely held comprehensive doctrines. The notion that autonomy has intrinsic 
value conflicts with any theory which believes that value has a different source 
(such as utilitarian theories or spiritual notions of flourishing). As I showed when 
criticizing the Razian account of perfectionism this view is rendered objectionably 
sectarian because of its reliance on value pluralism.   
The assumption that debate and scrutiny can lead individuals to better views 
differs significantly from these comprehensive theories.  An acceptance of the 
value of this kind of scrutiny and debate is found within many different 
186 
 
comprehensive doctrines. Shelly Burtt draws attention to the importance of this 
kind of study within numerous different religiously run schools of many faiths 
(Burtt, 1994).  Indeed, for much of western history the institutions of the church 
were amongst the foremost centres of debate and scholarship. As such, the 
assumption that debate is valuable is one which can be defended from within a 
wide variety of different doctrines and perspectives.17 
Of course, to say that this kind of education is compatible with many different 
faiths and creeds is not to say that it is compatible with the sets of beliefs that are 
actually held in society. If it were, we would expect no objections to this level of 
debate and scrutiny and, of course, in actual societies there are many such 
objections. Accepting the ethical education I advocate would thus require a 
significant change in the beliefs of some members of society. While this is 
regrettable, it does not imply that the policy is illegitimate.  Any plausible account 
of political liberalism will require comprehensive doctrines to alter in order to 
meet public standards. For example, many members of the religious right in 
America believe that their religious views should have direct relevance for political 
decisions in a way that contravenes the principles of public reason (and the 
Constitution). The mere fact that these citizens would have to change this view 
surely cannot imply that the principle of public reason should be rejected.  
Instead, the defence of political liberalism is that believers do not have to abandon 
the core elements of their beliefs in order to embrace liberal institutions, although 
as I said above, some aspects of doctrines may need to change significantly. The 
reason we should reject an education designed to foster Kantian autonomy or 
Millian individuality is because these comprehensive varieties of liberalism are 
incompatible with other reasonable comprehensive views. Thus, consider Rawls’ 
belief that a principle of free faith is compatible with each of the major religions 
                                                          
17
 At this point, some would raise the suggestion that debate within sectarian institutions is significantly different from debate 
between individuals who hold fundamentally different beliefs. It is outside the purview of the thesis to rebut this critique 
fully, since my arguments are addressed to theorists who accept the broad acceptability of liberalism. It is worth mentioning 
here though that my arguments may show some problems with this line of thought, particularly the problems inherent in 
classifying individuals as belonging to any one ‘tradition’ in pluralistic societies like ours. The circumstances of pluralism 
imply that many individuals will hold beliefs and insights drawn from a number of doctrines. Moreover, even if we accept the 
possibility that deep deliberation within a comprehensive doctrine rather than between them is more fruitful, the existence of 




(Rawls, 1993: 170).  The point of this argument cannot be that currently existing 
religious believers are committed to a principle of free faith. This argument would 
be contradicted by any number of different religious creeds which are much more 
hostile to liberal principles.  
Instead, the claim is that believers of each of the major religions can become 
reconciled to liberalism without abandoning their beliefs.  In a similar fashion, if 
making education fair means promoting scrutiny and debate then religions and 
creeds will have to adapt to this in order to be compatible with what liberalism 
requires. The point of raising Burtt’s comments, and the historical compatibility of 
religions and debate, is to show that even though some believers may have to 
adapt, they can do so without abandoning their core beliefs. In this way our 
defence of liberal education can avoid the dangerous charge of advancing a single 
sectarian view. 
Avoiding sectarianism in this way means that my account does not promote overly 
liberal values in the sense that would undermine its claim to neutrality. Of course, 
this is not to say that my account of reasoning does not rest on assumptions that 
non-liberals might reject. As I alluded to at the outset, the correct response to the 
charge that a belief in debate is overly liberal is to argue that being overly ‘liberal’ 
is no bad thing when liberal is construed in a broad sense rather than a narrow 
sectarian one. Political liberalism is, rightly, opposed to a society in which only 
individuals who are Kantians or consequentialists can accept the reasoning given 
for the shape of their institutions. The drive to appeal to individuals who hold a 
plethora of different views defines the project.  
However, this does not mean we should attempt to accommodate every position 
in society. After all, political liberalism is a liberal project and as such is an 
alternative set of institutions to non liberal solutions to pluralism.  For instance, 
political liberals would oppose the dividing up of society into small enclaves, each 
dedicated to one specific comprehensive doctrine. Instead, the kind of society 
envisioned by political liberals is a democratic one, and is one in which individuals 
of different views will come together to deliberate about the matters that affect 
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them as a collective body. For this project to be successful, people who live in this 
society must come to see the value of their common institutions to them. Many of 
the most important liberal freedoms guaranteed by these common institutions 
only make sense in light of the value of some kind of debate and exchange of 
ideas. It should therefore be no surprise, and certainly does not constitute a 
reneging on the commitment to neutrality, for political liberals to defend these 
values. 
Therefore, while my account does rely upon assumptions about the good, these 
assumptions do not undermine its legitimacy. Debate and critique are not simply 
elements of one sectarian view, but instead are valued by many different 
doctrines. While promoting debate amongst children, rather than leaving them in 
separate and divided enclaves, does indeed promote liberal values in a broader 
sense, this presents no problem. Political liberalism is at core a liberal doctrine, 
and therefore will have to defend distinctively liberal values against alternative 
responses to pluralism.  
Problems of legitimacy -reasonable dissent 
The second possible challenge to the legitimacy of my account is whether 
reasonable citizens could reasonably reject an education system designed to foster 
skills of criticism and debate. If such citizens exist, then again this account must be 
rejected as being illegitimate. Initially, we should note that there will almost 
certainly be reasonable citizens who would object to my proffered scheme of 
education. As I noted in chapter five, the standards of reasonableness are likely to 
be set by political rather than metaphysical criteria. On plausible assumptions 
there are likely to be many cases in which children come to reject the politically 
reasonable views of their parents because they find them to be metaphysically 
unreasonable. By contrast, such children may well have gone on to accept their 
parents’ views given a purely civic model of education such as the one proposed 
by Rawls. Given this, these parents will object to the proposed education system, 
and their politically reasonable beliefs would imply that they should be considered 
as reasonable citizens.  
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Given that these are reasonable citizens, we must then ask whether the 
complaints they advance are themselves reasonable. If they are, then my account 
is illegitimate and despite whatever value it might have to children it should 
therefore be rejected. Fortunately, I believe there are good reasons to doubt the 
reasonableness of these objections. In particular, it is important to differentiate 
the account I am proposing from others offered in the literature. For instance, on 
the argument presented by Matthew Clayton parents cannot legitimately aim to 
pass on their values or theological beliefs to their children at all. In contrast, I 
argued that Clayton was wrong to think that the principle of legitimacy applied to 
parental conduct. Indeed I argued that parental authority over children was a 
direct consequence of the principle of legitimacy. As the state cannot promote an 
alternative comprehensive doctrine it cannot have a good reason to oppose 
parents’ wishes, unless these violate children’s basic rights or will compromise the 
ability of children to act as reasonable citizens. Since my account endorses the 
principle of legitimacy this conclusion is still valid. Parents will still be able to pass 
on whatever beliefs they wish in the home, and they will still be able to send their 
children to other institutions such as a church or Sunday school. 
Therefore, on my account parents will still be given significant scope to choose the 
style and content of their children’s upbringing. The caveat is that their children 
will learn about other belief systems when at school.  Given the fact that parents 
will still control both the environment of the home and other important aspects of 
upbringing, it does not seem compelling to think that they have insufficient 
influence or connection with their child’s development.  
If the parents do still object then it can only be to the mere fact that their children 
learn seriously about other beliefs. At this point it does not seem to violate the 
spirit of political liberalism to oppose parental wishes. The intuitive appeal of 
political liberalism rests on accepting the fact of reasonable pluralism, liberals 
must accept that citizens will disagree about matters of the good and not all will 
come to see autonomy or individuality as the correct guiding ideals for human life. 
This disagreement arises from the burdens of judgment which together imply that 
reasonable individuals will persistently disagree about the most profound 
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questions in life.  Political liberals explicitly differentiate these sources of 
reasonable disagreement from others, such as doctrines being maintained by 
manipulation or wilful error. If a doctrine or viewpoint can only survive because 
children learn it exclusively in the home and never scrutinise either the reasons 
given for this view or the implications it might have, then it seems plausible to 
suggest that curtailing it (as my scheme of education would do) does not fail to 
respect the fact of reasonable pluralism.  Maintaining a view simply by excluding 
children from knowing about alternatives can be compared to other unreasonable 
ways of perpetuating beliefs, such as restricting the freedom of speech of rival 
views. 
Thus, while I reach similar conclusions to other writers, my account rests on a 
different understanding of the reasons we ought to block parental wishes than the 
views held in much of the existing literature. Consider again the cases of Mozert 
and Yoder. Perfectionist liberals would object that the parents in these cases are 
denying their children autonomy, and that this is bad for children because 
autonomy is an essential element of living well, at least in societies like ours. I 
rejected this view because the assumption that autonomy was constitutive of the 
good life conflicted with many reasonable views about the good life. The 
proponents of the instrumental argument believed that what the parents in Yoder 
had done wrong was deny their children the opportunity to follow valuable ways 
of life different from their own, an argument that could only be sustained via the 
problematic assumption that these other ways of life were actually valuable. In 
contrast, on my account the parents’ claims are rejected because they are trying 
to force their views illegitimately onto another member of society. We can object 
to individuals imposing their views on others without making any assessment 
about the relative merits of the value of each way of life. As such, this argument is 
consistent with the principle of legitimacy in the way the others are not.  
Empirical education 
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An education which encourages discussion about ethical matters from a wide 
variety of perspectives is thus desirable, in that it is more likely to generate views 
which are plausible and consistent, and is legitimate since it does not privilege a 
single comprehensive doctrine.  As such, this kind of class will form an important 
part of the curriculum of a properly justified political liberal society. 
However, given practical constraints and important ethical concerns, debate and 
discussion cannot constitute the entirety of the curriculum. While no hard and fast 
line exists in reality, in schools practical concerns mean that we must distinguish 
between those areas of schooling which deal with ethical and cultural matters and 
those that depend upon children learning a set of empirical facts.  Good examples 
of the latter are subjects such as science and parts of history. Of course, this is not 
to say that either history or science class should simply be learning a series of facts 
by rote.  Historical analysis admits of many different interpretations. As such, it 
would be inappropriate for teachers to simply lecture students about the correct 
way to view historical events. Moreover, debate and discussion are valuable ways 
to help students learn and should therefore be encouraged in these classes.  
All I am drawing attention to is thus that education in subjects like history or 
science will not get off the ground unless the teacher also has a role in passing on 
a series of facts; we cannot simply let children debate amongst themselves about 
how best to explain natural phenomena. As well as these practical concerns, there 
are strong ethical reasons to teach children how to think scientifically and 
historically. Used properly, children can learn about how to assess the evidence for 
a particular account of events, and understand the reasoning that has allowed 
modern technological progress. Understanding at least the basics of how these 
aspects of world work and having some knowledge of the course of human history 
are profoundly important in coming to understand one’s place in the world and 
how best to respond to it.   
On the face of it, teaching a core set of empirical facts would not pose a problem 
for political liberalism. As I have discussed, the goal of this theory is to remain 
neutral between comprehensive philosophical and theological disputes. Political 
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liberal neutrality thus does not obviously extend to empirical disagreements. 
Indeed, Rawls seems to imply that reasonable disagreement should be expected 
only over matters of the good rather than scientific or historical questions. For 
instance Rawls writes that: ‘Why does not our conscientious attempt to reason 
with one another lead to reasonable agreement? It seems to do so in natural 
science, at least in the long run’ (Rawls, 1993: 55).   
The problem is that many of the most pressing issues facing education are caused 
precisely because citizens do in fact disagree over questions which are at least 
partly empirical. Perhaps the most obvious example of this, particularly in the 
United States, is that of the place of religious doctrines within science classes, and 
specifically whether schools should exclusively teach Darwin’s theory of evolution 
or include instruction in some religiously motivated alternatives.  I will use this 
case as an example to highlight the problem for political liberalism as defended by 
Rawls when considering subjects like science, and to show how my account can 
better deal with both this case and wider empirical disputes. 
Intelligent design 
Teaching the theory of evolution has been a particularly significant flashpoint 
because of its fundamental importance to both secular individuals, who view it as 
one of the most important scientific theories of recent centuries, and certain 
sections of the Christian community, who view Darwinian theory as antithetical to 
their most fundamental beliefs about God’s role in creation and man’s place 
within the world.  In the US case, during the early decades of the Twentieth 
Century the Christian view was often legally enforced. Most famously, this 
includes the verdict of the Scopes trial, in which the courts ruled that it was 
permissible for the state of Tennessee to prohibiting the teaching of evolution in 
public classrooms. However, in recent decades legal opinion has shifted in favour 
of those in favour of teaching evolution. In 1968 in the case of Epperson vs 
Arksansas the Supreme Court ruled that prohibited teaching evolution was 
unconstitutional. The response of some states was to introduce laws stating that 
the teaching of evolution had to be partnered with an education covering 
creationism. These laws were also attacked by liberals in the court, culminating in 
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the 1987 case of Edwards vs Aguillard. The case dealt with a law in Louisiana which 
required that creation science be taught in public schools alongside the theory of 
evolution. The court eventually ruled that this law was unconstitutional, since 
creationism was premised on a religious doctrine and therefore its teaching would 
breach the establishment clause forbidding the state from establishing an official 
religion. 
Following this, and other important Supreme Court decisions, public schools in the 
US cannot teach explicitly religious doctrines as ‘science’. However, opponents of 
evolution have put forward a new theory termed ‘intelligent design’, which is 
offered as a permissible alternative to Darwin’s theory. This theory differs from 
creationism in that it is, purportedly, neutral about the nature of the creator of the 
universe. All that this theory posits is that the theory of evolution is insufficient to 
explain all of the variety of life in the universe and that instead elements of life 
point to a designer. Supporters of this theory believe that it meets the criterion of 
being a scientific one, and is therefore constitutional. Opponents argue that this is 
a sham, and that in fact religious believers are merely disguising their beliefs in 
order to get them into the classroom. 
 
Therefore, if we accept at face value the claims of the proponents of intelligent 
design these empirical questions constitute the entirety of the disagreement. 
These theorists merely claim that natural selection cannot explain all the variety of 
life which exists on planet Earth and that therefore a more plausible explanation is 
that an intelligent entity played a role in life’s development. If this is indeed the 
totality of their claim, then this disagreement is clearly an empirical matter similar 
to debates between theorists who believe the universe was created in a big bang 
and those who believe it is has always existed in its present state. Even if we think 
that in fact the proponents of intelligent design are attempting to push a 
religiously motivated agenda, there is still an important empirical disagreement 
between the two groups rather than simply a disagreement over questions of the 
good or theology. 
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This case thus reminds us that while perpetual disagreement may be a peculiar 
aspect of debates about the good, our societies in fact disagree about a whole 
variety of empirical matters as well. Beyond the debate over intelligent design, our 
societies disagree over many different empirical questions, an obvious current 
example of this is the issue of whether man made actions are responsible for 
global warming.  While Rawls may be right to argue that in the long run citizens 
will come to agree on scientific questions, though we cannot take this for granted, 
there is still a problem about how to respond to the empirical disagreement we 
find in society as it is now.  
At this point, political liberals might make a number of possible arguments in order 
to differentiate empirical disagreement from disagreements between competing 
comprehensive conceptions of the good. They might argue that empirical 
questions are publicly solvable in a way that matters of the good are not. Given 
publicly recognised standards of reasoning, we can leave empirical questions in 
the hands of relevant experts and accept their conclusions, whereas no such 
experts exist over matters of the good.  In addition, we might argue that empirical 
questions are less fundamental than matters of the good.  While a conception of 
the good might form the core of one’s being a scientific theory will usually have a 
less significant status. As such, the fact that the state acts in accordance with 
empirical views different to one’s own is not illegitimate in the way that state 
actions which contravene a conception of the good are. This is a view suggested by 
Harry Brighouse, who believes that while there is an intimate connection between 
an individual’s identity and their ethical or spiritual beliefs  ‘the same intimacy is 
not present in the case of empirical beliefs. While significant revision of our moral 
beliefs supports revision of our identities, this is not true of our empirical beliefs, 
especially abstract beliefs such as epistemological beliefs’ (Brighouse, 1998, 738). 
Unfortunately, neither of these responses is fully convincing when we consider the 
teaching of evolution. This is because the empirical disagreements in question are 
often inseparable from deeper questions of the good. Creationists’ empirical 
beliefs about the process of the creation of life are a direct result of their 
conception of the good, which states that God exists and was the creator of man 
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and the universe. Thus we cannot argue that the state acting in a way that 
contravenes a citizen’s empirical beliefs is necessarily less significant than 
contravening their conception of the good, since in this case to deny a creationist’s 
empirical beliefs simply is to deny an important aspect of his beliefs about the 
good.  
This interaction between comprehensive doctrines and more immediate empirical 
questions presents a real problem for political liberalism and the concept of liberal 
neutrality more generally. It seems to suggest that the political liberal state cannot 
use education to advance one single view of scientific or historical truth, for the 
same reasons that we cannot use education to advance one comprehensive 
conception of the good.  
Indeed, this interpretation of the implications of liberal neutrality is suggested by 
Thomas Nagel. Nagel argues that if a state aims to remain neutral between the 
competing comprehensive doctrines in society then it must allow intelligent design 
to form a legitimate part of school curriculum. His reasoning for this follows 
directly from the close connection between these scientific theories and wider 
views of the good. He writes, ‘I believe that if a state legislature or school board 
voted to prohibit discussion of ID in the classroom, that would contravene the 
requirement of religious neutrality, although not as obviously as the exclusion of 
the theory of evolution, because it would depend upon a view, atheism or theistic 
non-determinism, that clearly falls into the domain of religious belief’ (Nagel, 
2008: 15).     
The problem with this line of thinking is that it is unclear how Nagel can restrict 
the scope of his argument in the way that he believes.  Nagel argues that 
intelligent design is a plausible theory if one begins with the appropriate religious 
conviction but believes that the more extreme view of creationism, which holds 
that God created the world in seven days, is ruled out by the evidence. However, it 
is difficult to see how Nagel can make the distinction between intelligent design 
and creationism in the way required.  Just as it may be sensible to believe in 
intelligent design given certain theological assumptions, so there are other 
196 
 
theological beliefs which make it rational to believe in creationism or other 
doctrines which would be rejected by most scientists. For instance, we could hold 
the belief that God exists and is an omnipotent being and that the Bible is a literal 
account of His word.  If we take seriously these two assumptions it seems difficult 
to see what empirical evidence could possibly be offered to contradict the view 
that God created the world in seven days. After all, any seemingly contradictory 
evidence could be explained as part of God’s plan. Similar reasoning can 
presumably be offered for any number of other accounts which conflict with 
scientific orthodoxy. 
Therefore, the principle of neutrality seems to require far more than allowing the 
teaching of intelligent design. Instead, this view seems to require giving equal 
weight to a large number of religiously motivated accounts of creation in order to 
avoid privileging the scientific world view. However, this move would encounter 
two serious problems. Firstly, it does not seem plausible for the liberal state, or 
indeed any state, to give all of these different empirical views equal standing. 
There are after all a vast variety of different beliefs held in pluralistic society, many 
of which have empirical connotations. Teaching all of them in class seems 
implausible.   
More significantly, teaching a wide variety of different accounts of the world as 
equally valid alternatives is unfair to children. There are powerful reasons to think 
that many of the empirical beliefs held in society are disproved by the evidence, 
and accepting that people can reasonably disagree over philosophical and 
theological matters should not obscure this fact. Exploring the science behind the 
debate between intelligent design and the theory of evolution is beyond the scope 
of this thesis (and the competence of the author). Nevertheless, I am persuaded 
by refutations of the reasoning behind intelligent design put forward by theorists 
such as Sober (2007) and Kitcher (1993). Note, though, that my wider argument 
does not depend on the efficacy of these accounts. Even if it were true that there 
are plausible reasons to believe in intelligent design, there would still surely be any 
number of other religiously or ethically motivated accounts of reality which are 
implausible. The general point is that unless there is a way to justify a scientific 
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curriculum despite the fact that it conflicts with some parental beliefs then a 
political liberal education seems doomed to be vacuous or non-existent. 
The case of intelligent design and the existence of empirical disagreement more 
generally, thus show why the goal of remaining entirely freestanding with regards 
to different competing comprehensive doctrines is a misguided one, particularly in 
education. Many citizens hold beliefs, drawn directly from their comprehensive 
doctrines, which are radically different from those accepted by scientific 
orthodoxy. Designing a school curriculum which attempted to be neutral between 
all of these views is both practically difficult and unfair to children. 
Compatibility  
In addition to showing problems with the goal of remaining freestanding, the case 
of intelligent design also suggests that the goal of compatibility which I developed 
earlier may be a more attainable one.  Instead of aiming to craft a curriculum that 
does not violate any comprehensive beliefs, we should instead aim to create a 
curriculum which can fit in with a broad variety of different ethical and theological 
beliefs. This goal offers strong reasons to pursue a scientific education based on 
the consensus of scientific experts, with the proviso that teachers must not push 
any broader account of the deeper meaning of science lessons, and make clear 
that any number of different accounts of spirituality can be held while still 
accepting the validity of the scientific method in settling some questions. 
While it does not follow logically from the goal of compatibility to the presumption 
that schools will teach  a secular science curriculum, the range of different 
religious doctrines held in society means that only a curriculum free of any 
religious tenets can plausibly meet this goal. It seems obviously incompatible with 
atheist beliefs also to hold that an omnipotent being played a role in the creation 
of life. Moreover, different religious accounts of the origins of life or the universe 
are themselves in conflict. Of course, one could object that just as a belief in a 
creator is incompatible with atheism, so a belief in the evolution or the big bang is 
incompatible with religious doctrines. If this was the case, then it would follow 
that no science curriculum could meet the criteria of compatibility. 
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Fortunately, a compelling rebuttal to this challenge is suggested by Warnick and 
Fooce. They argue that current understandings of religious texts - in particular, the 
Bible - are based on a faulty method of interpretation. The modern reading of 
texts seems to suggest that religious texts present an actual account of events and 
are therefore contradictory to scientific understandings. However, a deeper 
understanding of the historical context of religious texts suggests that they should 
not be seen in this way. On the modernist view ‘Genesis is taken to be an accurate 
description of an independent event’ and ‘this modernist reading of Genesis is 
what compels some believers to see it as an alternative to evolution.’ (Warnick 
and Focce, 2007: 366). They argue though that this reading is inappropriate since 
sacred texts were written according premodern standards. They then argue that, 
‘Premoderns understood sacred texts not so much as something which refers to 
the sacred, but something which incarnates or enacts the sacred’ (Warnick and 
Focce, 2007: 365). On this model sacred texts are taken to be more analogous to 
poetry than science text books, and are attempts to capture the significance and 
emotions of events rather than to depict exactly how they occurred in the physical 
world.  
 The case of intelligent design thus highlights the way in which the ‘compatibility 
approach’ will operate more generally, and shows its attractions.  Attempting to 
remain neutral between all existing comprehensive doctrines seems to have 
significant, and unpalatable, consequences for the teaching of facts and evidence 
in schools. Many comprehensive doctrines will have implications for empirical 
matters as well as matters of the good. Refusing to take a position on any of these 
matters will leave the state’s curriculum as vacuous, and cede the teaching of 
these important questions entirely to parents or private organisations, whose 
views may be incoherent or unjustified.  
Instead of avoiding a position on these questions, the goal of state education 
should be to teach a set of facts which leaves open the more fundamental 
questions of ethics and theology. In this way, the state does not advance one 
single comprehensive doctrine over the rest. Moreover, the fact of pluralism does 
not imply that we can hold no justified knowledge about empirical matters, even 
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though they are sometimes open to disagreement.  Where there is good reason to 
hold one set of beliefs, teaching them to children is an important part of creating 
the right conditions for them to come to their own beliefs and values. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, these two schemes of education – the ethical and the empirical – 
cover the different sides of the syllabus. For those questions concerning ethical 
matters I have advocated debate with the teacher (or better, committed guest 
speaker) acting as moderator. For other subjects the teacher should advocate 
those facts which relevant experts believe to be true, but stress that the account 
learned in science or history is consistent with a wide variety of different ethical 
and philosophical perspectives (even if not with all, or with the particular 
interpretation of the ethical perspective endorsed by their parents).  
The guiding purpose behind both of these elements is to create a learning 
environment which is conducive to children coming to hold more justifiable 
comprehensive doctrines. So, I emphasised ethical debate and scrutiny on the 
assumption that it might lead children to come to more coherent views about the 
ethics and philosophy, and to reject views which are incoherent or implausible. 
Likewise, I argued that children needed an introductory education in science and 
history in order properly to understand their world and the different philosophical 
or religious ways of viewing it.  
This goal differs significantly from the merely civic role that Rawls envisions for 
education. My account is justified by reference to its value to the children 
themselves, not to maintaining the stability of liberal institutions. Moreover, in so 
doing it takes a position on issues which political liberals might wish to side step. I 
argued that the state should consider debate and scrutiny to be valuable in 
coming to justified conclusions about ethics and theology and further that the 
state should teach as true certain historical or scientific facts which might conflict 
with the deeply held beliefs of some members of society. 
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While this policy would doubtless be controversial, I have argued that it need not 
contravene the principle of legitimacy. Specifically, when defending both aspects 
of my account, I argued that a liberal education should be compatible with each of 
the different reasonable comprehensive doctrines found in society. So, when 
defending a robust debate in class about ethical issues, I noted that debate and 
criticism were emphasised in many religious traditions and formed part of the 
curriculum in many religiously run institutions. Likewise, when defending a science 
curriculum which teaches Darwinian evolution rather than creationism, I argued 
that a modest defence of the scientific method, which remained silent on deeper 
questions, was compatible with a wide variety of different ethical and 
philosophical beliefs. 
This goal of compatibility is significantly different from that of remaining entirely 
freestanding from ethical and philosophical disputes. This chapter has aimed to 
show its advantages in the case of education. Firstly, the goal of remaining entirely 
freestanding from ethical disputes seems difficult to maintain given the close 
connections between an individual’s philosophical and religious convictions and 
their empirical beliefs. As I showed when I considered Nagel’s arguments, 
remaining neutral between all of these different beliefs would render the science 
curriculum hopelessly incoherent. More importantly, the goal of compatibility is 
fairer to children than that of being freestanding. Remaining freestanding implies 
that the state take no position on issues such as the teaching of evolution. This 
implies that the state cannot guide children between the many different and 
incompatible views found in society. Thus, either some other actor will act as a 
guide, possible to the detriment of children, or children will have to come to an 
understanding on their own. By contrast, my account still leaves sufficient space 
for a wide variety of different views and creeds to flourish, but also aims to ensure 
that children have the training and appropriate grounding to assess different 
empirical or ethical theories. 
Thus, the arguments of this chapter go some way to meeting the challenge of 
legitimacy that arises once we admit that policies and institutions must be 
justifiable to children. The chief problem faced by a purely civic model was that 
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parents could pass on almost any set of beliefs to their children, even if these 
beliefs were implausible or pernicious. The broad response to this challenge was 
that a political liberal education should give children the skills to evaluate and 
critique the beliefs endorsed by their parents or communities. In doing so the 
state can at least respond to a child who later objects to the beliefs that she holds 
that she had some opportunity to consider the implications of her views and that 


























Chapter 9-Flourishing in a Liberal Society 
 
The previous chapter considered how children come to acquire their 
comprehensive doctrines. I argued that merely letting parents pass on whatever 
beliefs they wished was illegitimate, and that instead children must learn about a 
number of different views as well as having instruction in some basic features of 
science and history. While parents should be allowed to pass on beliefs to their 
children this does not imply that they ought to have the right to limit their 
children’s ability to question and scrutinise these doctrines. The aim of education 
should be to ensure that all children have the ability to think critically about what 
they learn in the home and from their communities. In so doing, education acts as 
a barrier against the inculcation of bizarre or misguided views, which we hope are 
less likely to survive rational scrutiny. The reason this change was required was so 
that it could mitigate the problem of legitimacy which beset a purely civic account 
of education. A purely civic account was subject to future reasonable rejection by 
children, since it did not consider their interests in the development of their 
comprehensive beliefs. 
However, while my account of education can meet this challenge of legitimacy, it 
might do so at the cost of creating another. Specifically, in pushing children to 
consider carefully the opinions and beliefs they learn at home, a liberal education 
will inevitably foster skills of self reflection and criticism which will have an impact 
on many different aspects of their lives. Indeed, returning to the argument of 
chapter five, the convergence between my account and attempts to use education 
to foster autonomy will be far greater than was the case for Rawls’ civically 
minded account of the role of education. Although note that even on my view 
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there is not a full convergence since my account simply calls for children to have 
an adequate level of critical skills rather than demanding that such skills be 
continually promoted. 
The possible problem here is that in a pluralistic society, many individuals will have 
an account of non-political values which do not prioritise autonomy, or indeed, 
have belief systems in which certain kinds of personal autonomy are seen as 
deeply detrimental. It would be a serious problem if an education which fosters 
skills of critique and reflection thus precludes, or profoundly impairs, the ability to 
live in accordance with some reasonable doctrines. Citizens who wish to live in 
accordance with ways of life inimical to these skills could object to the education 
they received as a child. As such, my account would suffer from a similar problem, 
although manifested in different ways, to that which afflicts a purely civic model of 
education. 
Matthew Clayton considers this case by imagining a religious believer who thinks 
that revising her attitude to her faith would be catastrophic, and thus that it is 
unthinkable for her to alter their deepest beliefs.  He writes that:  
‘Rawls draws a distinction between an individual’s public or 
institutional identity and her moral, or non-institutional, identity.  In 
the former sense, as a citizen, an individual can accept she has an 
interest in developing and exercising her capacity for a conception of 
the good, which motivates her concern for the liberal rights that 
support that capacity.  However, in her non-institutional life, as a 
member of a church, she may hold a different view…. As a citizen, she 
will favour the freedoms of religion, association and expression; as a 
member of a church, she may take steps to ensure that she does not 
step back from, and reflect on, the value of her deepest religious 
commitments” (Clayton, 2006,134). 
The challenge is thus that, for some individuals, the kind of education I am 
promoting will seem useless or perhaps even dangerous. Since on any plausible 
notion of political liberalism individuals will be free to adopt such beliefs, 
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examples such as this pose a serious challenge. These religious individuals can 
legitimately complain that the education system did not furnish them with skills 
that were useful to their plan of life – indeed, instead it supplied them with 
character traits that make adhering to their life choices more difficult – and thus 
did not take into account their interests. 
My response to this challenge is to show how the usefulness of a limited notion of  
autonomy and self reflection arises out of deep seated aspects of our society and 
human interaction more generally, and is thus not merely valuable to those who 
hold a conception of the good which emphasises autonomy. I do this by outlining 
three different ways in which these skills might be useful to individuals in a society 
like ours. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, nor do any of them hold as a 
matter of logic. That is, there may well be cases for each in which we can imagine 
individuals to whom the argument does not apply. The hope, though, is that taken 
together we can offer a plausible set of reasons why even devout religious 
believers might gain, by their own lights, from the education I propose.  
The role of a comprehensive doctrine within a life 
 The first advantage afforded by limited autonomy is in aiding individuals to form 
their own plan of life and to relate this to their comprehensive beliefs. To explain 
this, we must distinguish the notion of plan of life from the more specific notion of 
a comprehensive view. To show this distinction, consider again the examples that 
Rawls gives as exemplars of comprehensive doctrines. These are the major 
religions, and ethical theories such as Kantianism or utilitarianism. These doctrines 
are expansive, and have applications to a wide variety of cases. In this way, these 
doctrines provide reference points which are clearly vital in designing a rational 
plan of life. However, neither the major religions nor Kantianism constitute a plan 
of life in and of themselves.   
 Indeed, it is only in a relatively few decisions that a citizen’s fundamental ethical 
or spiritual beliefs might determine their course of action. This would be the case 
if one choice was either required, or alternatively prohibited, by their ethical or 
religious beliefs. So, for instance, the decision about whether to enlist in the army 
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when one’s country goes to war would be a difficult and complex one for many 
citizens, but might be determined if that citizens adhered to a pacifist faith such as 
Quakerism. However, even in these, relatively rare, cases in which a decision 
seems determined entirely by one’s comprehensive conception, it will often be far 
from obvious precisely how to interpret the tenets of this doctrine. So, returning 
to the previous example, many pacifistic religious doctrines might allow 
exceptions in the case of self defence or other extreme circumstances.  
The central role for a limited amount of autonomy in forming a plan of life is even 
clearer when we consider individuals who hold the ethical or philosophical 
doctrines which are given as examples of comprehensive doctrines. Virtually any 
plausible ethical theory will require serious consideration on the part of the agent 
about how to apply these abstract principles to real world cases. For instance, a 
citizen totally committed to utilitarianism would still need to reflect on how best 
to maximise utility in any given circumstance. Likewise, the application of Kantian 
philosophical principles is far from clear in many cases.    
My own comprehensive view of the world includes a feeling that animals are 
worthy of much greater respect than they currently receive.  As such, I am a 
vegetarian and in not eating meat I believe that I am aligning my life with 
important principles that I hold.  However, I am not a vegan, and have dithered 
continually over the issue of whether to eat eggs.  Even in this rather limited 
example, then, the application of my comprehensive principles requires precisely 
those skills of reflection and reasoning which would be the goal of the liberal 
education described by Brighouse and others. 
Therefore, it would be an extremely rare case, indeed almost unimaginable, if the 
practical requirements of one’s comprehensive view were neatly set out and did 
not require any deliberation or reflection on the part of the agent.  By far the more 
usual case, in both religious and secular spheres, is that individuals will hold to a 
number of core beliefs and principles but will use their own judgement to decide 
how these come to bear on the situations we face in daily life. This is most obvious 
if we consider how most believers apply religious scripture to their lives, but we 
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also see a reliance on reflection in a whole variety of cases. This role for some 
degree of autonomy arises directly out of the circumstances of life in pluralistic 
societies. In such a world, citizens will face a wide array of choices and options 
about how to live their lives. Even relatively asocial existences are lived in these 
circumstances, and constitute a conscious, and therefore at least in part a chosen, 
rejection of these possible choices. Further, the constantly changing circumstances 
of modern life present ethical challenges which are both complex and nuanced.  
 While abstract principles provide guides to living in this world, none will provide a 
clear and easy to follow list of actions to cover every conceivable circumstance. 
Instead, coherently applying our deepest ethical and religious beliefs will require 
coming to understand the circumstances of our society and the ways we are 
allowed to act in it. Teaching children about their society, and talking through 
some of the choices they will be faced with, is not merely a way of promoting one 
sectarian way of living, but rather inculcates skills which will be useful to children 
who live in a community together with individuals with profoundly different 
beliefs. 
Partially comprehensive conceptions of the good 
The second factor that I will discuss that shows the value of autonomy to 
adherents of many different doctrines is most views people hold about the world 
are only partially comprehensive. Rawls defines a doctrine as more or less 
comprehensive depending on the number of different cases on which it has a 
bearing. A fully comprehensive view would order the relevant values of social and 
personal life into a coherent whole, and as such provide a guide to judgement in 
all cases. A partially comprehensive conception will cover some of the possible 
values and situations in life but will be silent on others (Rawls, 1993: 13).  
Put in these terms, we must surely classify most of the doctrines that are held in 
society as partially rather than fully comprehensive, although of course some are 
much more comprehensive than others. Very few creeds or belief systems order 
all of the relevant values which bear on our lives. Indeed, it seems almost 
unimaginable to think of a single coherent view of the world which fully answered 
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all possible questions and was applicable to all of the decisions we faced in life.  
Even religious doctrines, which we might tend to think of as relatively 
comprehensive, will leave wide scope in many areas of life for individual choice 
and deliberation.   Further, many religious believers will accept many, but not all, 
of their religions tenets.  
Given these considerations, there is significant space between even a relatively 
comprehensive doctrine and a worked out plan of life. For instance, in order to 
have a fully worked out plan of life we would need to have a view on whether we 
would be better off being a high paid but hard working executive, an artist, or a 
devoted family man. It would seem deeply strange to think that this question was 
directly and simply answered simply by us being a Muslim or a Christian, or for 
that matter, a Kantian.  
 Of course, faced with some issue or question, we would likely scrutinize our 
choices in the light of the ethical content of the theory to which we adhere, and as 
such they will be a powerful guiding force within our lives, but fully working out 
such decisions will involve consideration of a whole host of other matters. When 
deeply religious persons consider significant decisions, they will naturally consider 
what to do from the perspective of their spiritual beliefs. In the vast majority of 
cases, these spiritual and ethical beliefs will provide guidance, but leave open a 
wide variety of choices. The obvious example here might be the choice of partner. 
It might be that for devout believers it is important that their partner shares their 
religious commitments. Such a belief would be an important factor to consider 
when choosing a mate, but would be far from the only relevant factor. 
 
The importance of remembering the complex and diverse nature of citizen’s 
beliefs is reinforced by the fact that most individuals will hold elements of 
numerous comprehensive doctrines. The noted conservative commentator Ross 
Douthat draws attention to this phenomenon within the Christian community of 
the United States. He quotes a pew research study which notes that even 
avowedly evangelical Christians hold beliefs about the ‘spiritual energy’ of trees 
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and mountains; beliefs which are not part of recognised Christian orthodoxy 
(Douthat, 2009). 
 Individual’s religious beliefs are often not an ideologically pure version of any one 
of the major faiths, but contain elements of many different belief systems in a 
more or less coherent whole. Further, it is wrong to think that various religious 
commitments are incompatible with the philosophical doctrines that are counted 
amongst the comprehensive views. So, a citizen could quite coherently be a 
devout follower of a major religion, and also believe that some other important 
ethical decisions ought to be settled by a utilitarian calculus. So, a practicing 
Muslim or Jew might believe that the reason one ought not to each pork or 
shellfish was due to divine commandment, but this does not commit them to 
thinking that diving commandment is the only way to come to moral conclusions. 
Likewise, one could be a vegetarian and a Christian, or a Muslim and a pacifist.  
 Where individuals hold elements and insights from a variety of different 
perspectives and doctrines, they will often have to use their own intuitions and 
judgement to reconcile these influences into their own rational plan of life.  In so 
far as this is the case, we once again see a place for the skills of reflection and 
reasoning even for those people who do not endorse a view that commends 
personal autonomy as constitutive of the good life. 
The fact that most doctrines are only partially comprehensive, and that therefore 
we can often hold insights from multiple doctrines, is an important consideration 
for thinking about how citizens can live well in a liberal society.  It reminds us that 
we should not treat citizens as merely ciphers of a single comprehensive doctrine, 
but instead as having their own unique view point which is informed but not 
determined by their philosophical and religious commitments. A citizen’s ethical 
and religious views do not, by any means constitute the whole of their lives, and 
many mundane choices and projects can be aided by the kind of skills that a liberal 
education might promote. This is vitally important since the test of legitimacy is 
whether a given policy can be justified to citizens, the question of whether a given 
set of institutions accords with the tenets of different comprehensive doctrines is 
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an important, but ultimately secondary, issue. This means that if actual citizens 
can see the value of the skills education provides, this education will be justifiable, 
even if these skills do not form a prominent place in many widely held abstract 
religious or philosophical theories. 
Acquiring primary goods 
 
The final consideration to which I will draw attention is the usefulness of a liberal 
education in securing the resources by which to pursue one’s comprehensive 
doctrine.  Paradigmatically here we would think of the usefulness of an advanced 
education, which may as a by product promote limited autonomy, in securing 
financial gain and access to a wider range of career options. Such resources might 
be intrinsically important to one’s plan of life. That is, for many gaining a specific 
job will be important, or a citizen could quite legitimately simply want to become 
an affluent member of society. Even for citizens who do not desire such ends, 
money and employment will be instrumentally useful towards many ends.  
Moreover, having marketable skills and thus being able to live an independent 
existence with real control over career choices is in itself an important source of 
self respect for many individuals. 
Given the institutions which are imagined by political liberals, and some plausible 
assumptions about the likely changes in the economic system in coming decades, 
some form of education is very likely to be useful in securing these material 
resources. In Rawlsian terms, the ability to participate effectively in the market 
place is vital in securing adequate primary goods. Primary goods are defined as 
those things which ‘things that every rational man is assumed to want. These 
goods normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life. For simplicity, 
assume that the chief primary goods at the disposition of society are rights and 
liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth (Rawls, 1971: 62). In short, 
they are the things that almost any plausible plan of life is going to require in 
societies like ours.  
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Given the extent of pluralism in our society, we might question the degree to 
which it is reasonable to assume that all individuals will require skills of money 
making or skills which are useful in the market place. After all, some individuals’ 
plans of life are predicated on a rejection of these institutions. Perhaps we might 
imagine the lives of monks or radical greens. Given the existence of such ascetic 
modes of life, we might critique the idea that the state should promote 
individuals’ abilities to garner primary goods. In short, the critique is that the use 
of primary goods as a metric is unfair to some citizens, and unfairly privileges more 
comprehensively liberal doctrines. This point is made forcefully by Thomas Nagel, 
who writes that: 
‘the primary goods are not equally valuable in pursuit of all conceptions of the 
good. They will serve to advance many different individual life plans (some more 
efficiently than others), but they are less useful in implementing views that hold a 
good life to be readily achievable only in certain well-defined types of social 
structure, or only in a society that works concertedly for the realization of certain 
higher human capacities…The model contains a strong individualistic bias, which is 
further strengthened by the motivational assumptions of mutual disinterest and 
absence of envy. These assumptions have the effect of discounting the claims of 
conceptions of the good that depend heavily on the relation between one’s own 
position and that of others’ (Nagel, 1973: 228). 
A similar point is made by Adina Schwartz, who argues that individuals who are 
convinced by socialist theories, particularly those expounded by the early Marx, 
would be highly averse to caching out their interests in terms of primary goods 
(Schwartz, 1973: 302-310). Indeed, following Richard Arneson we can term this 
critique the ‘Nagel-Schwartz’ objection, after these important contributions 
(Arneson, 1990). However, while this is a powerful complaint, and one that could 
be seriously damaging to other aspects of the Rawlsian account, it is not one that 
seriously imperils my own view. The real force of the Nagel-Schwartz objection is 
against the claim that the primary goods approach is fair between all 
comprehensive doctrines. Both Nagel’s discussion of socially situated lifestyles, 
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and Schwartz’s example of the socialist, shows that many citizens may have much 
less to gain than others from an increase in their holdings of primary goods.  
By contrast, all my account requires is that what Rawls calls primary goods will be 
useful to adherents of many different comprehensive doctrines. So, it may well be 
true that, as Nagel contends, the specific make up of primary goods is far more 
hospitable to some comprehensive views than it is to others.  If this is the case, it 
would follow that education policies designed to aid individuals in acquiring 
primary goods would be more beneficial to some citizens compared to others. 
However, it would still true in a whole range of cases that individuals do benefit to 
some degree from increases in primary goods; particularly from easily transferable 
primary goods such as wealth and income. This conclusion is all that is required to 
sustain the point I am making here, which is that the fact education might aid 
individuals in gaining primary goods can be used to assuage some instances of 
citizens’ objections to a common education policy. 
Moreover, it is important to reiterate what I noted at the outset, which is that 
none of the arguments I am outlining here should be thought to apply as a matter 
of necessity. When faced by live choices such as living in a monastery or as green 
activists, we may concede some instances in which the argument from primary 
goods does not apply at all. Nevertheless, the importance of marketable skills and 
the availability of certain careers should not be under estimated. Truly ascetic 
plans of life are pursued by a very small proportion of the population. They are 
joined by many more individuals who, for a variety of reasons, do not pursue a 
career. Nevertheless, this does not diminish the point that marketable skills are of 
real importance to many citizens, well beyond simply those who value a certain 
ideal of autonomy, and including many devoutly religious citizens. As such, they 
can form an important part of the case showing why these skills are valuable 
across a wide range of society. 
Conclusion 
Each of the factors discussed above section provides good reason to think that 
many individuals will gain from an advanced liberal education, not merely those 
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who end up prioritising their autonomy as part of their comprehensive doctrine.  
Since comprehensive conceptions do not lead neatly into plans of action citizens 
must be prepared to interpret for themselves the implications of their ethical and 
religious beliefs. In light of the fact that most doctrines are not fully 
comprehensive, we must remember that many choices of life will not be 
determined at all by an individual’s comprehensive doctrine. Since many people 
will endorse a variety of differing views, they must often balance competing 
considerations.  Finally there is the fact that an advanced education is useful in 
securing many types of employment, which are instrumentally important in 
fulfilling other plans or are themselves important sources of self esteem.  
Alone, each of these factors points towards a role for the skills of rational 
reflection, and thus supports an education designed to promote them.  In each 
case, we have a reason to teach individuals the skills by which to form and revise a 
conception of the good that does not rely upon the notion that personal 
autonomy ought to be considered by the state as inherently valuable.  
Importantly, these factors become more compelling once we consider them 
together. Thus, for instance, because it is wrong to assume that a comprehensive 
doctrine will determine completely an individual’s entire plan of life, it makes 
more sense to assume that they will have an interest in acquiring the skills 
necessary to secure advanced employment. That is, while there is nothing intrinsic 
to a specific faith or creed that implies these skills are valuable, it does not follow 
that the citizens who follow these doctrines will not value such knowledge.  
In the light of these considerations, political liberals may possess the resources to 
cope adequately with the problem of seeming to promote skills that are inimical to 
the life plans of some citizens.  The example used to illustrate this problem was of 
a dedicated religious believer whose private projects are utterly antithetical with 
respect to reflecting on her deepest commitments. The broad response to this 
problem is to note that even if the very devout believer’s doctrine has no place at 
all for autonomy, as a person these skills may well be valuable. Thus, in so far as 
this religious believer endorses a creed which is indeterminate in some cases, or is 
only partially comprehensive, she may have an interest in gaining skills of 
213 
 
reflection in order to apply her views to the situations she faces in everyday life.  
She may well therefore benefit from a more detailed focus on ethical and political 
dilemmas at school, if such an education helps her clarify her own views. Further, 
we should not forget the benefits an advanced education might have in securing 
primary goods, which are valuable to many individuals, not merely those whose 
life plans revolve around securing these goods. 
Taken together, these complete the picture of how a political liberal education 
system can meet the possible claims of children while still responding fairly to 
pluralism. The core objection to the political model that has been running 
throughout the thesis is that children have an interest in the content of the beliefs 
they come to acquire, but political liberals seem bound to consider only the civic 
goals of education. To meet this complaint, I argued that a political liberal 
education must ensure that children acquire their views in the right way. This 
condition was expounded in terms of giving children the skills to assess and alter 
the views presented to them at home. 
The problem with this response was that it opened up the possibility that my own 
account might fail to meet the test of legitimacy, and could not therefore be 
considered a fair response to the existence of pluralism in society. So, when 
discussing the need for a more robust ethical education, I considered the 
possibility that reasonable parents might reasonably reject the policy. In response, 
I argued that one could not reasonably object to this kind of schooling, since to do 
so is to impose one’s beliefs unfairly onto the next generation. Following this, I 
considered the special case of science education, and the case of intelligent design 
in detail. Here I argued that the state could not plausibly avoid taking a position on 
contested issues, which was possibly a very damaging conclusion since these 
empirical issues were deeply entwined with broader views about metaphysics and 
theology. Since it is practically impossible to remain above these debates, I argued 
instead that the goal of the state should be to ensure that the science curriculum 
was compatible with many different philosophical and spiritual views. If this 
condition was met then while a common education would doubtless be 
controversial, and alter the views held in society, it would not preclude any 
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reasonable comprehensive doctrine. This was enough to secure the legitimacy of 
this aspect of the curriculum. 
Following these defences of specific aspects of the model, I then considered a 
broader threat to the legitimacy of my account. This was the charge that the 
education necessary to give children the skills to assess different views would also 
promote skills which are inimical to some reasonable plans of life.  If this charge 
was accurate, it would imply that my account should be rejected for the same 
reasons that we should reject perfectionism, namely that a sectarian liberalism is 
not an appropriate response to pluralism. 
 In response to this serious worry, I argued that in fact the skills promoted by this 
kind of education could be seen as valuable to individuals who hold a wide variety 
of different viewpoints, not merely those who think that autonomy is essential to 
living well. If accurate, these considerations allow my account to remain legitimate 
in a way other leading accounts are not. This is because, as I have shown 
throughout the thesis, the main problem with other leading accounts lies in their 
underlying justification, not their political implications. 
At this point, it is worth reiterating the differences between this account of the 
value of autonomy and others that might be offered. The first possible defence of 
autonomy might be that only by living in an autonomous way do our lives have 
real meaning. This would be a strongly perfectionist defence of autonomy. The 
problem with this account is twofold. Firstly, it is questionable that the connection 
between choice and value really is as close as this account contends. More 
fundamentally though, the problem with this perfectionist defence is that we 
cannot expect citizens to come to an agreement about the special value of 
autonomy. Indeed, this privileged value of autonomy will be directly contradictory 
to the deepest beliefs of citizens with different ethical commitments or those with 
certain religious beliefs.  
Instead of this explicitly perfectionist defence of autonomy, a different approach 
was suggested by proponents of the instrumental argument. They argued that we 
should defend autonomy’s value through its usefulness in selecting a way of life in 
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which we are likely to flourish. Thus, make all citizens autonomous and they are 
each more likely to end up in a way of life that suits them. The problem with this 
approach is its basic assumptions that there are many ways of life in which 
individuals can flourish, and that individuals are better suited to some of these 
than others. These two assumptions proved just as sectarian as the more overtly 
perfectionist belief in the intrinsic value of autonomy. 
In contrast to these approaches, my own defence of autonomy has focussed on its 
value to citizens who hold many different comprehensive views about ethics and 
the good. Thus I have focused on elements which will be common to citizens’ lives 
despite their differing comprehensive doctrines.  This has drawn attention to the 
common problem of applying abstract ideals to actual ethical dilemmas, and to 
the fact that most citizens do not simply accept ideas from one doctrine. Instead, 
citizens have much more nuanced and complex sets of belief. Each of these 
features shows the ineliminable role for deliberation and judgment in the 
decisions which will be faced by children as they grow up.  
Further, an important argument running throughout the chapter has been the 
importance of distinguishing between the totality of the lives of citizens and their 
comprehensive doctrines.  Thus we should not imagine that an actual citizen’s 
desires or projects will be only those defined by their religious or philosophical 
doctrines.   As such, it is important to note that the skills promoted by a liberal 
education will be useful in any number of rather mundane situations faced by 
citizens. As long as a relatively modest conception of autonomy is promoted it is 
thus possible to make an argument in its defence to adherents of a wide variety of 
different faiths and perspectives. 
The critical advantage of this approach is that it is able to remain compatible with 
the core beliefs of many different comprehensive doctrines. It might be the case 
that only one of the religious conceptions in society is correct, and thus that only 
those citizens who follow this faith can live fully flourishing lives.  Even then, we 
could still point to the value of an advanced education within the lives of believers, 
and commend this as a reason to promote it. My account does not require any 
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fundamental assumptions about what makes a human life go well, or about the 
relative worth of the different ways of life found in society. Instead, it is merely 
premised on a belief about the kind of skills which will be likely to help people live 
well, by their own understanding of what that consists in, in societies like ours. As 
such, the defence of this limited account of autonomy rests on the belief that 























At the beginning of the thesis I outlined two broad goals which might guide 
education policy. These are the interests of children and the civic goals of 
education. I began by considering an approach which focussed squarely upon 
using education to aid children by increasing their chance of flourishing. This 
educational approach was linked to the broader theory known as perfectionism, 
which held that the role of the liberal state was to promote valid and worthwhile 
plans of life and to hinder empty or mistaken ones. The most prominent version of 
perfectionism linked the good life to a notion of autonomy. In education, liberal 
perfectionism thus supports the view that the role of schools is to increase the 
ability of children to formulate their own beliefs and become the authors of their 
own lives.  
The difficulty with this view was that it rested upon assumptions which were 
deeply problematic. This is true even for those versions of perfectionism which do 
not rest on obviously sectarian views such as a Kantian view of the self. I showed 
this deep problem with the theory of perfectionism through a survey of its most 
influential defender, Joseph Raz. Raz’s account of autonomy was shown to be 
inseparable from his background theory of value pluralism. Basing liberal policy on 
an assessment of the actual value of the different ways of life found in society 
cannot be a fair way of responding to pluralism, since the conflicts within 
pluralistic society arise because of the different opinions people have about the 
worth and accuracy of different lifestyles and belief systems. While the belief that 
many different ways of life are valuable appears to be an ecumenical way of 
assessing pluralism, in fact it is deeply controversial. 
This survey of Raz had immediate consequences for the educational debate, since 
it undermined the instrumental argument developed by Brighouse, Arneson and 
Shapiro. This instrumental argument claimed to rest on no controversial 
assumptions about the good life. However, it does rely upon a similar conception 
of autonomy to that developed by Raz, and is in turn dependent on the 
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assumption of value pluralism. As such, even this limited defence of a perfectionist 
education must be rejected as sectarian. 
The rejection of perfectionism pushed towards accepting the theory of political 
liberalism developed by John Rawls. By accepting that pluralism is best described 
as reasonable disagreement, we can avoid taking a position on those matters 
which divide society. Only by doing this can the liberal state possibly be in a 
position to arbitrate fairly between the competing claims of different sections of 
society.  Following this, I outlined how political liberalism should best be 
understood. I considered two different ways of understanding the move towards 
neutrality between competing views. The first, epistemic strategy, argued that we 
should be neutral about the good because reason is indeterminate between a 
variety of possible options. The second strategy linked liberal neutrality to securing 
the stability of liberal institutions. 
However, both of these defences of neutrality were eventually rejected. Pursuing 
the epistemic strategy seemed to imply a deep scepticism about knowledge of the 
good and theology, which is a problematic justification for liberalism. Further, the 
classifying of citizens as reasonable or unreasonable based on the philosophical 
sophistication of their views does not capture our beliefs about the purpose of 
liberalism.  
A defence of neutrality based on the value of stability was equally problematic. 
The kind of neutrality recommended by political liberalism did not seem a 
plausible way of securing social order, and this approach would make our defence 
of liberalism perniciously pragmatic. Fortunately, while both of the defences seem 
to be suggested by some of Rawls’ writings, they are not in fact the best 
interpretation of his view. Instead, the defence of political liberalism is explicitly 
moral, and is based upon the equal concern owed to all citizens of a liberal society. 
 The educational agenda outlined in Political Liberalism was explicitly focussed on 
the civic aims of education, rather than the concerns of children themselves. 
Recall that Rawls used education to distinguish a purely political liberalism from 
more comprehensive varieties. While comprehensive liberals would seek to use 
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education to foster values to guide the whole of life, political liberalism would seek 
merely to ensure that children could act as reasonable citizens and were aware of 
their political rights.  
The following section of the thesis explored how far political liberalism really was 
committed to an education with a purely civic agenda, and what the implications 
of this commitment might be. In chapter four, I argued that political liberalism 
would not often provide sufficient reasons to act against parental wishes in the 
case of education. Proposing an alternative scheme of education was possible only 
if we relied upon a theory of what was in children’s best interest. This in turn 
though would surely be connected to a wider theory of the human good, which 
the principle of legitimacy rules out as a basis for public policy. On the political 
liberal model parents would thus be free to pursue any scheme of education and 
upbringing for their children, with the important proviso that their children were 
capable of acting as reasonable citizens when they grew up. 
Moreover, I argued that this proviso was far laxer than is commonly understood. 
Theorists such as Gutmann, Callan and Macedo argued that in fact the practical 
implications of political liberalism would be virtually indistinguishable from those 
of comprehensive liberalism. If this convergence thesis was correct, then the 
problems outlined in the thesis would be confined merely to the realm of abstract 
theory rather than practical politics.  However, a closer consideration of the 
purposes of political liberalism as opposed to comprehensive liberalism revealed 
deep differences between the approaches, and these differences translated into 
significant real world consequences. The conclusion of this section was thus that 
Rawls was right to think that political liberal principles lead to a purely civically 
minded education, and to think that this education would be significantly different 
from that proposed by theorists concerned with promoting autonomy. 
The third section of the thesis explored the problem with this account. This was 
that a purely civically minded education failed to take proper account of the 
interests that children have in education. This problem went to the heart of 
political liberalism because I argued it implied a serious challenge to the legitimacy 
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of the entire liberal state. This challenge to the legitimacy of a purely civic 
education arose because of my arguments that showed children could not be 
excluded from the justificatory community. These arguments were developed in 
chapter six, in which I explored the criteria of citizenship outlined in Political 
Liberalism. The possible exclusion of children was the consequence of the 
threshold view of citizenship, which held that a person must have sufficient 
capacities in order to be counted as a full citizen of a liberal state. This threshold 
view encountered fatal difficulties when tested against the actual processes of 
human development, as it would either permanently exclude some individuals 
from citizenship or include many children. In its place, I proposed a whole lives 
view which counted children as full citizens. This meant that the principle of 
legitimacy implied that children’s possible objections must be taken into account. 
Taking account of children’s objections proved theoretically difficult. I argued in 
chapter seven that the best way was to take seriously the future complaints that 
children might have against policies which are applied to them now. In education, 
this meant that we must reject a curriculum or school system if the children who 
attend it can fairly complain that the education they received was not designed in 
way that took their interests into account. Since the political liberal model, as 
defend by Rawls, is purely civically minded it fails to take into account children’s 
interests in education. As such it must be rejected. 
At this point, I returned to the two possible problems that I offered at the outset 
of the thesis which I suggested might arise for education policy because of the 
permanence of pluralism in society. These were that education might become a 
vehicle to enforce the views of some of society onto others, or that education 
might become vacuous and ineffective. The first danger was shown to affect 
perfectionist theories, even of the more moderate kind. Closer investigation of 
political liberalism appeared to show that it was afflicted by the second.  
In the final section I aimed to avoid this pessimistic conclusion, and show that 
political liberalism could be recast so as fairly to take children’s interests into 
account, while retaining what was attractive about this response to pluralism. To 
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do this I attempted to develop an account of the worth of education which did not 
promote one single comprehensive doctrine or rest on a controversial account of 
the value of different ways of life. 
 
The first part of this account focussed on the ways in which children come to 
acquire comprehensive doctrines. In chapter eight, I argued that the liberal state 
cannot simply allow parents to teach their children whatever values and beliefs 
they wish, since this ignores children’s interest in the acquisition of views. Instead, 
the purpose of education should be to ensure that children can scrutinise and 
assess the beliefs they are taught by their parents as a child. To do this, education 
should ensure that children emerge with some knowledge of their world and its 
history, and having had the opportunity to subject different ethical and spiritual 
views to debate and scrutiny in class. The bulk of this chapter was designed to 
meet the possible problems of legitimacy faced by my account. A defence which 
was bolstered by the arguments of chapter nine, in which I pointed to a number of 
considerations to show why an advanced education, which may promote 
autonomy, is not detrimental to a large majority of citizens’ plans. 
The consequences of this project for the educational debate are to offer new ways 
of justifying a relatively familiar set of institutions. The kind of program promoted 
by my account is relatively similar to that promoted by theorists such as Harry 
Brighouse and Eamonn Callan. Where my account differs is in the theoretical 
justification for this set of institutions. In short, my account offers different and 
hopefully more compelling reasons to offer in defence of a liberal education.  
So, while Callan attractively outlines the virtues of learning about other cultures 
and imaginatively engaging with the tenets of different comprehensive doctrines, 
we cannot derive this requirement from the purely civic goals of political 
liberalism. Citizens can theoretically (and many do) act in a perfectly reasonable 
way towards others without ever achieving the kind of reflective view that Callan 
puts forward.  Similarly, Brighouse also sees the worth in children learning about 
different comprehensive doctrines and alternative ways of life from that pursued 
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by their parents. Indeed, he commends the idea of teaching children via a series of 
engaged guest speakers who are each adherents of different faiths. For him, 
though, this education is inextricably bound up with a desire to further children’s 
autonomy. His account thus views pluralism as a series of possible ways of life, a 
view which is deeply problematic. Instead, I have justified the scrutiny of views 
through the need for children to come to views which are coherent and plausible. 
The imperative is to be fair to children, not to raise reasonable citizens or to 
produce autonomous individuals. 
As well as providing new arguments which contribute to the existing debate over 
how to justify education policies in a liberal regime, the thesis is also relevant to 
broader debates about political liberalism and pluralism more generally. 
Specifically, I have argued that political liberals cannot ignore children, or merely 
treat children as future citizens. Children are people now, and there is no plausible 
way to exclude them from citizenship which does not undermine the core 
purposes of political liberalism. I showed this through thinking about the threshold 
view. I argued that no possible set of capacities could differentiate children from 
adults. This conclusion formed a building block of the overall argument, but is also 
important in its own right and relevant to theorists who do not accept the political 
liberal principle of legitimacy. Any liberal theory which begins from a premise of 
equal treatment of citizens must also have a view about what makes an individual 
a citizen. While it may seem natural to want to exclude children, on account of 
their diminished faculties, in fact this tactic will always be unstable. Whatever 
grounds we give for excluding children will either be based on some notion of 
capacities, a route which will imply excluding some adults, or will be based simply 
on age, which is a reason that appears perniciously similar to discriminating 
against people simply because they are female or a member of an ethnic minority. 
By contrast, the whole lives account I developed is able to treat children 
differently for the right reasons, and is thus a valuable addition to a variety of 
theorists beyond those who adhere to political liberal principles.    
In the political context, I argued that the requirement to treat children as citizens 
implied that they must be considered when we decide whether a given set of 
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institutions or policies is legitimate.  The first important conclusion that follows 
from this is that political liberalism must demand more than a purely civic 
education. By definition, a purely civic education focuses on the interests of 
society rather than the interests the child has in education. While these societal 
interests are undoubtedly important, a purely civic education thus abrogates our 
responsibilities to our children. 
More broadly, considering the case of education and our responsibilities to 
children rendered problematic the aim of remaining freestanding from debates 
over questions of the good and human flourishing. If we consider only adults, it 
seems relatively plausible for the state simply to allow citizens to act in accordance 
with their own views, which may or may not be in their best interests. The role of 
the state is thus as an arbiter between competing claims. In this case, it does not 
seem overly problematic that some comprehensive doctrines are bizarre or may 
not be conducive to the flourishing of individuals who pursue it. We allow 
individuals to pursue whatever way of life they see fit, even in cases where we 
think there are good reasons to doubt its worth. It was for this reason, amongst 
others, that I argued that political liberals were bound to class views as reasonable 
based on political, rather than metaphysical, considerations.  
By contrast, in the case of education it seems difficult for the state to play only this 
role as neutral arbiter. The education system is an important aspect of the 
environment in which children’s views come to be held.  As such, through the 
education system, the state stands between parents and communities who may 
want to pass on their views. The fact that some comprehensive doctrines are 
bizarre or undermining of the child’s future well-being is much more problematic 
in this case, since they will be passed on to children who can legitimately object. 
The case of education has thus served as a vehicle to show that political liberals 
cannot simply be concerned with how to arbitrate legitimately between the claims 
of individuals who hold different doctrines, but must be concerned with the 
effects holding different views will have on the believers themselves. This 
constitutes a significant change in the political liberal view. However, I have also 
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argued it does not have to imply abandoning what made the project attractive in 
the first place. By considering the value of liberalism to many different ways of life, 
we can promote a genuinely liberal way of thinking which is compatible with a 
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